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1. Motivation 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to systematically investigate the relationship 
between horizontal inequalities, or socioeconomic inequalities between culturally defined 
groups, and political violence in developing countries. This ambition is my response to 
three major and so far unsolved puzzles that feature in the academic literature on 
political violence.  
First, while qualitative case studies conclude that socioeconomic inequality is an 
important cause of conflict, nearly all statistical studies reject this idea. Second, despite 
the fact that the relative share of ethnic conflict has been steadily rising since World War 
II, ethnic heterogeneity as such does not seem contribute to an increased risk of conflict. 
Third, it is a paradox that the regions of the world which are clearly the most violence-
prone (Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) remain largely under-researched in global 
investigations of armed conflict, due to low-quality or missing data. In concert, these 
three puzzles underscore a serious knowledge gap in the literature on political violence. 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to fill this gap. Below, I present the puzzles in 
more detail. I start out with the first and most concrete puzzle, which almost begged to 
be addressed by a PhD project. I then introduce the two more general, albeit often 
ignored, puzzles which are inherently related to the first one, and which in my view 
should inspire a shift of focus in general conflict research.    
                                              
* I thank Hanne Fjelde, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordås, Anne Julie Semb, 
Håvard Strand, and participants at the Comparative Democratic Politics seminar, University of Oslo, 30 
September 2010, for valuable comments on this introduction chapter. 
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1.1. Puzzle I: The quantitative–qualitative mismatch  
For almost half a century, scholars have tried to test the assumption that inequality
breeds political conflict, relying on statistical as well as qualitative methods. These efforts 
have not produced a conclusive answer to the question: ‘What is the relationship 
between economic inequality and political violence?’ (see e.g. Blattman & Miguel, 2010
Lichbach, 1989; Murshed, 2010). In line with earlier critics of relative deprivation theory 
(Skocpol, 1979; Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978), contemporary statistical studies 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) have largely dismissed the role of 
inequality and other grievances alike, focusing instead on opportunities for violent 
mobilization and state capacity. 
In contrast to this statistical rejection of the inequality–conflict link, a case-based 
literature has emerged, spearheaded by the Oxford-based development economist 
Frances Stewart. She focuses on the role of ‘horizontal inequalities’ (HIs), or systematic 
economic and political inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional groups, in 
affecting conflict likelihood and conflict dynamics (see e.g. Stewart, 2002; Stewart, 2008). 
The concept of horizontal inequality differs from the ‘normal’ definition of inequality, 
often referred to as ‘vertical inequality’ (VI), because the latter type lines individuals up 
vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals rather than groups. 
Furthermore, HIs are conceived of as inherently multidimensional, encompassing 
economic, social and political dimensions, unlike previous accounts and measures of 
inequality that seem to concentrate exclusively on economic inequality (usually 
operationalized as income inequality or inequality in land distribution). In brief, the 
horizontal inequality argument states that inequalities coinciding with cultural cleavages 
may enhance group grievances which in turn may facilitate mobilization for conflict. 
Based on material from several case studies, Stewart (2002; 2008) and her 
collaborators have concluded that horizontal inequalities have indeed provoked violence, 
ranging from a high level of criminality in Brazil to civil war in Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Sri Lanka. The lessons derived from such cases provide deep insight into specific 
cases. However, a restricted number of cases does not yield an ideal basis for 
generalizations about the relationship between horizontal inequalities and violent 
conflict; especially when dimensions of horizontal inequalities (and political violence) are 
2
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not systematically measured across countries. In order to evaluate the generalizability of 
the horizontal inequality–political conflict nexus, a systematic quantitative research 
design is needed. This is where this project enters. 
If the statistical studies are right, the contradictory evidence from some case 
studies should be viewed as anecdotal and cannot be generalized further. On the other 
hand, if the findings from case studies do actually reflect a more universal relationship, 
then the majority of the statistical inequality–conflict studies must have missed the target 
with their exclusive focus on inequality between individuals rather than groups. Drawing 
on the insights from the case-based literature, I aim to test whether horizontal 
inequalities affect political violence when tested across many cases.  
1.2. Puzzle II: The ‘ethnic paradox’ 
The second conundrum in the conflict literature that spurred my curiosity and interest in 
the topic of horizontal inequalities is the unclear relationship between ethnicity and 
political violence. Globally, the total number of armed conflicts has decreased since the 
Cold War, but the share of ethnic conflict (i.e. conflicts fought between ethnically 
distinguished belligerents over some ethno-nationalist aim)1 in the international system 
has been continuously rising since World War II. During the Cold War, many conflicts 
were portrayed as disputes about class or ideology, following the East–West division, 
with each side supported by the major powers along ideological lines. Since the end of 
the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, ideological differences have diminished, and 
the identity basis of conflicts has become much more explicit. Data on conflict confirm 
this trend revealing a significant increase in the proportion of all conflicts characterized 
as ethnic, as shown in Figure 1.  
                                              
1 More specifically, I adapt Cederman, Min & Wimmer’s (2008: 1–2) definition of ethnic conflict 
as conflicts in which armed organizations both explicitly pursue ethnonationalist aims and interests (such 
as selfdetermination, the ethnic balance of power in government, and ethnic and racial discrimination), 
and recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations.  
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Figure 1. Ethnic Conflict as a Proportion of all Armed Conflicts, 1946–2005 
 
The graph is generated based on data from Cederman, Min & Wimmer’s (2008), ‘Ethnic Armed Conflict 
Dataset’ available at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11797, and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. 
Ethnic identity is indeed a factor which has received wide attention in the civil 
conflict literature, and conflicts are often expected to occur between groups with 
different ethnic identities. Yet, the results regarding different forms of ethnicity and 
conflict are at best mixed (see e.g. Ellingsen 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Østby, 2008a 
[Chapter 2]; Reynal-Querol 2002). It seems evident that cultural/ethnic differences are 
not a sufficient cause of conflict. On the contrary, most multiethnic societies are 
relatively peaceful. In fact, Fearon & Laitin (1996) estimated that in the period from 
1960 to 1979, of all the possible conflict scenarios between neighboring ethnic groups in 
Africa, only 0.01% actually turned into violent conflict. This leaves us with what I refer 
to here as the ‘ethnic paradox’: the relative share of ethnic conflicts is rising, but 
according to statistical tests, ethnic diversity as such does not cause conflict, nor does it 
40
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influence war duration (Fearon, 2004).2 In other words, the finding that many conflicts 
are fought partially along ethnic lines is not sufficient to make the case that ethnic-based 
grievances are driving the fighting. The critical question, then, becomes: Why do certain 
multiethnic countries experience civil conflict, while others do not? To answer this 
question one needs to go beyond the sheer cultural differences between ethnic groups 
and explore what contextual factors may contribute to an increased risk of conflict 
across ethnic lines. Indeed, Woodward (1995) holds that so-called ethnic conflicts are in 
fact driven by underlying economic inequalities, which in turn politicize ethnic identities. 
This line of reasoning is captured by the horizontal inequality argument. Hence, the 
second motivation for my PhD project is to investigate the role of one potential key to 
ethnic conflicts: horizontal inequalities. 
1.3. Puzzle III: The key and the lamppost 
The third paradox which has motivated this project pertains to the geographical scope 
and quality of the data we use in order to investigate theoretical claims about the causes 
of conflict. This problem is of a more general nature and is more or less present in 
almost all general investigations of political violence. 
When it comes to the variable of interest – political violence, or conflict (‘the 
right hand side of the equation’), the status of the data is actually not so bad. The main 
source of conflict data used in this thesis, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002)3 provides systematic yearly data on the outbreak and incidence of 
violent conflict for all countries in the global system since World War II. According to 
Human Security Report, this dataset is indeed ‘the most comprehensive yet created on 
political violence around the world’ (Human Security Centre, 2005).  
The graph in Figure 2 shows the yearly incidence of armed conflict (including 
both internal and inter-state conflict), broken down by world region. The figure yields 
                                              
2 However, Freaon (2004) finds that civil wars which involve land or natural resource conflicts 
between state supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group and the ethnically distinct ‘sons of the 
soil’ who inhabit the region in question tend to last significantly longer. Such conflicts would be classified 
as ethnic conflict according to Cederman, Min & Wimmer’s (2008) definition. 
3 See http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. 
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two immediate observations: First, throughout the entire period since 1946, Africa and 
Asia have seen much more conflict than the other world regions. Second, whereas the 
total amount of conflict has gone down since the Cold War, this has not been the case 
for Africa and (South) Asia, which are still plagued by several armed conflicts,4 including 
the bulk of the so-called ethnic conflicts. Civil conflicts occur disproportionately in poor 
countries, and retard economic development in entire regions. For this reason, civil 
conflict is increasingly seen as a development problem (Collier et al., 2003; Collier & 
Sambanis, 2005: xiii). 
Figure 2. Conflicts by Region 
 
The graph is generated based on data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. Figures for year 2009 are added 
from Harbom & Wallensteen (2010). 
A clear implication of the graph in Figure 2 is that we should put more energy 
and resources in trying to understand why conflicts erupt, especially with an eye to the 
most conflict-ridden parts of the world. Ironically, though, most of the alleged ‘global’ 
statistical studies on civil conflict tend to suffer from poor data on the left hand side of 
                                              
4 Of the 36 conflicts which were ongoing in 2009, 1 was taking place in Europe; 5 in the Middle 
East; 15 in Asia; 12 in Africa; and 3 in the Americas (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2010: 506–507). 
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the equation, often as a result of missing or extremely low-quality data for several 
developing countries. This is particularly the case with regard to economic indicators, as 
I will explore further in Section 4. Indices of income inequality data are measured with 
particularly high levels of error (Cramer, 2001). Add to this that for many countries we 
hardly have any income or inequality data at all, which implies that these countries are 
literally thrown out of the analyses. 
When studying conflict, a biased sample of cases may disturb the effect of the 
independent variable. Humphreys (2003: 3) notes that if we for instance are less likely to 
have income inequality data for countries where there are civil wars, this could bias the 
estimated effect of inequality downwards, which will make us believe that the 
relationship is weaker than it actually is. This problem is aptly captured by the parable of 
the key and the lamppost, which describes a man searching for a lost key underneath a 
lamppost. When questioned as to exactly where the key was lost, he indicated that it was 
lost elsewhere but that he was searching under the lamppost because the light was better 
there. The key to the inequality–conflict nexus is not likely to be found with data for the 
overall relatively peaceful, developed countries of the Western world. And even though 
there have been some conflicts in this part of the world, it is not given that we should be 
significantly better suited to understand the conflict dynamics in Sub-Saharan African 
countries like Chad and Sudan by studying the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Spain or 
the former Yugoslav republics. Despite the ‘better light’ afforded by focusing on this 
area, the proper method is to look carefully for the inequality–conflict nexus where it is 
more likely to be found: in regions of the world which still suffer from a great amount of 
conflict and deteriorating economic conditions.  
1.4. Research questions 
Motivated by the three puzzles described above, this doctoral project is an attempt to 
rectify the notable lack of systematic studies of the horizontal inequality–political 
violence nexus, with a strong priority for collecting comparable and high-quality HI data 
for developing countries. Through six independent but related articles I – and my 
various co-authors – attempt to answer whether various forms of horizontal inequalities 
increase the risk of civil conflict as well as other forms of political violence. The 
dissertation has a clear quantitative orientation, as all the articles include empirical 
7
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investigations that employ statistical models to evaluate various aspects of the impact of 
horizontal inequalities on political violence. The project has been guided by four broad 
research questions, which together form the basis for the formulation of specific 
hypotheses that are tested in the subsequent chapters: 
1. Are societies that experience severe horizontal inequality more prone to internal 
armed conflict? 
2. Are there any contextual or intervening factors that influence the relationship 
between horizontal inequality and internal armed conflict?  
3. Are horizontal inequalities relevant across different forms of political violence? 
4. Does the effect of horizontal inequalities vary at the sub-national level? 
The rationale behind formulating these research questions is developed in the 
subsequent sections, and in Section 5 I elaborate on how the four research questions are 
addressed in the various chapters. 
1.5. Defining concepts 
As all the chapters of the dissertation include empirical investigations that employ 
statistical models and numerical data to evaluate various aspects of the relationship 
between horizontal inequalities and political violence, it is timely to clarify what I mean 
by these two concepts before proceeding further. 
1.5.1. Horizontal inequalities 
The concept of ‘horizontal inequalities’ (HIs) and its theorized relationship with conflict 
was first developed by Frances Stewart and her collaborators (e.g. Stewart, 2000). 
Stewart (2008: 3) defines HIs as ‘inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions 
or cultural status between culturally defined groups’. In other words, HIs are present 
when e.g. ethnic or religious cleavages coincide with systematic socioeconomic divisions 
in society. There are two particularly important aspects pertaining to the concept of HIs. 
First, current thinking about inequality tends to place the individual firmly at the center 
of concern, and measures of inequality typically relate to the ranking of individuals (or 
households) vertically within a country, or sometimes the globe. As mentioned above, in 
the development literature such inter-individual inequality is referred to as vertical 
8
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inequality. Stewart (2002a: 2) argues that this definition of inequality neglects a vital 
dimension of human well-being and of social stability, namely the group dimension. Sen 
(1992: 117) agrees that general analyses of inequality must, in many cases, proceed in 
terms of groups – rather than specific individuals – and that one should focus on inter-
group variations. Possible group-identifiers include e.g. ethnicity, religion, regions, gender, 
age cohorts, and migrant status. The relevant group definition varies across different 
arenas and societies. 
Measures of vertical inequality look at differences between all individuals in a 
society, whereas measures of horizontal inequality look instead at differences in income 
between groups or e.g. subnational regions. Although there is often some correlation 
between the two measures, they need not be related to each other. In practice, a country 
can have large income inequalities between groups (HIs), despite the fact that the overall 
(vertical) income inequality is rather low (as is the case in Rwanda), and vice versa; a 
country can have a high vertical income inequality score, even though the structural 
differences between groups might be low (e.g. Brazil). Besides, a country can have both 
strong vertical and horizontal inequalities at the same time (e.g. South Africa), or it can 
score low on both (e.g. Switzerland). Figure 3 illustrates these four possible scenarios (i.e. 
combinations of VI and HI) in a society consisting of two equally sized groups: people 
from the South (dark grey) and people from the North (light grey).  
  
9
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Figure 3. Four Stylized Combinations of Horizontal and Vertical Inequalities 
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The graphs in scenarios A–D are stacked, so that the uppermost line indicates the overall income 
distribution. Thanks to Håvard Strand for generating these graphs. 
The second essential thing to note about HIs is that they are multidimensional – 
with political, economic and social elements (as indeed are VIs, but they are rarely 
measured in a multidimensional way5). Despite that fact that VIs are usually measured 
only in terms of income (or land) distribution, the esteem of a group, which impacts on 
individual well-being, arises from the relative position of the group in a large number of 
areas, not just in incomes. Stewart (2008: 13) roughly categorizes HIs into four areas: 
political participation; economic aspects; social aspects; and cultural status. HIs in 
                                              
5 For an exception to this rule, see Hicks (1997).
Rich Poor Rich Poor 
Rich Poor Rich Poor 
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political participation can occur e.g. at the level of the cabinet, the parliament, the 
bureaucracy, or the army. Economic HIs encompass access to ownership of assets (e.g. 
financial, land, livestock), employment and income. Social HIs may involve unequal 
access to health services and education. Finally HIs in cultural status may pertain to the 
extent to which a society recognizes (or fails to recognize) a group’s cultural practices in 
matters of e.g. language, dress, and holidays. In this dissertation I explore HIs between 
various group indicators, including ethnicity, religion, region, locality, and migrant status. 
With regard to dimensions, I mainly focus on economic and social aspects of HIs, but I 
also include some level of political HIs in Chapter 3. 
1.5.2. Political violence 
The second central concept in this dissertation is (domestic) political violence (PV). The 
key question asked is under what circumstances political organizations use violence to 
achieve their political goals. This broad concept encompasses different forms of 
collective, politically motivated violence, including demonstrations, riots, terrorism, 
communal conflict, and civil war. 
The collective aspect of political violence is central. While history often 
recognizes the importance of individuals, politics is a collective phenomenon. This 
becomes particularly important when studying group-level inequality. The level of 
organization can differ considerably, from small and tight terrorist organizations to large 
but somewhat ad hoc public demonstration organizers. While they differ, some 
organizations use violent means to reach political ends, and this is what distinguishes 
political violence from other forms of political protest. 
Furthermore, distinguishing political violence from crime, which is often 
organized but lacks the political aspect, can be difficult. What is a political motivation? 
The US ‘War against drugs’ is fought against a number of criminal gangs, of which some 
are recognized as rebel organizations and others are not. This difference can be difficult 
to define, but in the end, the most credible piece of information is probably the 
statements of the groups. Do they make political statements? Do they justify their 
violent means with political ends?  
In my various articles I look at political violence between various actors, both 
state- and non-state ones. A state is by definition regarded as a formally organized group. 
11
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For non-state actors the level of organization can vary from formally organized groups 
to various types of informally organized groups (see Harbom & Pettersson, 2010). The 
former typically refers to e.g. highly organized rebel groups with an announced name. 
Informally organized non-state actors can range from groups composed of supporters 
and affiliates to political parties (often not permanently organized for combat, but who 
at times use their organizational structure for such purpose) to groups that simply share 
a common identification such a common ethnic, clan, tribal, or religious affiliation. The 
latter level of organization is often associated with what is referred to as ‘communal 
violence’. Finally, there can be episodes of political violence which may lack an 
organizational structure altogether, such as riots or strikes. In this dissertation I assess 
whether horizontal inequalities are relevant across various forms of political violence, as 
spelled out in Research Question 3 above.  
Most of the attention in this dissertation is devoted to one particular form of PV, 
namely civil war. The most apparent variations within the quantitative tradition relate to 
fatality thresholds and whether or not civilian casualties should be counted (Buhaug, 
2006). The analyses presented in Chapters 2–5 are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Database, which includes all armed conflicts between a government and an 
organized opposition group with a clearly stated incompatibility, or aim (governmental 
change or territorial secession) that generated at least 25 battle-related deaths (civilians 
not included) per calendar year (see Gleditsch et al., 2002). Less than half of these 
conflicts reach the stricter 1,000 fatalities threshold, which is required for them to be 
classified as ‘war’. Yet, I use the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ interchangeably in this 
dissertation unless specified otherwise. For more comprehensive discussions of the 
conceptual issues of civil war, see Sambanis (2004a) and Strand (2006).  
However, the HI–conflict argument is not restricted to cases where the state is a 
participant in the violence. On the contrary, one should expect lower organizational 
barrier for non-state violence than for mobilizing and sustaining and armed challenge 
against the state.6 In Chapter 6 (Østby, Urdal, Tadjoeddin, Murshed & Strand, 2011), we 
distinguish between two different forms of political violence in Indonesia: ‘routine’ and 
‘episodic’. Routine violence happens on an ‘everyday’ basis, and is centered around 
                                              
6 See Fjelde & Østby (2010) for more discussion on how HIs relate to non-state violence. 
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group-based vigilante violence/popular justice and intergroup/neighborhood brawls. 
Episodic violence refers to ethno-communal and separatist violence, the latter which 
partly overlaps with UCDP/PRIO’s broader definition of civil war. While routine 
violence is more frequent and spatially widespread compared to episodic violence, the 
latter can lead to greater fatalities when and where it occurs (see Tadjoeddin, 2002; 
Varshney, Tadjoeddin & Panggabean, 2008). Less attention is devoted to routine 
violence in the conflict literature, which tends to be dominated by accounts of civil war.  
Since civil wars often take place in rural areas (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003), this also raises the question on whether inequality has similar effects on 
urban violence. Finally, in Chapter 7 I shift the focus to cities and address the 
determinants of various events of ‘urban social disturbance’.7 I adopt Urdal’s (2008) 
definition of ‘social disturbance’, which refers to a broad range of non-violent and 
violent political activity ranging from peaceful demonstrations and strikes to organized 
warfare or acts of terrorism. 
1.6. Structure  
This introduction proceeds as follows: In Section 2 I set the stage by reviewing the 
extensive literature on (vertical) inequality and conflict. In Section 3 I narrow the scope 
and present a theoretical framework that links horizontal inequalities with political 
violence through various mechanisms relating to both motivation and opportunities. 
Section 4 outlines the analytical approach underlying this doctoral project, with an 
emphasis on how to generate measures of horizontal inequalities based on survey data. 
In Section 5 I provide an overview of the various chapters and outline their individual 
and joint contributions and findings, situating my own research within the larger debate 
on inequality and political violence. I conclude by outlining some lessons from the 
current research and providing some directions for future research. 
2. Inequality and Civil Conflict: A Review 
Ideas about human frustration and responses to grievances are inescapably part of the 
rationale for believing that there is a relationship between inequalities and political 
                                              
7 For a brief introduction to urban violence, see Buhaug, Urdal & Østby (forthcoming). 
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violence. Such ideas are not of recent origin. Explanations of aggression and relative 
deprivation have deep roots in the history of thought. At least since Aristotle (e.g. 350 
B.C./1984), political theorists have believed that political discontent and its 
consequences – protest, instability, and violence – depend not only on the absolute level 
of economic wealth, but also its distribution, i.e. inequality between the rich and poor. A 
remarkably diverse literature, both ancient and modern, theoretical as well as empirical, 
has coalesced on the proposition that political violence is a function of economic 
inequality. 
In this section I review the most central theoretical arguments and empirical 
studies of vertical inequality and conflict. As we will see, the proposed relationship 
between inequality and conflict has a very mixed record in the empirical literature (see 
e.g. Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Lichbach, 1989; Murshed, 2010). I discuss some of the 
problems associated with this extensive literature, and suggest how a reconceptualization 
of inequality may be a solution to the empirical confusion in the field.  
2.1. Theoretical arguments and empirical findings 
Different theoretical approaches to inequality and conflict include Marxist theory of class 
struggle and revolution (Marx 1887/1967)8, relative deprivation theory (e.g. Davies, 
1962; Feierabend & Feierabend 1966; Gurr, 1970) and theories of ethnic conflict and 
structural inequality (e.g. Galtung, 1964; Gurr, 1993, 2000; Hechter, 1975; Horowitz, 
1985). What these theories have in common is the interpretation of conflict as a result of 
widely felt grievances among the relatively disadvantaged in society.  
Marxist theory emphasizes the violence potential of economic inequality, as the 
industrial working class is expected to rebel because they have ‘nothing to loose but their 
chains’. Exploitation is the fundamental source of class struggle according to Marx’s 
theory (see e.g. Boswell & Dixon, 1993).  
As Marx had articulated in the 19th century the discontent arising from political 
oppression and economic exploitation, psychologist Sigmund Freud provided a theory 
                                              
8 Despite the importance of Marx’s theory of class struggle and revolution, surprisingly little 
attention has been devoted to class exploitation in cross-national studies of violent political conflict. 
Exceptions include Boswell & Dixon (1993) and Shock (1996). 
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expanding such ideas in the direction of frustration and alienation. Freud (1920/1950) 
regarded the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain as the basic goal for individuals. 
Frustration was expected to occur whenever pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding behavior 
was blocked. He believed that the natural reaction to this state of affairs would be 
aggression, normally directed toward those persons or objects that were perceived as the 
source of the frustration.  
Inspired by Freud, the most influential formulation of frustration–aggression 
theory was proposed by Dollard and his colleagues at Yale in 1939 with the book 
Frustration and Aggression. Their theory is quite simple. The authors’ basic assumption is 
that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dollard et al., 1939/1964: 1). 
More specifically, the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always 
presupposes frustration and, on the contrary, that frustration always leads to some form 
of aggression. Aggression is defined as ‘an act whose goal-response is injury to an 
organism’ 
Later, Davies (1962) applied the frustration–aggression hypothesis to revolutions 
and developed the first concrete drafts for the theory of relative deprivation. Combining 
the two perspectives of de Tocqueville and Marx, Davies predicted revolutions to occur 
when a population is exposed to a ‘de Tocqueville-effect’ (a socio-economic 
improvement) followed by a ‘Marx-effect’ (a deterioration of the situation). Hence, 
according to Davies, relative deprivation results when expected need satisfaction 
increases linearly over time, whereas the actual need satisfaction levels off after some 
time. This leads to a growing gap between the expected and the actual, which causes 
frustration and mobilizes people to engage in conflict, commonly referred to as the 
inverse J-curve of need satisfaction and revolution (Davies, 1962: 6). 
Following in the wake of Davies, Gurr (1969, 1970) developed relative 
deprivation theory further. For Gurr (1970) the magnitude of relative deprivation is the 
extent of the difference between a person’s desired and actual situation. More 
specifically, Gurr (1970: 13) defined relative deprivation as the perceived discrepancy 
between people’s ‘value expectations’ (the goods to which people believe they are 
entitled) and their ‘value capabilities’ (the goods and conditions they think they are 
capable of obtaining), which he saw as a fundamental and necessary precondition for 
civil conflict (Gurr, 1969: 596) 
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Most studies of inequality and conflict relate somehow to the relative deprivation 
theory. However, classical variants of relative deprivation theory do not explicitly focus 
on interpersonal or inter-group wealth comparisons (Gurr & Duvall, 1973; Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988; Stewart, 2009), but rather concentrate on what Boswell & Dixon (1990) 
refer to as ‘diachronic’ relative deprivation, which occurs when the standard of living 
decays over time. More relevant for empirical studies of civil conflict is ‘synchronic 
relative deprivation’, or simply, inequality. This variant of relative deprivation theory 
argues that while absolute poverty may lead to apathy and inactivity, comparisons with 
those in the same society who do better may inspire radical action and even violence.  
Early on, the theory of relative deprivation attracted criticism from advocates of 
what has come to be called the ‘resource mobilization’– or ‘mobilization opportunity’ 
approach to the explanation of collective violence and protest (e.g. Snyder & Tilly, 1972; 
Tilly, 1978). They reject grievance explanations hypotheses for the reason that inequality 
and discontent are more or less always present in practically all societies (see also 
Skocpol, 1979). Hence, they believe that the most direct and influential explanatory 
factors are not perceived grievances, but rather financial and political opportunities for 
mobilizing a rebel organization. Furthermore, a series of statistical studies challenged the 
results pertaining to income inequality, which was usually seen as the main indicator of 
relative deprivation (Weede, 1981). In theory there are five possible relationships 
between economic inequality and political conflict: positive, negative, convex (inverted 
U-shaped), concave (U-shaped), or null. The literature includes examples of all.9  
The pioneering cross-national research on the inequality–violence relationship 
was Russett’s (1964), who documented moderate correlations between inequality in land 
tenure systems and political instability in 47 countries. A subsequent study by Parvin 
(1973) came to the opposite conclusion. Working with a sample of 26 predominantly 
Western nations, he found that inequality proved to be only marginally significant and 
even inversely related to political unrest. Nagel (1974) tried to combine the two 
                                              
9 Lichbach (1989: 436−439) identified seventeen studies which posit that the inequality–conflict 
nexus is positive. He found only a handful of scholars who anticipate that the relationship will be 
negative. As regards curvilinear relationships, Lichbach identified six studies, four of which suggest that 
it is convex and two which suggest that it is concave. Finally, several of the studies failed to find a 
significant inequality–conflict nexus at all. 
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assumptions and resolve the contradiction. The discontent triggered by inequality, Nagel 
believed, consisted of the tendency of individuals to compare wealth (a tendency he 
assumed was inversely related to the amount of objective inequality), and the extent of the 
grievance resulting from such comparisons (a direct function of inequality). Combining 
these two factors multiplicatively, Nagel suggested that the inequality-violence 
relationship resembled an inverse U-curve, with political violence most likely at 
intermediate levels of inequality. He found some support for this assumption in a study 
of Vietnamese provinces, but not with a cross-national sample.10  
Sigelman & Simpson (1977) were the first to have access to personal income data. 
They assumed that data on income inequality would have greater violence potential than 
land inequality because in many societies – particularly those at higher development 
levels – life chances are not so closely connected to land ownership. They found some 
support for a linear relationship between the Gini index11 for personal income inequality 
and internal war, but concluded that ‘the overall level of societal well-being is a more 
critical determinant of political violence than is income inequality.’ (Sigelman & 
Simpson, 1977: 124) The latter was supported in a subsequent study by Weede (1981), 
who found a strong impact of average income, but no effect of inequality on collective 
violence. 
Integrating relative deprivation theory with the resource mobilization approach, 
Muller & Seligson’s (1987) postulated that whereas a high level of income inequality 
nationwide would significantly raise the probability that at least some dissident groups 
would be able to organize for violent collective action, a high level of agrarian inequality 
                                              
10 Davis (1948) offered another curvilinear interpretation of the inequality-violence relationship, 
diametrically opposed to that of Nagel. A narrow concentration of incomes, Davis believed, would spur 
mass resentment and lead to revolution, while a wide dispersion would endanger elite dissatisfaction and 
ultimately cause civil war. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been demonstrated empirically. 
11 The most common measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient – an index between 0 
and 1 (or 0 and 100) where 0 implies an egalitarian distribution (perfect equality) and 1 (or 100) indicates 
total concentration (perfect inequality). The Gini coefficient is defined graphically as the area of 
concentration between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality. The Lorenz curve is a graphical 
representation of the proportionality of a distribution (the cumulative percentage of the values) (Lorenz, 
1905). See Sen (1997) for an overview of inequality measures. 
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would not have the same effect on collective violence because it would be more difficult 
to mobilize people in the countryside. They found support for a positive relationship 
between income inequality and domestic conflict, whereas land inequality was found to 
be relevant only to the extent that it was associated with the nationwide distribution of 
income inequality.  
With a plethora of inconsistent findings in the literature, the inequality–conflict 
riddle remained unsolved by the late 1980s (see Lichbach, 1989). The end of the Cold 
War, which entailed a new wave of ethno-national conflict, inspired Gurr (1993; 2000) to 
extend his previous theory on relative deprivation. He now began to focus on ethnic 
minorities’ reactions to socioeconomic and political disadvantage as well as state-
imposed discrimination, and found that ethnically-based grievances resulting from such 
factors contributed to ethnic mobilization and hence increased risk of collective 
violence. Gurr’s results were in line with Horowitz’ (1985) seminal study of ethnic 
groups in conflict. 
Overall, relative deprivation theory remains the most prominent explanation that 
connects inequality, (as well as other grievance-related factors), with conflict. However, 
despite the persistence of the theme, grievance models have not fared well in the 
contemporary empirical literature on inequality and conflict (see Blattman & Miguel, 
2010). In the mid-1990s, World Bank researchers Deininger & Squire (1996) presented a 
new dataset on income inequality, which was later expanded into The World Income 
Inequality Database (UNU/WIDER & UNDP, 2000). These data represent a great 
improvement in terms of quality and spatio-temporal coverage compared to previous 
datasets, and soon became the standard source of inequality data. Subsequently, in 
virtually all cross-country regressions of civil conflict, economic inequality is not 
significant.12  
The contemporary conflict literature has been strongly marked by the pioneering 
works of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Latin (2003). Echoing earlier critics of 
relative deprivation they largely dismiss grievances as causes of conflict for the reason 
that inequality and discontent are more or less always present in practically all societies. 
                                              
12 The one exception I am aware of is Auvinen & Nafziger (1999). However, see Humphreys 
(2002: 3). 
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In their seminal article, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) discuss whether civil conflicts are 
caused by ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’. They present two alternative explanations for civil war: 
atypical grievances or atypical opportunities for forming a rebel organization. Collier & 
Hoeffler’s grievance model consists of factors such as high income inequality, a lack of 
political rights and ethnic and religious divisions in society. Among the ‘greed’ factors in 
their opportunity model, are access to finance, such as the scope for extortion of natural 
resources, and geographical factors such as the extent of mountains and forests. Relying 
on the Gini coefficient from the Deininger & Squire (1996) data, Collier & Hoeffler find 
no statistically significant effect for inequality and other proxies for grievances, such as 
ethnic heterogeneity, which makes them conclude that greed outperforms grievance’ 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). In more recent research, Collier has toned down the greed 
focus (e.g. Collier, 2007), but Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner (2009) maintain that conflict is 
caused by factors associated with what they refer to as ‘feasibility’, rather than 
grievances. In another influential study that focuses on political and institutional causes 
of civil war, Fearon & Laitin (2003) reach the same conclusion as Collier & Hoeffler (e.g. 
2004), i.e. that there appears to be no cross-national relationship between inequality and 
conflict onset. 
2.2. Problems with the inequality–conflict literature 
There are a number of potential reasons why the studies reviewed here come to so 
different conclusions with regard to the relationship between inequality and conflict. I 
have divided the critique of the literature into two parts. The first considers various 
methodological problems, and the second provides a more fundamental critique, relating 
to the conceptualization of inequality, and underscores the purpose of my dissertation 
project. 
2.2.1. Methodological objections 
It has been argued that the contradictory inequality–conflict results are due to variations 
among the studies in all aspects of research design (see e.g. Cramer, 2001, 2003; 
Lichbach, 1989; Zimmerman, 1983). Various critics have suggested that the inconsistent 
conclusions arise from a lack of essential control variables, from the different cases and 
19
G. Østby   
time frames in which the effects of conflict are examined, and not least from poor data 
and inadequate level of analysis. 
First, Zimmerman (1983) and Lichbach (1989) warn that those studies that find a 
positive relationship between inequality and conflict may be spurious because they failed 
to include control variables like the level of economic development and regime type. A 
related critique comes from Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch (2003: 257), who claim that 
‘scholars have focused on relative deprivation at the cost of ignoring more important 
explanatory factors.’ 
Second, the spatio-temporal domain covered by empirical inequality–conflict 
studies has varied greatly. Some of the recent cross-national studies have employed a 
global sample of states (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, 
Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003). Others have focused on a restricted spatial domain (e.g. 
Nagel 1974; Parvin, 1973). While there may be a number of good reasons for doing so, 
focusing on a limited number of states makes it harder to make generalizations due to 
potential lack of representativeness. Also, most of the studies reviewed are cross-
sectional studies, with only one year of observations for each variable. A cross-sectional 
study is not the best approach to analyzing domestic conflict, which may erupt at any 
given time during the observation period. This makes it problematic to study the 
relationship between inequality and conflict over time.  
One of the most serious objections to previous empirical studies concerns the 
poor data on income inequality and the high level of missing observations. Before the 
Deininger & Squire (1996) dataset, and the recent appearance of the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU/WIDER & UNDP, 2000), cross-national data on 
inequality were distressingly scarce and imprecise. Yet, with this progress, the problem of 
a very large amount of missing data is still present. Deiniger & Squire include inequality 
data from quite a limited number of countries and years.13  
Worse than the problem of poor and missing data itself, is the problem that arises 
when the pattern of missing data is non-random, or biased. Many countries do not have 
                                              
13 Deiniger & Squire (1996) use an objective and valid operationalization of income inequality, 
but, as noted by Székely & Hilgert (1999), the observations are not always comparable because they do 
not necessarily refer to the same notion of income. 
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any inequality data at all. Trying to locate income inequality for these countries, Strand & 
Gates (2002) put a request to the Scientific Study of International Processes (SSIP)14 
listserv for information, and got the following answer from Phil Schrodt (quoted in 
Strand & Gates, 2002: 5–6):  
Missing data is usually missing for a reason and this is a splendid example. Seems to me 
almost all of these cases fall into one of three cases: 
1. None of your business, infidel; 
2. None of your business, capitalist running dog CIA lackey; 
3. We’d be delighted to give you the information, but we haven’t had a decent 
meal in thirty years; 
4. All of the above (Somalia). 
The missing data problem relates to the ‘key and the lamppost’ puzzle introduced in 
Section 1. The point is that a situation in which we are less likely to have inequality data 
for conflict-ridden conflicts, this bias could imply that we infer that the effect of 
inequality on conflict is weaker than it actually is (see e.g. Gates, 2004). 
A final methodological caveat relates to the level of analysis. Civil wars often take 
place within limited areas within countries. Since features of wealth and income 
distributions tend to vary considerably within countries, the use of national level 
indicators of inequality to explain variations in civil conflict is likely to be inappropriate 
(see e.g. Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Buhaug et al., 2011). Based on a similar reasoning, 
Cramer (2001) describes the national-level Gini coefficient as a ‘superficial outward sign 
of inequality’. His point is illustrated by the examples of Indonesia and Rwanda, which 
are commonly regarded as two countries with low Gini coefficients. Cramer claims that 
to draw from the published data on inequality that either of these two countries is a low-
inequality country would be misleading, or even absurd:  
Indonesia has probably experienced rapid increase in income and wealth 
inequality in recent years, a fact that is directly observable to the eye in and 
around Jakarta, for example, with its extravagant shopping emporia coexisting 
with extreme poverty and, further afield, dire indigence in rural areas. Rwanda 
also is not quite the Cuba or Kerala of its Gini image’ (Cramer, 2001: 5–6). 
                                              
14 See SSIP homepage: http://www.isanet.org/ssip/ 
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In other words, there may be severe inequalities locally (micro-level) even though 
a country, on the whole, scores relatively low on the Gini index. Cramer holds that in the 
majority of civil conflicts the intensity of violence is conflict at ‘close quarters’, i.e. about 
visible and felt inequalities at the local level rather than the extremes of the Gini 
coefficient and the ratio between earnings of the richest and the poorest quintile of the 
population. This line of criticism relates to the more conceptual objections discussed 
below.  
2.2.2. Conceptual and theoretical objections 
Scholars suspect that inequality (whatever it is) is related to political instability (whatever 
that is), but they are not sure; nor are they sure what the relationship should look like if 
it is there. We have some conceptual work to do.  
(Linehan, 1980: 195) 
The standard (technical) critiques about lacking control variables; restricted samples; 
poor data; and inappropriate level of analysis may apply to most of the studies reviewed. 
However, I contend that there is a more fundamental problem that produces the 
conflicting results concerning the inequality–conflict relationship: One of the most 
important flaws of the quantitative studies of inequality and conflict may be conceptual. 
My first conceptual objection is that in the inequality–conflict literature, most attention 
has been focused on inequality between individuals. However, the topic of interest, 
violent conflict, is a group phenomenon, not situations of individuals randomly 
committing violence against each other. Group identity is critical to recruitment and 
maintaining allegiance to a military organization. Hence, we should focus the attention 
on the relevant form of inequality – that between groups.  
Such reasoning is supported by psychological experiments. For example, Brewer 
(1991: 478–479) concludes that individuals derive value from the group to which they 
belong. The willingness of individuals to make any sacrifice for group action is predicted 
more by a sense of collective rather than individual relative deprivation. Improvement of 
the group’s condition, in other words, may be a more powerful motivation to participate 
in collective actions than improvement of the individual’s condition. I recognize that 
ethnic or religious groups are to some extent socially constructed, sometimes with fluid 
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membership. Nevertheless, the relative performance of identity groups is an important 
source of individual welfare, and can hence cause serious conflicts where structural 
economic or political differences coincide with cultural cleavages (see e.g. Stewart, 2002). 
Also, as demonstrated in Section 1, vertical and horizontal inequalities do not necessarily 
overlap.  
My second conceptual objection concurs with Sen (1992) and Stewart’s (2002) 
complaint that most studies of the relationship between inequality have exclusively 
focused at economic inequality (usually measured by income). I have consistently talked 
about horizontal inequalities in plural. This choice of words is not incidental. In order to 
fully explore the inequality–conflict nexus, one should study various dimensions of 
inequality in addition to the strictly economic dimension. Sen (1992) asks an essential 
question: ‘Equality of what?’ Given the fact that the human population is different in 
many respects, it is important to remember that inequality can be much more than just 
income inequality measured by e.g. the Gini index. Sen (1992; 2006) focuses on three 
different categories (or ‘spaces’) of equality: equality of income or other financial assets; 
equality of welfare and equal rights and liberties, and argues that the various categories of 
equality cannot be combined perfectly, since the differences in environmental factors 
and human capacities influence the final outcome. Stewart (2008) also stresses that 
horizontal inequalities are multidimensional – with political, economic, and social 
elements (as indeed are vertical inequalities, but they are rarely measured in a 
multidimensional way).15 
Finally, it has been argued that the general lack of theory and explanation is a fatal 
flaw of many statistical models of the inequality–conflict nexus (Lichbach, 1989). Many 
studies begin by assuming that there is such a relationship – often citing one of the 
‘classics’ à la Russett (1964) – and then jump straight to the empirical analysis, leaving 
unexplored what Elster (1983) refers to as the ‘black box’ in the causal chain. In other 
                                              
15 One study of the relationship between vertical inequality and conflict, however, stands out in 
this regard: de Soysa & Wagner (2003) test the effect of vertical schooling inequality rather than income 
inequality on conflict, using data from Castelló & Doménech (2002) on differences in educational 
attainment. The authors even argue that this vertical measure captures some of the logic of horizontal 
inequalities, due to the assumption that dominant ethnic groups control state resources and often use 
education policies to discriminate against minorities. 
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words, the reasoning behind the various propositions – how and why inequality breeds 
conflict, has typically been lacking. 
For the reasons presented above, we cannot conclude from the extant literature 
that inequality is unrelated to political violence. On the contrary, I argue that the 
rejection of the inequality–conflict nexus is at best premature. Indeed, it could be the 
case that vertical inequality in a homogenous population, despite the class differences it 
engenders, does not seriously increase the risk of conflict, but that could still leave a role 
for group inequality. Yet, most of the contributions reviewed here ignore how different 
dimensions of inequality are institutionalized and shaped by history and various social 
and cultural cleavages, and how such inequalities can be translated into collective 
violence. A more promising avenue to capture the inequality–conflict link has been taken 
by Stewart (e.g. 2000, 2002, 2008) and her collaborators, who focus on the role of 
horizontal inequalities, or ‘inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or 
cultural status between culturally defined groups’ (Stewart, 2009: 3). In the next section I 
outline the theoretical framework which has guided this project. My argument 
demonstrates how horizontal inequalities can spur violent group mobilization through 
both grievance-based and opportunity-based mechanisms.  
3. Theorizing Horizontal Inequalities and Political Violence 
Although the concept of horizontal inequalities is quite new, there are clear synergies 
between this and other approaches to understanding multidimensional inequalities and 
the dynamics of violent group mobilization in ethnically heterogeneous countries. For 
example, Barrow’s (1976) concept of ‘ethnic group inequality’, Horowitz’s (1985) ‘ranked 
ethnic groups’; and Tilly’s (1999) ‘categorical inequalities’ describe similar inter-group 
inequalities. Gurr’s (1993) concept of ‘relative deprivation’ as a cause of minority 
rebellion represents another related perspective. As noted in the last section, the general 
concept of relative deprivation is often conceived of as diachronic, or inter-temporal, 
often measured in terms of economic growth (or the lack thereof).  
Less commonly discussed, but more important for empirical studies of inter-
ethnic conflict is what Boswell & Dixon (1990: 542) refer to as synchronic relative 
deprivation, which is usually measured in terms of income distribution. Add to this that 
the literature has distinguished between individual vs. collective relative deprivation. 
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According to social identity theory individuals’ investment in their membership group 
and the salience of group boundaries increase the likelihood that relative deprivation will 
be experienced in its collective form (Walker & Smith, 2002). Yet, most studies of 
inequality and conflict operationalize relative deprivation at the individual level by 
various measures of vertical inequalities, such as the Gini coefficient. 
If we combine the distinctions diachronic/synchronic and individual/collective 
relative deprivation in a 2x2 matrix (see Table 1), alternative d) – collective synchronic 
relative deprivation – comes closest to the concept of horizontal inequalities. However, 
there is one important feature that distinguishes the HI approach from that of relative 
deprivation (see Stewart, 2008). Whereas relative deprivation theory by definition focuses 
on the motives of the disadvantaged in society, the HI thesis stresses that it is not only 
resentment among the deprived that may cause political instability – although this clearly 
seems to be the case in many disputes (e.g. the Hutus vs. Tutsis in Rwanda or race riots 
in industrialized countries). The relatively privileged can also attack the unprivileged (or 
the state) as a reaction to what they may perceive of as unfair redistribution, or out of 
fear that the relatively deprived may demand more resources and political power (e.g. the 
Biafra war in Nigeria, or the Basque conflict in Spain).16 
Table 1. Typology of Different Forms of Relative Deprivation17  
Aggregation level 
Time perspective 
Individual Collective 
Diachronic 
 
a) Intra-Individual 
 
b) Intra-Group 
Synchronic 
 
c)Inter-Individual  
 
d) Inter-Group  
3.1. Origins of horizontal inequalities 
There can be many causes and origins of systematic differences between different ethnic, 
religious groups, or regions. They relate to different factors such as ecological and 
climatological differences, the distribution of natural resource endowments, the 
                                              
16 In fact, Gurr’s (2000) minorities at risk also include advantaged minorities like the Sunni Arabs 
of Iraq and the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, but his focus is on relative deprivation, i.e. that these 
groups are vulnerable to challenges from disadvantaged groups. 
17 The labels ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ RD stem from Boswell & Dixon (1990: 542). 
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differential impacts of colonialism, as well as various economic policies (Brown & 
Langer, 2010: 30). Horizontal inequalities often have their origin in historical 
circumstances – often colonial policy which privileged some groups over others. 
Sometimes, however, horizontal inequalities are not caused by deliberate agency at all 
but simply become evident for example when traditional peoples on the periphery of 
modernizing societies are drawn into closer contact with the more powerful and 
technologically proficient groups (see Gurr, 2000). Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 3, 
HIs tend to reproduce over time, sometimes lasting for decades. An initial advantage 
often leads to long-term cumulative advantages, as resources and education allow the 
more privileged groups to secure further advantages (Stewart, 2009). For example, 
children growing up in poor communities usually have less access to good schooling and 
must travel further, in social and geographical terms, to raise their own children out of 
poverty. According to HI theory, the risk of violent group mobilization should be higher 
when people are convinced that their socioeconomic deprivation is caused by deliberate 
discrimination by the state. Conversely, if a country’s government introduces policies 
designed to reduce HIs, this may reduce the political salience of the prevailing HIs, even 
when the actual redistributional effect is rather limited (Brown & Langer, 2010: 31).  
3.2. The formation of identity groups 
For a group to mobilize, it first needs a common identity and unifying structure among 
its members (Tilly, 1978: 84). Gellner (1964: 149) states that there is a human need to 
‘belong, to identify and hence to exclude’. An intrinsic part of life is group membership 
– in fact it is what makes up the identity of individuals. Since groups are the central 
building blocks in thinking of horizontal inequalities it is important to understand how 
groups are formed. Although personal motivation also obviously plays a part in causing 
people to fight (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), I assume that in many conflicts people are 
primarily motivated and organized based on their group identity. In order to mobilize a 
group there must be some way that it is differentiated from the other groups. Depending 
on the context, most people have multiple affiliations and identities – some locally 
based, some family based, some age or class based, and some culturally and ethnically 
differentiated (see, e.g. Smith, 2001). Some identities are fluid, short-lived and 
insignificant (for example, being a member of a sports club or a students’ choir), whereas 
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others are more permanent and personally and socially more significant, such as gender, 
ethnicity, religion or regional belonging (Stewart, 2008). 
Psychologists and other social scientists of diverse orientations have developed a 
variety of theories regarding the development and functions of identity. In particular, 
much social psychological research has shed light on the ways in which individuals and 
groups’ efforts to establish and maintain secure identities can produce conflict between 
identity groups (Seul, 1999). It is common to distinguish between individual and group 
identity, though the two levels of analysis are integrally and reciprocally related to each 
other. Individual identity refers to the relatively stable elements of an individual’s sense 
of self (Seul, 1999). The contents consist of one’s values, motives, emotions, feelings, 
attitudes, thoughts, goals and aspirations on the one hand, and one’s group 
memberships, social influence and roles, on the other. A group is a self-defining 
collection of individuals. Like an individual, a group can be said to have an identity of its 
own (Seul, 1999: 556). The identity of a group is born and communicated by the group’s 
members, but it cannot be thought of as the sum of the members’ respective individual 
identities, nor is an individual’s identity merely a composite of the identities of the 
various groups to which one belongs. According to Kelman (1998: 16) a group’s identity 
consists of the members’ shared ‘conception of its enduring characteristics and basic 
values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of 
existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes and future 
prospects’. Like individual identity, group identity is fluid and dynamic, and levels of 
involvement and emotional commitment may differ widely among the group’s members. 
Incompatible interests may be the apparent cause of conflict among groups in 
many cases, but conflict, arguably, will not occur in the absence of some inter-group 
identity competition. Tajfel & Turner (1986: 23) hypothesize that when a group’s action 
for positive distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded or in any way actively prevented by an 
out-group, this will promote overt conflict and hostility between the groups. Accepting 
that groups are central, the critical question is why and how some groups are perceived 
as socially significant, and others not.  
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3.3. Theoretical perspectives on ethnic identity and conflict 
Ethnicity is a group identifier that is often assumed to influence behavior and well-being 
in a significant way, and hence form the basis of identity conflicts. Hence, before 
discussing the mechanisms that link horizontal inequalities to violent group mobilization, 
it is useful to address the epistemological question about the nature of ethnicity and how 
it relates to political violence. Theoretically, there are three broad approaches to the 
study of ethnicity and conflict (see e.g. Ferguson, 2003; Gurr, 1993; Lake & Rotchild, 
1998). In an influential argument, Young (1993) sorted accounts of ethnic identity under 
the labels ‘primordialism’, ‘instrumentalism’, and ‘constructivism’ (see also Ellingsen, 
2000). 
At one extreme, the so-called primordialist approach takes ethnicity as a fixed 
characteristic of individuals and communities, defined by one’s descent (e.g. Geertz, 
1963; Smith, 2001; Vanhanen, 1999).18 Primordialist analyses of conflict stress the 
uniqueness and overriding importance of ethnic identity. In this view ethnic affiliations 
are highly emotionally charged and, on some accounts, irrational. Although the 
primordialists recognize that ethnic warfare is not a constant state of affairs, 
primordialists see conflict as resulting from ethnic differences and, consequently, not in 
need of further explanation. In other words, conflict is understood as being ultimately 
rooted in ethnicity itself. For the primordialists ethnic conflict is something apart; what 
one learns about ethnic conflict is typically not relevant to other social, political or 
economic conflicts (Lake & Rotchild, 1998).  
The most common criticism of the primordialist approach is its assumption of 
fixed identities and its failure to account for variations in the level of conflict over time 
and place. The primordialist view does not explain why ethnic groups change over 
time.19 Nor does it explain why some multiethnic countries live in peace, while elsewhere 
violence erupts. As shown above, the great majority of ethnically oriented conflicts 
within nations have not led to violence (see also, Licklider, 1998). Yet another criticism 
                                              
18 In its extreme form, primordialism wanders into the zoological gardens of socio-biology. In 
1978 Pierre Van den Berghe suggested that ethnicity should be understood as an extended form of kin 
selection, best grasped as an elemental instinctual impulse (Van den Berghe, 1978).  
19 Cohen (1969), for example, describes how some rural people moving to towns in Nigeria 
became ‘detribalized’ whereas tribal identity became more important for other urbanized Nigerians. 
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has been articulated by Horowitz (1998), who notes that primordialists have not 
provided a satisfying explanation as to why ethnic affiliations are so emotive. 
The second approach to ethnic identity, instrumentalism, is founded in a political 
economy paradigm and rooted in the premise that social action rests on rational 
calculation. This approach originally arose as a challenge to modernization theory, which 
held that social and economic development would level out ethnic differences and 
replace them with class stratification. Rotchild (1981) claims that the ambivalent effects 
of modernization create opportunities for political and cultural entrepreneurs to mobilize 
ethnicity into an effective instrument of political leverage and economic interests. 
Instrumentalists thus (e.g. Bates, 1986; Rotchild, 1981) see ethnicity as being used by 
groups and their leaders in order to achieve political or economic goals. In this view, 
ethnicity has little independent standing outside the political process in which collective 
ends are sought. Ethnicity is primarily a set of symbolic ties that may be used for political 
and economic advantage – like political party affiliation. For instrumentalists, conflicts 
are largely stimulated by elites who mobilize ethnicity in pursuit of their own interests. 
Hence it seems to be the case that, for the instrumentalists, ethnicity is ‘there’ to be 
exploited at will. In contrast to the primordialist view, instrumentalists believe that 
politicized ethnicity is not inherently different from other forms of political association, 
and that the knowledge deduced from ethnic conflicts may also be applied to other kinds 
of conflicts.  
Critics of instrumentalism argue that ethnicity is not something that can be 
decided upon by individuals at will, like other political affiliations, but that it is rooted in 
the larger society. While people have some choice over their own identities, this is not 
unconstrained (Stewart, 2002). For example, in Kenya, a Kikuyu cannot decide that from 
tomorrow he will be a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group. Choice of identity is 
constrained both by characteristics of the group (its customs, symbols, norms etc.) and 
by other groups’ willingness to admit new members. Critics of instrumentalism focus on 
the inherently social nature of ethnic identity, and argue that ethnicity can only be 
understood within a relational framework (Lake & Rotchild, 1998). 
Finally, bridging the other two perspectives, constructivists emphasize the social 
origins and nature of ethnicity (e.g. Anderson, 1991; Gurr, 2000; Hobsbawn & Ranger, 
1983). Arguing that ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open, this approach 
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represents an emerging scholarly consensus. Distinguishing their position, the 
constructivists believes that while identities can be reshaped, they can only be altered at 
significant costs (Bates, 2004). The constructivists believe that ethnicity is not an 
individual attribute but a social phenomenon – a person’s culture is partly inherited, but 
also constructed and chosen, with many people having multiple identities. It is widely 
agreed that many tribal distinctions in Africa, for example, were invented by the colonial 
powers. An example is the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, largely 
invented by the colonial powers for administrative conveniences (Stewart, 2008). For the 
constructivists, thus, a person’s identity remains outside the control of that individual. In 
accordance with the instrumentalist view, constructivists do not see ethnicity as 
inherently conflictual, and believe that it is the social system that breeds conflict rather than 
individuals (Lake & Rotchild, 1998). In the constructivist view, accounts of ethnic 
conflict are generalizable, but only to other conflicts that are largely based on socially 
constructed groups and cleavages. From the perspective of horizontal inequalities, this 
provides a causal explanation of why HIs may lead to conflict, with the possibility of 
ethnic conflict being driven by structural inequalities in society. 
Although clearly important, ethnicity is not the only relevant group distinction 
with regard to horizontal inequalities and conflict (see Stewart, 2008). However, ethnicity 
often overlaps with other fundamental factors like language, religion, and territorial 
affiliation. Furthermore, ethnic cleavages in developing countries are often ambiguous, 
and whether perceived distinctions become considered as ‘ethnic’ may in part depend on 
past conflict and lack of integration (Barth 1969; Tronvoll, 2009). Ethnicity is a slippery 
concept and can be difficult to define in certain contexts. This is not the case with e.g. 
administrative boundaries, which are usually (but not always) unambiguously defined. 
The case-based literature shows how a number of various group affiliations have 
been the source of group differentiation and mobilization, and how group-identifiers 
may overlap with each other (see e.g. Stewart, 2008). In some cases, the main source of 
affiliation has been ethnicity (as in Rwanda & Sri Lanka). In other cases religion is the 
binding factor (e.g. Protestant/Catholics conflicts in Northern Ireland and 
Muslim/Hindu conflicts in India). Sometimes, the binding agent seems to be race (for 
example in Fiji), and sometimes, it is clan (for example, in Somalia), while in Central 
America, group identification and organization has developed along social class lines 
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(which tends to overlap with ethnicity).20 Finally, regional location is also a source of 
group differentiation, which often overlaps with ethnic or linguistic cleavages, as for 
example in Uganda (Minority Rights Group International, 1997) and Zambia (Posner, 
2004). In Østby, Nordås & Rød (2009 [Chapter 4]) we make the case why regions matter 
in a horizontal inequality framework. 
3.4.  How do HIs spur collective action? 
When and how does ethnic identity (or other group identities) lead to political violence? 
A constructivist answer to this question would be: when ethnicity has collective 
consequences for a group in its relations with other groups. More specifically, to the 
extent that ethnicity is a major determinant of a group’s security, status, material well-
being, or access to political power, it is likely to be a salient part of their identity. In line 
with such reasoning we need to go beyond the sheer cultural differences to understand 
the causes of conflict. The literature on political violence emphasizes two factors in 
addition to a shared identity that may lead to group mobilization: grievance (or frustration; 
resentment) and opportunity (see e.g. Ellingsen, 2000; Gurr, 1993; 2000). These concepts 
serve as the main guideline for my understanding on how horizontal inequalities 
influence collective action. I posit that all three factors operate interdependently and that 
they can be incorporated in a synthetic model of horizontal inequalities and collective 
mobilization.  
Stewart (2000) argues that in societies where economic, social and/or political 
inequalities coincide with ethnic cleavages, identity can be a mobilizing agent that can 
lead to political violence. Her theory of horizontal inequality and conflict hence 
combines elements from both social identity theory and theories of relative deprivation. 
Gurr (1993: 127) explicitly argues that ethnic identities and grievances mutually reinforce 
each other: ‘a group’s grievances and potential for political mobilization are both 
influenced by the strength of group identity. Accepting Gurr’s reasoning, horizontal 
                                              
20 A former colleague who recently came back from fieldwork in Bolivia where he had 
interviewed people about perceptions of ethnicity told me that one informant had categorized the main 
ethnic groups in Bolivia as follows: ‘Well, we have the Aymara, the Quechua, and the private sector...’. 
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inequalities may increase both the perception of a common identity and the level of 
group grievances.  
As mentioned above, conflict can be initiated by both relatively deprived and 
relatively privileged groups, although the literature tends to focus mostly on the former. 
According to Horowitz (1985) in stratified social systems, social comparison reflecting 
superiority or inferiority should be particularly likely to trigger conflict. Gurr (2000) 
found that ethnic groups are in fact often subject to economic discrimination to the 
extent that their members have been systematically limited in access to desirable 
economic goods and conditions. Whether such inequalities are due to overt 
discrimination or not, unequal access to economic resources by different groups can 
provoke collective grievances. In the words of Petersen (2002: 40) ‘resentment is the 
feeling of being politically dominated by a group that has no right to be in a superior 
position’. Conversely, groups that are relatively advantaged may also experience 
collective grievances due to their fear that the deprived groups may gain political power 
and demand more resource redistribution, or turn to armed aggression to redress their 
grievances. For example, inter-regional inequality is often associated with inter-regional 
transfers from richer to poorer regions. If richer regions view these transfers as too 
large, this increases grievances, and they may seek to secede or they can push poorer 
regions to exit by insisting on a lower transfer rate (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2004: 24). In 
a study of conflict in Indonesia, Tadjoeddin (2007: 23) refers to the demands of the 
richer regions for a degree of community welfare that corresponds to their relative high 
regional prosperity as ‘aspiration to inequality’. 
It is clear that collective grievances do not automatically lead to violent action. 
Without resources and organization, grievances as such can do little to challenge 
powerful defenders of the status quo (Tilly, 1978). Even Gurr (1970) admitted that affect 
and frustration are insufficient to create rebellion. In his rational-actor model of political 
violence, Tilly (1978) argued that only when resources, organization and opportunity 
become available, people will mobilize for collective action, including rebellion, if they 
calculate that it is in their interest to do so. For Tilly (1978: 7) opportunity concerns the 
relationship between a group and the world around it. It may come from a government 
weakness or an opposition organization’s calculation of its own strength. Gurr (1993: 
130), on the other hand, distinguishes between internal and external opportunities for a 
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group to mobilize. Opportunity factors internal to the group are the salience of group 
identity, networks among its members, and the extent of common grievances. 
Opportunity factors external to the group include the character of the state and its 
resources, and whether the group has transnational kindred.21 According to Gurr’s 
theory (2000: 95), the factors of identity and frustration are innate in a group’s internal 
opportunities to mobilize.22 Internal opportunities are seen as the elements from which 
skilful leaders and ethnic entrepreneurs build collective movements for political action. 
However, the timing of action and the choices of strategies of participation, protest, or 
rebellion, depends largely on political and economic opportunities external to the group, 
such as the repressiveness of the state (see also Østby & de Soysa, 2008). 
Whereas political scientists such as e.g. Gurr (2000) tend to focus mainly on the 
political opportunities external to the group (e.g. regime type), economists such as e.g. 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004), focus more on economic opportunities (e.g. in terms of the 
extortion of lootable natural resources), treating the objective of rebellion as financial 
gain. I argue that the level of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities may influence a rebel 
group’s calculation of its own strength and thus serve as an indicator of the internal 
opportunities for a group to mobilize. Soldiers must be paid, and the cost of recruiting is 
related to their income forgone by enlisting as rebels. By definition, richer groups are 
more capable of supporting a rebel group with economic contributions and other kinds 
of material resources. On the other hand, members of the relatively disadvantaged 
groups are more likely to enlist as rebel recruits due to lower opportunity costs, and 
because perceptions of injustice generate grievances that serve as a strong tool for 
recruitment. A final source of opportunity, or the ability to take coordinated action, is 
strong group cohesion, which in turn is often strengthened by commonly felt grievances. 
                                              
21 In a later work, Gurr (2000) uses a different terminology, distinguishing between capacities 
(similar to internal opportunities) and opportunities (similar to external opportunities) for group action.  
22 According to Gurr (2000: 65−95) the salience of group identity is partly attributed to previous 
collective disadvantages. Collective grievances and identities in their turn form the basis of a group’s 
capacity, or internal opportunities for mobilization. Gurr’s (2000: 74) admits that there is no single 
answer to this ‘chicken-and-egg problem’ concerning the root causes of ethnic conflict. 
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Figure 4 summarizes my argument, visualizing how various aspects associated with 
horizontal inequalities influence the risk of violent group mobilization.23  
Figure 4. Mechanisms Linking Horizontal Inequalities to Group Mobilization  
 
In short, Figure 4 shows that HIs imply both relative deprivation (a) and relative 
privilege (b). RD may lead directly to collective grievances (c), whereas relative privilege 
is assumed to lead to grievances via fears of potential or real redistribution (d, e). 
Grievances of both types are likely to constitute a strong motive for collective action (h). 
Furthermore, richer groups have more material resources (f) which implies better 
opportunities to establish and sustain a rebellion (g). But opportunity can also increase as 
a result of strong group cohesion (j) which in turn is reinforced by and reinforces 
collective grievances (i). Finally, violent group mobilization is assumed to result from a 
combination of opportunity (k) and motive (l). I have not been able to test each 
individual mechanism (arrow) in this dissertation, but together they form the theoretical 
basis from which I develop my hypotheses. 
                                              
23 For the sake of simplicity, I have kept the boxes in Figure 4 to a minimum, although one 
could have envisioned additional boxes and arrows. For example the figure only includes socioeconomic 
HIs, despite the fact that I have stressed the multidimensionality of HIs. However, the two types of HI 
are often likely to be interrelated and the main focus in this thesis is on economic HIs. See also Langer 
(2005), who argues that political HIs are of great importance to leaders, whereas socioeconomic HIs 
matter more for the masses. 
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3.5. Contextual factors  
Clearly, horizontal inequalities do not exist in a vacuum. If HIs are really as static and 
persistent as they are often considered to be (see e.g. Ahluwalia 1976; Østby, 2008b 
[Chapter 3]; Williamson, 1965), there is good reason to assume that contextual factors 
play a significant role in translating HIs into conflict, particularly with regard to state 
regulation and the absolute economic level. In this thesis I particularly focus on three 
mediating aspects of relevance: political conditions (regime type, electoral system, 
political exclusion) (see Chapter 3); economic conditions (natural resources) (see Chapter 
4), and demographic factors (population growth) (see Chapter 6). I elaborate more on 
the postulated interaction effects between socioeconomic HIs and these factors when I 
describe the contributions of the individual chapters in Section 5. 
3.6. HIs and different types, features and locations of political violence  
Since the group perspective is so integral to the thinking of HIs, it seems almost intuitive 
that HIs should be particularly relevant for politically motivated violence directed against 
the state or other group(s). Vertical inequality, on the other hand, should be more likely 
to spur violent actions that lack a clear political basis, such as crime (e.g. Fajnzylber, 
Lederman & Loayza, 2002; Hagan & Peterson, 1995; Neuman & Berger, 1988).  
Although I argue that HIs should be more relevant for political violence than 
pure crime, the assumption that HIs may provoke politically motivated violence is rather 
general, as the term ‘political conflict’ encompasses a wide range of empirical 
phenomena. The HI literature (e.g. Stewart, 2008) is not very specific as to what kind of 
political violence may be caused by horizontal inequalities. Stewart’s (2002) broad 
conclusion based on a number of case studies is that HIs may provoke a range of 
different forms of violence ranging from riots to civil war.  
It is beyond the ambition of this dissertation to construct a thorough typology of 
political violence and discuss and test whether and how HIs are associated with each 
possible variant of this broad phenomenon. Nevertheless, the various chapters jointly 
offer some discussion and insights as to whether HIs are more likely to produce some 
forms of violence rather than others. For example, in Chapter 6 (Østby et al., 2011) we 
postulate that HIs should have stronger effect on episodic violence than on routine 
violence. The rationale behind this expectation is that low-scale ‘routine’ violence usually 
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has little or nothing to do with ethnic groupings. In line with this, Tadjoeddin, 
Chowdhury & Murshed (2010: 6) hold that ‘horizontal inequality is more appropriately 
located in the context of secessionist and ethnic conflicts’, an argument that resonates 
with recent findings by case studies (e.g. Sambanis, 2004b).  
With regard to conflict dynamics, HIs could also have different effects on the 
various stages of conflict. The features shaping how and why conflicts escalate or spread 
after the initial outbreak can differ significantly and take place in very different areas. 
Subsequent conflict events are likely to be influenced by strategic considerations and 
subsequent battle outcomes, and may often take place in remote and scarcely populated 
areas that bear little if any resemblance to the initial area where violence emerged. It is 
my assumption that HIs should be particularly relevant for conflict onset since HIs are 
assumed to form a strong motive for group mobilization in the first place. A related 
argument is more fully developed in Hegre, Østby & Raleigh (2009) [Chapter 5]. 
Related to the discussion of HIs and various forms of political violence, a final 
point hinges on geographical features, such as the urban–rural distinction. As noted by 
Moser (2004), inequalities are generally more marked in urban than in rural areas. Add to 
this Brown’s (2008) observation that the experience of horizontal inequality is rooted in 
locality and day-to-day interactions. The implication of this is that HIs should be 
particularly pronounced and visible in cities (which are often highly demographically 
heterogeneous) and produce higher risks of urban violence, due to e.g. systematic 
differences between migrants and born city dwellers. This line of reasoning is not new. 
Sociological research in the United States has long identified ‘racial inequalities’ as an 
important explanatory factor behind interracial violence in urban areas (e.g. Blau & Blau, 
1982; McCall & Parker, 2005). These accounts broadly point to issues of ‘racial 
competition’ between ethnic groups as key to understanding the dynamics of urban 
violence. In Chapter 7 (Østby, 2010) I explore the effects of HIs on urban violence.  
Despite these modest efforts at theoretically linking HIs to certain forms, features 
and locations of political violence, the dissertation primarily uses these typologies for 
heuristic purposes in constructing the research designs underlying the various articles. 
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3.7. Evidence of HIs and conflict 
Upon closing this theory section it is timely to briefly review the existing empirical 
evidence on horizontal inequalities and political violence.24 As we have seen, so far, most 
researchers of the horizontal inequality–conflict relationship have relied on qualitative 
case studies rather than large-N comparisons (e.g. Humphreys & Mohamed, 2005; 
Langer, 2005; Sambanis, 2004b; Stewart, 2002, 2009). The main picture that emerges 
from these works is that horizontal inequalities are indeed associated with increased risks 
of political violence, ranging from occasional racial riots (e.g. Malaysia) to full-blown civil 
war (e.g. Uganda, Sri Lanka, South Africa). Another conclusion from this research is that 
both disadvantaged and advantaged groups have a higher likelihood of getting involved 
in internal conflict than groups closer to the national average (Stewart, 2009). There is 
also a handful of quantitative case studies that have addressed the HI–conflict link (e.g. 
Barron et al 2009; Mancini, 2008; and Østby et al., 2011 [Chapter 6] on Indonesia; 
Hegre, Østby & Raleigh, 2009 [Chapter 5] on Liberia; and Murshed & Gates, 2005 on 
Nepal), and these studies largely support the conclusions from the qualitative literature.25 
 Although Stewart (2000) was the first analyst to explicitly use the term 
‘horizontal inequalities’, a handful of scholars have attempted to study structural 
differences between ethnic groups on a cross-national (or cross-group) basis. In a 
pioneering test Barrows (1976) analyzed the determinants of political instability in 32 
African states south of Sahara during the 1960s. In a multiple correlation analysis he 
found that inequality was a consistent predictor of political instability when measured 
along a scale of ‘ethnic group inequality’ based on ‘the size of ethnic groups and their 
share of political power and/or other values [wealth, education and the like]’ (Barrows, 
1976: 154–155). Barrow’s study is particularly noteworthy since it appears to be the first 
attempt at measuring horizontal inequalities quantitatively. A major problem with his 
index, however, is that his personal judgment was the only source for determining the 
group inequality scores for each country. Another early strand of research on HIs and 
violence is Blau & Blau (1982) and others’ work on Black/White relationships in US 
                                              
24 See Brown & Langer (2010) for a more extensive review of this literature.  
25 The one exception I am aware of is Barron, Kaiser & Pradhan’s (2009) study of local conflict 
in Indonesia, which found that educational HIs were associated with lower levels of conflict in rural areas. 
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cities, which explores whether riot incidence is related to economic and social 
characteristics of the cities, including horizontal inequalities. Though some of these 
studies have led to mixed results (see Balkwell, 1990: 54–55) the general finding is a 
positive relationship between racial inequality and violence.  
More recently, Gurr (2000) has developed an index of political, economic and 
cultural disparities for some 275 minority groups in 116 countries. Based on the 
‘Minorities at Risk’ (hereafter MAR) database, he found that where there are strong 
identities together with large group grievances (i.e. major political, economic, or cultural 
differences/discrimination), protest is more likely. Gurr’s data, thus, provide strong 
support to the hypothesis that horizontal inequalities are liable to lead to political 
violence.26 
My own cross-national investigations (Chapters 2–3) represent the first attempts 
at measuring objective HIs based on data from household surveys. The main conclusion 
from these and subsequent disaggregated studies (Chapters 4–7), as well as a recent 
paper by Condra (2009)27 largely support the validity of the positive relationship between 
various forms of HIs and conflict. A different approach is taken in a very recent paper 
by Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010), who provide global evidence for the HI–
conflict nexus, based on geographically disaggregated data on economic output. 
Although the work presented in this dissertation and that of Cederman, Gleditsch & 
Weidmann (2010) differ considerably with regard to the operationalization of HIs, which 
will be discussed further in the next section, we do reach the same overall conclusion: 
HIs indeed seem to matter for political violence. 
4. Analytical Approach, Data and Measurement 
The issue of methodological design is central in the debate on the relationship between 
horizontal inequalities and political violence. So far, the field has been methodologically 
dominated by carefully selected qualitative case studies of particular countries, groups 
                                              
26 Despite its wide use and great potential, however, MAR suffers from some fundamental flaws 
(see Section 4).  
27 However, Condra’s (2009) results suggest that it is not the poorest groups in the country that 
are at highest risk of rebellion, but rather those that are relatively better off.  
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and conflict settings, which by definition imply restricted scope conditions and limited 
claims to generalizability. Given that there are a number of plausible mechanisms (and a 
wealth of empirical material from case studies) that link horizontal inequalities to 
conflict, testing the statistical relationship between HIs and political violence is much 
warranted.  
This PhD project includes the first systematic cross-national and subnational tests 
of the horizontal inequality–conflict link, relying on HI data based on national 
household-level data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Recently, a 
paper by Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010) has taken an alternative approach to 
the measurement of socioeconomic HIs, combining new geographical data on wealth 
and ethnic groups’ boundaries. In this section I will discuss some strengths and 
weaknesses of my own approach compared to that of Cederman, Gleditsch & 
Weidmann (2010). But first, I will comment briefly upon some other important aspects 
pertaining to the collection of HI data: potential data sources, measurement issues, and 
levels of analysis. 
4.1. Where to find data on HIs 
Gurr’s Minorities at Risk Database (1993, 2000) is the first worldwide dataset providing 
group-level inequality data. Despite its wide use, however, MAR suffers from 
fundamental flaws, notably selection on the dependent variable, i.e. focusing exclusively 
on groups that are at risk of engaging in conflict.28 This exclusion of apparently ‘non-
relevant’ ethnic groups may be quite problematic mainly because what we want to 
capture is not only actual conflict but also potential conflict. Furthermore, the various 
indicators of relative group grievances provided by MAR are quite crude and are largely 
based on statements and actions by group leaders and members (Minorities at Risk, 
2009: 12), which produces rather subjective evaluations of group deprivation.29 
                                              
28 The Minorities at Risk Database is currently being expanded to collect data on all ethnic 
groups worldwide – both minorities and majorities (see Birnir & Inman, 2010). 
29 Since the MAR dataset mostly focuses on relatively deprived groups it is not possible to single 
out the level of privilege among the groups that are better off than the national average, as these are 
simply coded as having ‘no grievances’. 
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It is a formidable challenge to get at objective and comparable data on horizontal 
inequalities. Horizontal inequalities (and vertical ones alike) can be politically sensitive, 
and national and subnational governments are likely to report biased data if any. My 
solution to the problem has been to construct HI data based on national surveys which 
include information on both socioeconomic well-being and ethnic/religious/regional 
group affiliations. More specifically, the data presented herein is based on a large number 
of national household surveys provided by the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
project.30 Biased information is very unlikely when data are generated from national 
surveys like the DHS, as the original intention behind these was far from assessing socio-
economic inequalities between ethnic groups. Finally, the aggregation of survey data 
ensures descriptive rather than evaluative data. That is, researchers do not need to rely on 
their personal judgment as the sole source for determining group inequality scores (as 
opposed to e.g. the Minorities at Risk project). 
Since 1984, the MEASURE DHS project, funded by USAID and implemented 
by ICF Marco, has administered more than 240 surveys in over 85 countries (see Figure 
5), collecting accurate, nationally representative data on fertility, family planning, 
maternal and child health, gender, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and nutrition. 
Figure 5. Countries Covered by the DHS Project as of 2009 
 
Source: DHS webpage: http://www.measuredhs.com/aboutdhs/. 
                                              
30 DHS webpage: http://www.measuredhs.com. 
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The DHS surveys were conducted primarily to provide researchers and policy-
makers with comprehensive and comparable data on fertility and child health and their 
determinants, and the DHS project has become the gold standard of survey data in the 
population and health sector in developing countries. However, the content of the 
surveys has changed over the years to adapt to changing circumstances and priorities. 
Apart from health and nutrition indicators, most of the surveys also include a host of 
question relating to socioeconomic background factors such as the possession of various 
household assets (such as electricity, radio, and refrigerator) and education levels. 
Furthermore, the surveys include information about the region of residence of the 
respondents, and sometimes, but not always, information of ethnic and religious 
affiliation. In a typical DHS survey, a sample of households is selected throughout the 
entire country and then interviewed using a household questionnaire to collect housing 
characteristics. Women between the ages 15 and 49 are interviewed using a women’s 
questionnaire to collect information mainly on background characteristics, children and 
women’s health and other issues, such as education level. Samples vary considerably in 
size, ranging from less than 5,000 women (e.g. Ghana DHS 1998) to more than 120,000 
(e.g. India DHS 2005–06).31 During the last decade, the DHS has begun to include 
detailed information about the geographical location of each EA. Together, these 
surveys provides a very rich dataset, from which one can construct reliable and valid32 
group inequality indicators.  
Stewart (2002, 2008) proposes a very rich scheme for operationalizing horizontal 
inequalities. Within the four main categories economic, social, political, and cultural 
status HIs she fits a range of variables, some which are easily measured (such as 
composition of government), and some which are harder to measure (such as human 
capital). However, Stewart does not study the same types of inequalities in each country. 
For example, in her study of horizontal inequalities between indigenous and Latinos in 
Chiapas, Mexico, she measures inequality in terms of income, illiteracy and household 
access to safe water. In South Africa, on the other hand, she focuses on the differences 
between the Black and White population in terms of managerial and civil service 
                                              
31 See Demographic and Health Surveys (1996) for details on the sampling methodology. 
32 See Chapter 2 for more details regarding the reliability and validity of the DHS data. 
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employment, life expectancy and literacy. Clearly, the richness of Stewart’s scheme for 
operationalizing horizontal inequalities is well suited for individual case studies. 
However, such broad conceptualizations of HIs are not particularly useful when the goal 
is to evaluate the generalizability of the horizontal inequality–political conflict nexus 
across many cases. 
For the various chapters in this dissertation, I have applied the DHS surveys to 
generate HI measures based on different group indicators: ethnicity, religion, region or 
locality of residence, and migrant status. I have also measured inequalities along various 
dimensions, using variables pertaining to household assets, educational levels, and infant 
mortality rates (see Table 2 in Section 5). 
4.2. Measurement of HIs 
Even with adequate group-level data for various dimensions of socioeconomic well-
being, there remains the challenge of measuring HIs at the aggregate level. In order to 
compare HIs across different countries a standardized measure is needed. For a 
comparison of two groups, the simplest measure conceivable would be the following: 
best
worstHI 1    
where worst refers to the average share of some asset owned by members of the 
poorer group and best refers to the average share of the asset owned by members of the 
richer group. The measure potentially ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (horizontal 
inequality with the richer group owning all the assets). In Chapter 2 I propose an 
application of this formula calculating HIs between the two largest ethnic groups per 
country, disregarding the status of smaller ethnic groups, and also compare HI measures 
with measures of polarization. Although Stewart (2009: 41) points to the problem of 
how to deal with intra-group inequalities, Mancini, Stewart & Brown (2008: 90) state that 
‘we wish to separate our measure of HIs from what is happening within the group’. Also, 
in an earlier paper, Stewart (2002a: 12) stresses that ‘we need to measure intra-group as 
well as inter-groups differentials in order to explore how intra-group differentials affect 
the consequences of HIs.’ To the best of my knowledge, there still is no ideal HI 
measure which fully combines information on both inter- and intra-group inequalities as 
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well as relative group sizes (see Østby, 2008a [Chapter 2] for more details and discussion 
of various measures). 
In general, Stewart’s and her team focus mostly on aggregate situations, taking an 
overall (as opposed to a group-specific) perspective on measuring HIs (see Table 2). 
Along similar lines, Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009), insist that inequality has to be 
measured at the level of the nation state. However, as we point out in Østby, Nordås & 
Rød (2009) and Hegre, Raleigh & Østby (2009) [Chapters 4 & 5], any country-level 
measure of HI risks failing to capture the relevant groups in society. In fact, the 
horizontal inequality argument only requires one under-privileged group to predict 
conflict. If the rest of the population in the country is homogenous or have small 
income differences, a country-level measure would be attenuated and unable to capture 
this. This problem is present in any country-level study of HIs and conflict, including 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. In Chapters 4 and 5 we (Østby, Nordås & Rød, 
2009; Hegre, Østby & Raleigh, 2009) minimize this problem by disaggregating the study 
of conflict below the national level. This way one can simply compare the group (or 
region) of interest with some other unit (e.g. the capital or the national average), and 
hence stick to simple ratio measures, or group-specific measures, as I have chosen to 
label them in Table 2. With a disaggregated design it is also easy to add an individual 
variable for intra-group inequality into the model.33 In addition, there are other good 
reasons to disaggregate the study of conflict, not least the fact that it is rarely the case 
that a conflict engulfs an entire country (see e.g. Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Buhaug & Rød, 
2006).34  
Most of the African DHS surveys now include the exact geographical coordinates 
for each sampled village or town. This has opened up new possibilities for measuring 
spatial inequalities within countries. The maps in Figures 6a and 6b shows the variation 
in economic (household assets) and social (educational) horizontal inequality between 
                                              
33 Cederman, Gleditsch & Rød (2010) also take a disaggregated approach. 
34 Disaggregating the unit of analysis from e.g. the state to the regional level does not necessarily 
imply a disaggregation of the HI measure. In Chapter 6, for example, which is a disaggregated study of 
Indonesian provinces, we still apply an aggregate level of HIs, which summarizes the level of HIs 
between religious groups within the region.  
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regions, based on the most recent data from DHS (see Chapter 4 for details about 
calculations).35 
Figure 6a. Horizontal Inequality in Terms of Assets, African Regions, 2000  
 
                                              
35 Since the DHS project is currently ongoing I can continuously update my HI data. Many new 
countries and surveys have been included since the two first chapters in this dissertation (Østby, 2008a,b) 
were published. See Appendix A for some additional tests with updated data for 73 countries. 
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Figure 6b. Horizontal Inequality in Terms of Education, African Regions, 2000  
 
Yellow color represents regions that are better off or have the same level of 
welfare as the national average, whereas the more reddish the color, the stronger relative 
deprivation of the region. The maps show that HIs seem to be more marked in Central 
Africa. Furthermore, there is no perfect correlation between economic and social HIs 
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4.3. Geographical Scope vs. Data Quality 
Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010) provide a new global dataset on economic 
HIs, combining their newly coded data on ethnic groups’ settlement areas (Min, 
Cederman & Wimmer, 2008) with Nordhaus et al.’s (2006) G-Econ dataset on local 
economic activity. In short, the G-Econ dataset tries to assemble the best available data 
on local economic activity within countries for geographical grid cells, and convert these 
to comparable figures in purchasing power parity to allow for meaningful comparisons. 
The resolution of the spatially explicit data set is 1 degree grid cells. The data are 
constructed from a variety of sources, including regional gross product data for the 
lowest available political subdivision, estimates of regional income by industry, and 
estimates of rural population and agricultural income. The specific methodologies differ 
by countries and data availability (see Nordhaus et al., 2006 for a detailed discussion). 
The database has global coverage, but the temporal scope is limited to a single year, 
1990. 
Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (hereafter CGW) (2010: 13) admit that the 
DHS ‘offer a relatively direct measure of well-being’, but point to a number of 
limitations afflicted with the use of DHS to create HI measures. Most importantly, they 
point to the restricted geographical coverage, and the focus on developing countries. 
They also mention potential problems associated with representativeness at the 
subnational level and potential response biases, such as the possibility that poorer 
individuals might overstate (or understate) their assets. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 
these problems should not be too severe, though. 
CGW are of course right that the DHS cannot be used to evaluate the role of HIs 
on a global basis. However, I do not agree with their position that the Nordhaus-based 
HIs data are necessarily superior to the DHS-based HI data for the countries that are 
included in both databases. First, the Nordhaus data cannot account for the informal 
economy, which very often benefits groups engaged in agriculture. This is particularly 
relevant for African and Asian countries where large segments of the population still 
depend on agricultural livelihoods. Any measure of economic productivity is a ‘flow 
measure’, and hence an imperfect proxy for the actual level of income or wealth.  
Second, and far more serious, a closer inspection of the documentation of the 
Nordhaus data reveals that the overall data quality is indeed very poor for large parts of 
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the developing world (where most conflicts occur) – exactly where the DHS surveys are 
conducted. The world map in Figure 7, which depicts the quality of the G-Econ data, 
with red color indicating top quality data, speaks for itself. With the exception of South 
Africa, the entire continent of Africa has ‘low quality or some regional data’ 36 (my 
emphasis). Also parts of Asia, such as Indonesia, have equally poor data. According to 
Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010: 14) ‘on some countries the official data may 
be of so poor quality that the variable is suppressed and accuracies over survey reports 
may be questionable’. This is at best an understatement.  
Figure 7. Quality of the G-Econ Data 
 
Source: Map generated by author on the basis of Nordhaus et al.’s (2006) G-Econ data and PRIO-GRID 
(Tollefsen, Buhaug & Strand, 2010). Quality designation: -999= some defect not yet determined; -99= 
very small or zero area, to be set at zero area (non-existent); 1= lowest quality (disputed, essentially non-
existent data); 2= low quality and some regional data; 3= small islands; 4= medium quality, developing 
country; 5= high quality but not complete or poor resolution regional data; 6= highest quality data and 
regional resolution. 
How well do the two data sources correspond to each other? In Africa, the 
continent with the poorest data from Nordhaus, the correlation between the survey-
generated asset indicator and the G-Econ-based GDPpc (Gross Domestic Product per 
capita) is r=.61 at the national level (N=38), compared to .41 (N=517) at the 
                                              
36 See updated data from G-Econ 2.11 at http://gecon.yale.edu/data-and-documentation-g-
econ-project. 
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subnational, regional level.37 Admittedly, a correlation above .6 is not so bad (especially 
since the variables measure slightly different phenomena). However, the fact that the 
correlation drops when we go below the national level could very well be a result of the 
lack of regional variation in the G-Econ data (i.e. that the data are to a certain extent 
geographically extrapolated). Adding this to the arguments presented above, I feel quite 
confident that the G-Econ data are not at all superior to the DHS data for the purpose 
of measuring horizontal inequalities in developing countries. Although CGW manage to 
construct a global dataset on HIs, their data are nevertheless of poor quality for most of 
the developing world. This highlights the puzzle of the key and the lamppost described 
above and only underscores the acute need for high quality economic data for such 
countries.  
It is not my intention to discredit the CGW study. On the contrary, I find their 
combination of new geographic data truly innovative and fascinating and hope that it 
will inspire and generate future attempts along similar lines. However, if King (2001: 
505) is right that ‘good data beats better methods every time’, we still have a lot of work 
to do. It seems to me that basic socioeconomic indicators from household surveys is 
really a fruitful starting point for measuring HIs in developing countries. Nevertheless, 
this dissertation and Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010) do reach the same 
overall conclusion; that HIs indeed matter for political violence. 
5. Content of  Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of six independent but related research papers, of which four 
have been published in international peer-reviewed journals, one is a book chapter, and 
one is currently under review in an academic journal. Chapters 2, 3 and 7 are single-
authored and Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are co-authored. The project has a clear quantitative 
orientation as all the chapters apply statistical models and numerical data to evaluate 
various aspects of the relationship between horizontal inequalities and political violence. 
In all the articles the main independent variable is some kind of socioeconomic 
horizontal inequality, and the dependent variable is some kind of political violence 
                                              
37 The corresponding correlation coefficients if we replace the DHS asset index with education 
years are even lower: .429 at the national level and .250 at the subnational, regional level. 
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involving civil conflict, low scale routine violence, (non-state) ethno-communal 
(episodic) violence, and various kinds of urban social disorder. The articles evaluate the 
link between various forms of HIs and political violence at various levels of analysis, and 
address various intervening contextual factors, such as political conditions, natural 
resources, and population pressure.  
Because the dissertation is a compilation of stand-alone articles rather than a 
coherent monograph, there is inevitably some repetition of content across the various 
chapters, so please bear with me. This particularly pertains to descriptions of the survey 
data and how the various HI measures are generated. 
Table 2 summarizes how the various research questions (which were introduced 
in Section 1), types and aspects of political violence, unit of analysis, geographical 
coverage, as well as various aspects relating to the independent variable (group identifier, 
dimension, and perspective of HIs) feature in the six dissertation chapters. The order of 
the articles is not random. I start out in Chapter 2 by addressing the main research 
question of whether HIs between ethnic groups influence civil conflict in a cross-
country setup. In Chapter 3 I provide a more nuanced test of this relationship looking at 
various group identifiers and taking into account the importance of the political context. 
In Chapter 4 we make the case for unpacking the HI measure and go below the national 
level to capture the link between regional inequalities and conflict in Africa, and we also 
look at the contextual influence of natural resource endowments. In Chapter 5 we stick 
to the subnational setup, but switch to a purely geographically defined unit of analysis 
and look at how absolute and relative local deprivation influences conflict dynamics 
(events), and not only conflict outbreak. In Chapter 6, we investigate how HIs at the 
regional level in Indonesia relate to different forms of political violence, and also pay 
attention to demographic mitigating factors. Finally, in the last chapter I focus 
particularly on urban violence, since civil and communal conflicts often happen in rural 
areas, whereas inequality is held to be a typically urban phenomenon. The individual 
chapters are described in more detail below.  
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Table 2. Schematic Overview of Dissertation Chapters 
Ch. Research 
Question 
Type of 
PV 
Aspect of 
PV 
Unit of 
analysis 
Geographical 
coverage 
HI group 
identifier 
HI element/ 
dimension 
HI 
perspective 
2 1 Civil 
conflict 
Onset State 36 developing 
countries  
Ethnic Assets; 
education 
 
Overall 
3 1,2 Civil 
conflict 
Onset State 55 developing 
countries 
Ethnic; 
religious; 
regional 
Assets; 
education; 
political  
 
Overall 
4 1,2,3 Civil 
conflict 
Onset Subnational 
region 
Regions in 22 
SSA countries 
 
Regional Assets; 
education 
Group-
specific 
5 1,3 Civil 
conflict 
Event Grid cell 
(76 km2) 
 
Liberia Geographic 
(local) 
 
Assets Group-
specific 
6 2,3,4 Routine 
violence/ 
Episodic 
violence 
 
Event/ 
Incidence 
Province Indonesia Regional Infant 
mortality 
rate 
Overall/ 
Group-
specific  
7 3,4 Urban 
social 
disorder 
Event City 34 cities in 
Africa and Asia 
Migrant 
status 
Assets; 
education; 
public 
services 
Group-
specific 
 
5.1. Chapter 2: Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil 
Conflict 
Chapter 2 was published in Journal of Peace Research (Østby, 2008a). Inspired by the 
finding of a positive link between group inequalities and conflict in a series of qualitative 
case studies, the article addresses whether economic and social inequalities between 
ethnic groups at the country-level are associated with onset of civil conflicts. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first published cross-national statistical study of objective 
horizontal inequalities and conflict. The article compares established as well as new 
measures of inequality and polarization and takes issue with the finding of previous 
quantitative studies concluding that (vertical) inequality does not increase the risk of 
internal armed conflict. I argue that these studies fail to account for horizontal 
inequalities and thus the concurrence of systematic inequalities with ethnic cleavages. 
Relying on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), I construct 
polarization indices and new horizontal inequality measures across 36 developing 
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countries during the period 1986–2004.38 These measures are constructed for both the 
economic and social dimension, i.e. based on ownership of household assets and 
educational attainment. The results from both panel and cross-sectional analysis show 
that social and economic polarization, and social horizontal inequality based on 
education significantly contributes to conflict. In contrast, measures for vertical 
inequality (Gini coefficient) and purely ethnic polarization do not produce significant 
effects on conflict. As an alternative to horizontal inequality, I also propose a hybrid 
measure of polarization that combines identity and economic polarities, but this term 
does not perform as well as the simpler ratio-measure of horizontal inequality. Finding 
that horizontal inequalities indeed matter for conflict, the main insight from this chapter 
is that previous studies’ rejection of the inequality–conflict nexus is clearly premature. 
5.2. Chapter 3: Inequalities, the Political Environment and Civil Conflict: 
Evidence from 55 Developing Countries 
Chapter 3, which first appeared as a World Bank working paper (Østby, 2007), and was 
later published as (Østby, 2008b), is another cross-country time-series analysis. Drawing 
on Stewart’s multi-dimensional conceptualization of HIs, this chapter investigates 
whether the relationship between socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and civil conflict 
onset is influenced by various aspects of the political context: regime type, electoral 
system, and explicit political exclusion of minorities. Furthermore, this chapter expands 
the country-level dataset on horizontal inequalities to 55 developing countries and 
measures horizontal inequalities between ethnic as well as religious groups and 
subnational regions. All the HI measures are found to be positively associated with 
conflict, but the effects seem to be most robust when using the regional group identifier. 
The regional HI measures are then interacted with terms for regime type; electoral 
system and political exclusion. The results show that the conflict potential of regional 
HIs is stronger for democracies and semi-democracies than for autocracies. Institutional 
arrangements also seem to matter since the positive effect of socioeconomic HIs on civil 
                                              
38 For a dynamic visualization of my HI data from this article, see the ‘Data Visualizer’ of the 
World Development Report 2011’s Conflict Database: 
http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/datafinder/BubbleChart00_101.html.  
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war increases with the level of inclusiveness of the electoral system. As argued in the 
chapter, democracy does not ensure political inclusion of all groups. Furthermore, the 
interaction between political exclusion and socioeconomic regional HIs seems to make 
countries particularly at risk for conflict, which provides evidence for the hypothesis that 
consistent horizontal inequalities across various dimensions increase the conflict risk. 
This suggests that what is required to secure peace in developing countries is the 
combination of politically and economically inclusive government. 
5.3. Chapter 4: Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Chapter 4 (Østby, Nordås & Rød, 2009) was published in International Studies Quarterly. In 
this article we acknowledge that civil conflicts are usually confined to limited areas within 
a country, and that features of socioeconomic welfare also tend to vary considerably 
within countries. For this reason, we argue that country-level aggregate measures of 
horizontal inequalities and conflict do not allow for adequately testing the relationship 
between geographically clustered poverty (or wealth) and regional engagement in 
conflict. For example, the horizontal inequality argument only requires one under-
privileged group or region to predict conflict. If the rest of the regions in the country 
were homogenous or had small income differences, a country-level measure would mask 
that one particular region was under-privileged. We overcome this potential shortcoming 
by applying GIS (Geographic Information Systems) operations to Demographic and Health 
Surveys to construct disaggregated data on welfare and socioeconomic inequalities between 
and within sub-national regions in 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moving to the 
subnational level also allows us to unpack the inequality measure and single out the 
separate effects of being relatively deprived and relatively privileged, as well as 
addressing the violence potential of intra-regional inequalities. By coupling these data 
with existing data on the spatial location of conflict zones we are able to investigate 
whether absolute poverty, relative regional welfare (inter-regional inequality), as well as 
inequality within regions affect the likelihood of conflict onset in a region. We also test 
the argument that relative deprivation in terms of actual living standards may be 
particularly conflict-provoking in regions rich in natural resources due to people’s 
perception that they do not benefit sufficiently from the regional resource revenues. We 
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find that conflict onsets are more likely in regions with overall low levels of education; 
strong relative deprivation regarding household assets; strong intra-regional inequalities; 
and, finally, that the positive effect of regional relative deprivation on conflict onset is 
particularly strong in regions with valuable natural resources endowments, such as oil 
and diamonds. 
5.4. Chapter 5: Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of 
Liberia 
Chapter 5 (Hegre, Østby & Raleigh, 2009), published in Journal of Conflict Resolution is a 
quantitative case study of the Liberian Civil War (1989–2002), which represents a 
different approach to disaggregating the study of political violence in two ways. First, 
unlike Chapter 4, which focuses on subnational administrative units, this article 
disaggregates the study of conflict to purely geographically defined units (grid cells of 
approximately 8.5 km x 8.5 km).39 Second, we shift the focus from conflict onset in 
Chapters 2–4 to conflict dynamics, or individual conflict events drawing on the ACLED 
dataset (see Raleigh et al., 2010). We develop a theoretical framework for studying the 
relationship between spatial distributions of welfare and the location of conflict, 
introducing the concepts ‘support level’ and ‘target value’. This theorizing implies that 
within-country variation in absolute and relative poverty levels should affect where and if 
conflicts emerge, where rebel groups are able to recruit soldiers, and where rebel groups 
operate. We use georeferenced data from the Liberian Demographic and Health Survey 
of 1986 to construct a welfare index based on a host of variables weighted according to 
their individual loadings resulting from a principal component analysis. Since we are 
analyzing locations within a single country, all estimated wealth levels may be interpreted 
as wealth relative to the average of Liberia. However, we also constructed a more 
geographically local measure of relative deprivation (LRD), defined as the absolute gap 
between each cell’s value on the wealth index compared to the overall performance of 
the neighboring cells. The data were analyzed by means of a zero-inflated negative 
                                              
39 Since the grid cells are purely geographically determined (and hence their function as proxies 
for group identifiers could be problematic), they are not ideal in order to generate HI measures. I still 
chose to include this article in the dissertation, as I think it makes a clear contribution to the overall 
project, particularly with regard to the focus on events and conflict dynamics. 
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binomial model. Controlling for such factors as neighboring conflict events, distance to 
Monrovia and national borders, population density, diamond deposits, and ethnic 
affiliations, we find that war events were more frequent in the richer locations of Liberia, 
both in the absolute and relative sense, although local wealth relative to the national 
average is more salient than the wealth relative to the immediate neighboring cells. This 
could be interpreted as better support for ‘opportunity’ explanations than for ‘relative 
deprivation’ theories of conflict, but we argue that the relative weakness of the Liberian 
government makes it difficult to distinguish between the two. 
5.5. Chapter 6: Population Pressure, Horizontal Inequality and Political 
Violence: A Disaggregated Study of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003 
Chapter 6 (Østby, Urdal, Tadjoeddin, Murshed & Strand, 2011) was published in Journal 
of Development Studies. This article addresses two broader and distinct claims of factors 
motivating violent conflict; the scarcity and competition over natural renewable resources, 
and intergroup dynamics in terms of group identity and horizontal inequalities. While these 
perspectives arise from disparate literatures, we empirically combine them and test 
whether their individual and simultaneous presence may help account for the variation in 
the level of political violence between provinces in Indonesia for the period 1990–2003. 
We investigate two types of violence. First, we look at ‘routine’ social violence, centered 
around group-based vigilante violence/popular justice and intergroup/neighborhood 
brawls. It should be distinguished from simple criminal acts with no socioeconomic or 
political basis. Second, we look at ‘episodic’ violence. This refers to ethno-communal 
and separatist violence. With regard to both types of violence, the study investigates the 
role of inter-group dynamics, in particular religious polarization and issues of 
socioeconomic inequalities (HIs) between religious groups at the provincial level. The 
study makes use of regional demographic and socioeconomic data from population 
censuses and province-level data from various Indonesian Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). Like Chapter 4 this is a disaggregated study, although the HI measures 
applied are overall, and not group-specific, since we focus on the overall inequality 
between religious groups within the subnational region (cf. Table 2). We find that 
demographic pressure and horizontal inequality seem to have little effect in isolation for 
the risk of political violence of either type across Indonesian provinces. However, in 
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provinces where population growth is high, greater levels of inequality between religious 
groups (proxied by different infant mortality rates) appear to increase the violence risk.  
5.6. Chapter 7: Internal Migration, Inequality and Urban Social Disorder: 
Evidence from African and Asian Cities 
Finally, the article presented in Chapter 7 (Østby, 2010) is currently under review in an 
academic journal in response to an invitation to contribute to a special issue on climate 
change and conflict. However, the paper does not directly assess the link between 
climatological variables and conflict. Rather, I study the level of urban political violence 
focusing on a host of demographic and economic factors that are often seen as a 
consequence of climate change and increasing population pressure in the countryside: 
rural-urban migration, urban poverty, and urban inequality between individuals as well as 
between migrants and non-migrants. Previous quantitative research on the security 
consequences of high urban population growth has produced little support for the 
widespread concern over increasing urbanization. With a more nuanced measure of 
rural-urban migration, this study adds momentum to the general conclusion that it is not 
the movement of people as such that seems to create problems. The article finds, 
however, that both inter-individual and inter-group inequalities between migrants and 
non-migrants seem to matter for lethal forms of urban political violence. More 
specifically, overall poor and unequal educational opportunities as well as marginalization 
of rural-urban migrants in terms of household assets as well as access to public services 
are found to spur increased levels of lethal urban political violence. 
6. Conclusions  
The main motivation behind this dissertation project was to provide a systematic 
evaluation of the relationship between structural inequalities between groups – 
horizontal inequalities – and political violence in order to transcend and supplement the 
broad qualitative case-study literature in the field. The principal research question was 
whether societies with marked horizontal inequalities are generally at a higher risk of 
experiencing armed conflict and other forms of political violence. In order to answer this 
question in an adequate manner, I have clarified theoretically how HIs can be translated 
to collective violence, provided new data on HIs, and conducted a set of statistical 
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studies, including both cross-national studies as well as various kinds of disaggregated 
studies. 
This thesis has contributed to the inequality–conflict research in several ways. 
First, I have demonstrated that in order to grasp the complex relationship between 
inequality and conflict, we need to move away from a single-tracked concept of 
inequality, distinguishing vertical from horizontal inequalities, and considering other 
dimensions than purely income inequality. Traditional inequality studies tend to ignore 
this diversity. Theoretically, the thesis provides a synthetic model of grievance and 
opportunity explanations of civil war, demonstrating that horizontal inequalities may 
affect both these preconditions of conflict simultaneously. The main contribution of this 
thesis, however, relates to the development of new data on HIs based on national 
surveys. This approach represents a way of generating data that are difficult to find 
elsewhere. Furthermore, the aggregation of survey data ensures descriptive rather than 
evaluative data.  
To the best of my knowledge this dissertation project provides the first 
systematic cross-national test of the horizontal inequality theory (Stewart, 2002, 2008). In 
my own view, the single most important finding in this project is that type of inequality 
matters. I am quite confident about the main conclusion: Whereas I find no evidence of 
a relationship between vertical inequality and conflict, horizontal inequalities do make 
developing countries more susceptible to civil conflict. This applies across various group 
identifiers (ethnic, religious and regional groups), although the most robust cross-
national evidence is found when horizontal inequalities are measured between 
subnational regions. With the larger sample (Østby, 2008b) [Chapter 3], the relationship 
also holds for both economic and social dimensions of inequality, measured in terms of 
household assets and educational attainment respectively. Because the DHS surveys do 
not include any questions pertaining to political status of the respondents, I have only 
been able to test a general measure of political exclusion derived from the Minorities at 
Risk dataset (Gurr, 2000).40 The effect of political exclusion has no separate effect on 
                                              
40 A more recent source of political HIs are Cederman, Min & Wimmer’s (2010) data on ‘Ethnic 
Power Relations’ (EPR). See Fjelde & Østby (2010) for an application of the geo-referenced version of 
these data (Wucherpfennig et al., 2010) with regard to non-state conflict in Africa. 
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conflict risk in my models, but there is a strong positive interaction effect between 
economic HIs and political exclusion, which confirms Stewart’s multidimensional notion 
of HI, and supports her assumption that consistent HIs are particularly conflict-
provoking.  
A second main conclusion from this project is that the political, economic and 
demographic context matters for the HI–conflict relationship. The articles included here 
have tested the impact of three kinds of contextual factors which are all found to 
influence the HI–conflict nexus: political conditions, natural resources and population 
pressure. Due to the apparent inertia of HIs, it should be especially relevant to consider 
mediating factors that influence when and how HIs lead to political violence. First, I find 
that political conditions such as regime type condition the HI–conflict relationships, 
indicating that democracies and semidemocracies may facilitate the transformation of 
horizontal inequalities into conflict, by permitting protest. Second, economic conditions 
are also found to matter: The positive effect of relative deprivation on conflict at the 
regional level is particularly strong for regions with valuable natural resource 
endowments. The explanation for this can be that violent group mobilization may be a 
result of grievances if people do not feel that they benefit as much as they should from 
the revenues generated from natural resources in their own region. Finally, in the 
Indonesia study (Chapter 6) we find a strong interaction between provincial population 
growth and inter-religious HIs. Demographic pressure and inequality seem to have little 
effect in isolation, but in provinces where population growth is high, greater levels of 
inequality between religious groups appear to increase the violence risk. In sum there 
seems to be several relevant contextual factors that could indeed influence the HI–
conflict nexus (see Stewart, 2008 for a more comprehensive discussion on this). 
A third insight offered by the work presented herein is that subnational studies 
largely confirm the main conclusion that HIs matter for various forms of political 
violence. More importantly, disaggregated designs make it possible to unpack the HI 
measure and single out the separate effects of being relatively deprived and relatively 
privileged with regard to conflict risk. The disaggregated study of African regions reveals 
that the overall finding that HIs influence conflict is really driven by the effect from the 
relatively deprived regions. In this sense, I fail to provide supporting evidence for my 
assumption that both richer and poorer regions have increased conflict risk. A new 
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research paper (Fjelde & Østby, 2010) reaches similar conclusions with regard to non-
state conflict in Africa, i.e. that it is the economically marginalized regions that see the 
higher risk of armed conflict between groups, whereas the regions that are economically 
privileged compared to the national average are not particularly at risk. An exception to 
this is the Liberia study (Hegre, Østby & Raleigh, 2009) in Chapter 5. It shows that 
conflict events were more frequent in the relatively richer locations of Liberia.41 This 
could be due to reporting bias of events in richer, more urban areas. But it could also be 
an indication that horizontal inequalities do not exert similar effects on conflict onset 
and incidence. Finally, one could of course question whether inequality between purely 
geographically defined units (grid cells) are sufficiently good proxies for inequalities 
between ‘real’ identity groups. Furthermore, Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann (2010) 
in their global test of ethnic HIs, find that both affluent and poor regions (relative to the 
national mean) are more likely to engage in conflict. Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch 
(2010) reach a similar conclusion for administrative regions in a global analysis of 
federations, but this study only includes four African countries.  
A final general conclusion from this dissertation is that horizontal inequalities 
seem to matter across various types of political violence – not only civil conflict, 
although the evidence is less clear. The quantitative case study of Indonesian provinces 
demonstrates that the separate effect of HIs is not significant for neither routine nor 
episodic, ethno-communal violence, but the former has an effect in a context of high 
population growth. There is also some evidence in the final study of urban violence that 
HIs between rural-urban migrants and others have a positive effect on urban social 
disorder which includes various forms of political violence, such as riots, strikes, 
terrorism and also civil war.  
In sum, my general and brief response to all the research questions 1–4 
introduced in the first section is ‘yes’: Societies with severe HIs are more prone to 
internal conflict (RQ1); this relationship is mitigated by various contextual factors, such 
as political environment, natural resources and population pressure (RQ2); the conflict 
                                              
41 A global test of spatial inequalities between 100km*100km grid cells (Buhaug et al., 2011) 
finds no general effect of either positive or negative income deviations. However, it finds some evidence 
that pockets of relative wealth within very low income countries are more likely to see conflict outbreaks. 
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provoking effect of HIs applies across various forms of political violence (RQ3) and 
varies at the subnational level (RQ4). These findings are of considerable theoretical 
importance and should inspire a revival of interest in grievance-based explanations of 
conflict in general. Although I argue that both grievances and opportunities contribute 
to linking HIs to political violence, we cannot easily separate between these to 
explanations. If it were the case that grievances do not matter for conflict due to their 
alleged omnipresence, then we should not be able to detect a statistically significant 
relationship between HIs and conflict. However, more research is needed to clarify the 
potential different effects of HIs on various types of political violence.  
Three particular caveats should be added to the overall conclusion. First, due to 
the restricted number of countries covered by the DHS project, I cannot offer global 
generalizations of my findings. What I can do, however, is say something about the 
relationship between HIs and conflict in developing countries. And, as argued above, 
this is not necessarily inferior to any global assessment, particularly since global studies 
are often conducted at the expense of the quality of data for the more war-prone 
countries. Second, there is the ever-present problem of endogeneity: Is it HIs that breed 
conflict, or vice versa? Because some of the DHS countries only have survey data for 
recent years, there are reasons to be concerned that endogeneity could have distorted the 
results. However, most of the chapters address the endogeneity of HIs by controlling for 
past conflict history.42 Finally, even with the disaggregated tests and unpacked (group-
specific) HI measures, the risk of ecological fallacy is still there. For example, even if a 
region is relatively deprived overall, we do not know whether it is the more deprived 
individuals who actually commit the violence.43 This should inspire en effort to collect 
new survey data which includes questions on both economic status and perpetration of – 
or attitudes to – political violence. 
                                              
42 Hegre, Oneal & Russett (2010) notes that advanced methods to account for endogeneity 
rarely makes a difference. 
43 See Østby & Urdal (2010) for more discussion relating to education and political violence. 
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6.1. Future research 
One obvious challenge for future research in this field is to collect more and better data 
on horizontal inequalities for various group identifiers and dimensions expanding the 
present spatio-temporal domain covered in this project. In addition to general, cross-
national datasets, there is a need for carefully designed micro-level studies, which can 
help us better understand the mechanisms linking HIs to political violence. A wish list 
for future data collection projects would include designing new household surveys so as 
to include data on various group affiliations, and objective as well as perceived 
inequalities along economic, social, political and cultural dimensions. There is also a need 
for better temporal data on HIs. As time passes on there will be a constant supply of 
new household surveys from DHS and other sources, which will contribute to better 
temporal data.44 A related point, noted by Blattman & Miguel (2010) is that it would be 
extremely useful to have follow-up surveys of the same respondents in post-conflict 
settings. At present, I am aware of one such survey which was conducted before and 
after the genocide in Rwanda (Verwimp, 2005).  
There is also room for improvement with regard to the measurement of HIs. 
Existing work by e.g. Mancini, Stewart & Brown (2008); Esteban & Ray (2005); Zhang & 
Kanbur (2001) have provided some useful guidelines and starting points for measuring 
HIs, but, as pointed out in Chapter 2 in this dissertation, we have yet to see the ideal HI 
formula which accounts for both group size, intra- and inter-group inequalities. Probably 
it is not even possible to construct such a summary measure of HI which makes perfect 
sense, but it is clearly worthwhile to explore various possibilities. Related to this, there is 
a need for more disaggregated studies of HI and political violence – not only in the 
spatial sense, but also dissertating by e.g. ethnic groups regardless of whether the group 
is clustered geographically or not. The Minority at Risk project is currently being 
expanded to include groups which are judged to be ‘not at risk’ (Birnir & Inman, 2010).  
This dissertation has tested the individual effects of HIs along various group 
identifiers (ethnicity, religion, region, migrant status) and dimensions (economic, social, 
political). Future efforts should explore the conflict potential of cross-cutting cleavages – 
                                              
44 Furthermore, Baten & Fraunholz (2004), and Moradi & Baten (2005) have used 
anthropometric data from the DHS surveys to construct measures of inequality for pre-survey decades.  
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not only with regard to various dimensions, but also with regard to various group 
identifiers.45 For example, when spatial cleavages are reinforced by other social divisions 
such as ethnicity and religion, the threat of armed conflict should be much greater 
(Rokkan, 1967). I would assume that the coincidence between multiple group identifiers 
and structural socioeconomic and political inequalities could be particularly dangerous. 
The conflict between the rural-based Mayan groups and the urban-richer mestizo in 
Guatemala and between the poorer Muslim areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago 
and the richer Christian areas of the Philippines serve as good examples of this. 
Furthermore, as there seems to be quite a robust statistical relationship between 
HI and conflict, one of the most important challenges for future research should be to 
better account for the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. This requires 
extensive theorizing and carefully selected micro-level studies. In particular we need to 
better understand the relationship between objective and perceived inequalities. Stewart 
(2009: 16) holds that ‘people take action because of perceived injustices rather than 
because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be aware’. In general, 
one would expect there to be a high correlation between perceived and observed HIs. 
Hence, it is important to study perceptions, and their determinants too, since leaders, the 
media and educational institutions can affect individuals’ judgment of inequality and 
their own relative position in society, even when the actual situation remains unchanged. 
Perception surveys for a selection of countries have already been undertaken by 
researchers at Stewart’s Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicity (see e.g. Stewart, 2009).  
Finally, since there is growing evidence that HIs promote conflict, future efforts 
should focus on exploring the root causes of various HIs and also look at the reverse 
causality, including the effects of conflict on HIs. There are some examples of such 
studies with regard to the determinants of vertical inequalities (e.g. Bircan, Brück & 
Vothknecht, 2010; Bussmann, de Soysa & Oneal, 2005), but I am not familiar with 
similar systematic studies of the causes of HIs.  
                                              
45 See also a paper by Han & Mahoney (2010), for an argument about how groups to compare 
their economic status both relative to the state mean and relative to kin groups in other countries. 
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6.2. Policy implications 
Over the last couple of years, the research on horizontal inequalities and conflict has 
started to gain speed. The general finding that HIs breed political violence has proven to 
be remarkably robust – across very different data sources, measurements and research 
designs. In addition to Stewart’s qualitative case studies, this dissertation, as well as some 
other recent statistical evidence (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann, 2010), have 
demonstrated that HIs are positively related to political violence. Despite the growing 
academic interest in HIs, the international community has paid little attention to HIs 
(Stewart & Wang, 2006). Yet, the finding that HIs breed political violence has direct 
policy relevance.  
Where HIs are found to be severe, policies are needed to correct them. In our 
increasingly pluralistic societies, the reduction of horizontal inequalities should be part of 
development policy for all countries, not only the ones which are currently, or have 
recently been, in conflict. Such policies should include both the elimination of 
discrimination, and affirmative action providing positive bias in favor of certain relatively 
deprived groups. Furthermore, policies reducing HIs should cover economic, social and 
political areas.  
On the socio-economic side such policies might involve actions like public 
investment designed to reduce HIs, public (and private) sector employment and 
education policies to include group distribution requirements and policies toward land 
reforms. It should be stressed, however that policies developed to correct economic HIs 
can be tricky and in the worst case have the opposite effect with regard to conflict 
(Stewart, 2008). Tadjoeddin (2007) for example found that economic redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions has actually triggered conflict in Indonesia. Such examples 
demonstrate that successful redistributive policies are hard to design. Without economic 
growth, redistribution by definition cannot be pareto-optimal.46 Hence one should put 
much energy and resources in promoting more inclusive and sustainable growth. 
However, the effects of redistribution policies may also depend on other contextual 
                                              
46 Given a set of alternative allocations of goods or outcomes for a set of individuals, a change 
from one allocation to another that makes at least one individual better off without making any other 
individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement or a Pareto-optimal move. 
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factors. Ross (2007) explores various measures to reduce regional HIs within the context 
of mineral-rich states. He discusses various strategies, such as direct distribution, 
decentralization of mineral revenues, and government actions. For example, he argues, 
distributional issues are more likely to spur violence when the police or the military 
engages in predatory behavior. Various activities can curtail such actions, such as holding 
extensive consultations with local communities and NGOs. 
 Politically, there is a need for inclusion of minority groups to avoid the 
monopolization of political power by one group or another. This may be among the 
most difficult changes to bring about, since it is not an automatic result of democracy. 
Majority rule may lead to permanent rule by one ethnic group in situations where one 
group is in a strong numerical majority. Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland are examples of 
conflicts that occurred in democratic contexts. Democracy in sharply divided societies 
thus calls for some constraints to ensure an inclusive system, such as alternative voting 
systems or other forms of proportional representation, and decentralizing of 
governments to ensure power-sharing. Naturally, any appropriate policies depend on the 
main variants and root sources of the HIs in each society.  
6.3. Closing remarks: peace by piece 
In the first part of this introductory chapter, I introduced three main puzzles pertaining 
to both the general conflict literature, and more specifically to the inequality–conflict 
nexus: (I) ‘the quantitative–qualitative mismatch’; (II) the ‘ethnic paradox’; and (III) ‘the 
key and the lamppost’. To what extent has this dissertation contributed to filling the 
immense knowledge gap resulting from these three puzzles? In my own view, I think the 
joint insights from the various chapters have largely contributed to solving the first 
puzzle: The reason for the previous conflicting findings between the qualitative case 
literature and the quantitative literature as regards the inequality–conflict nexus is that 
the latter has largely missed the target. It is not vertical inequalities that matter for 
political violence, but horizontal inequalities.  
As regards the second, more general, challenge of explaining the causes of ethnic 
conflict, this project has at least added some critical pieces to the puzzle, demonstrating 
that systematic inequalities between groups can be one factor that distinguished peaceful 
from belligerent multiethnic societies. However, there may of course still be other 
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possible omitted variables which could better account for the phenomenon of ethnic 
violence.  
The final puzzle relates to the general problem of low quality or missing data for 
the poorest, most conflict-ridden countries of the world. All global studies of economic 
factors and conflict that I am aware of suffer more or less from this problem. In this 
dissertation, my focus on generating reliable and valid HI data for developing countries 
has hopefully contributed to ‘shedding some more light’ on some countries which often 
either drop out of large-N global regressions due to missing data on vital indicators, or 
which are analyzed despite low quality data on the same. For this reason, I close this 
introduction chapter with a general plea for better data. 
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Abstract: 
Insecurity has become a fact of life for urbanites in African and Asian cities. By the mid-
century, two-thirds of the world population will reside in urban areas. The bulk of this 
urban growth will take place in developing countries. Rural-urban migration is often seen 
as a consequence of climate change and increasing population pressure in the 
countryside. Rapid urbanization puts significant demands on city governments’ ability to 
provide public services like adequate housing, electricity, water supply, health care, 
education, and employment. Whereas average living standards are usually higher in 
urban areas, economic growth does not result in prosperity for all. Inequality among city 
dwellers is a potential source of frustration which could increase the potential for 
political radicalization and unrest – especially if certain groups are underprivileged and 
suffer from social exclusion. Drawing on household surveys the paper provides new 
indicators of internal migration, poverty and inter-individual and inter-group inequality 
for 34 cities in Africa and Asia for the period 1986–2006. These data are linked with a 
newly developed dataset on social disorder events in African and Asian cities. The results 
suggest that it is not the actual movement of rural people into the cities that creates 
social upheaval. Rather, overall poor and unequal educational opportunities as well as 
socioeconomic marginalization of rural-urban migrants are found to spur increased 
levels of lethal urban political violence. This implies that urban planners and decision-
makers should relax efforts at reducing the magnitude of cityward migration, and focus 
instead on promoting inclusive urban governance. 
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1. Introduction 
In low and middle-income countries, hundreds of millions of urban dwellers are at risk 
from the direct and indirect effects of climate change. Whereas extreme weather events 
in recent years exemplify the direct vulnerability of urban populations (Satterthwaite et 
al., 2007), climate change may also spur rapid urbanization, which in turn puts significant 
demands on cities’ ability to provide public services like electricity, water supply, health 
care, education, and employment.  
The majority of the world population now lives in cities. By 2050, two-thirds of 
the world population will reside in urban areas and the bulk of overall population growth 
will be absorbed by cities (UN, 2008). Most of this growth is driven by urbanization in 
parts of the world where enormous development challenges remain, particularly Africa 
and Asia. Climate change is likely to exacerbate this trend further. Rising sea levels and 
more extreme weather patterns could permanently displace an additional several hundred 
million people within the mid-century. Although the exact figures remain contested, 
researchers agree that much of this population movement will consist of rural-urban 
migration.  
The trend towards increasing urbanization plays an important role in the 
literature on environmental security. One reason for this is that rural-urban migration is 
usually seen as a consequence of high and increasing population pressure in the 
countryside, leading to rural scarcity of renewable resources like cropland, forests, and 
freshwater (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Various forms of environmental degradation, 
including desertification, prolonged droughts, and soil salinization, are other factors that 
might deteriorate agricultural livelihoods and push people to the cities. For example, in 
India there are certain villages that are now situated in the rain shadow of mountains, so 
that the monsoon rain can no longer provide a basis for rain-fed agriculture (Gruber et 
al., 2005). Whereas opportunities for employment are usually better in urban areas, labor 
markets cannot absorb fast-growing populations. Moreover, there has been an increasing 
trend of political violence in developing cities (Urdal, 2008). 
As indicated above, an underlying assumption in this paper is that climate change 
affects cityward migration. The main focus here is on whether rural-urban migration, 
poverty, and inequality affect the magnitude of urban social disorder. Urban violence has 
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become a major preoccupation of policymakers, planners and development practitioners 
in cities around the world. In recent years, massive public protest and riots in cities such 
as New Delhi, Karachi, and Johannesburg have resulted in significant loss of life and 
widespread poverty. These disturbances have at times been triggered by immediate 
economic circumstances, such as rising food prices (see e.g. Hendrix, Haggard & 
Magaloni, 2009), and in some cases, ethnic tensions have resulted in even higher death 
tolls and destruction (e.g. clashes between Hindus and Sikhs in New Delhi, and Mahajirs 
and Pathans in Karachi). However, according to Brennan (1999: 17), ‘urban crime and 
violence in the world’s largest cities is generally not a spontaneous occurrence, but rather 
the product of inequality and social exclusion.’ 
With the exception of some anecdotal evidence from case studies (e.g. Percival & 
Homer-Dixon, 1998), the links between various forms of inequality and poverty and 
urban violence have so far not been systematically tested in statistical studies. In fact, 
there has been a general scarcity of research concerning political and criminal armed 
violence in urban settings (Jütersonke, Krause & Muggah, 2007). To the best of my 
knowledge, only a handful of quantitative large-N studies have systematically addressed 
political instability and violence at the city level (Buhaug & Urdal, 2009; Hendrix, 
Haggard & Magaloni, 2009; Urdal & Hoelscher, 2009), but none of these have looked 
explicitly at the violence potential of migration-induced urbanization or urban poverty 
and inequality.  
In an effort to fill this knowledge gap, this paper explores to what extent rural-
urban migration and social exclusion of individuals and groups affect the patterns of 
social disorder and violence in urban centers. I use national surveys to construct new 
city-level data on a wide range of indicators relating to migration, household deprivation, 
education levels, as well as access to basic public services like drinking water, sanitation, 
and electricity. I also construct various measures of inequalities between individuals and 
groups. Combined with existing data on social urban disorder in 34 large cities in Africa 
and Asia I test various hypotheses related to the violence potential of urbanization, 
poverty and inequality (both between individuals and between migrants and non-
migrants). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents the theoretical 
framework and derives some hypotheses about the expected relationships between rural-
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urban migration, poverty, inequality and urban violence. Next, the research design 
demonstrates how national surveys can be used to generate city-level measures of 
demographic and socioeconomic factors with the aid of GIS software. Section 4 
presents the empirical tests and Section 5 concludes. The analyses provide no evidence 
for the claim that greater levels of rural-urban migration are associated with urban social 
disturbance. However, it is shown that various forms of both urban poverty and 
inequality are associated with increased levels of disorder. Notably, socioeconomic 
marginalization of rural-urban migrants seems to increase the number of lethal events of 
urban political violence.  
2. Migration, Socioeconomic Status, and Political Violence 
The broad literature on social movements and collective action emphasizes two main 
factors that may lead to group mobilization and violence: motive and opportunity. The 
main issues of concern in this study, migration, poverty and inequality, are usually 
associated with grievances and hence relate to what is generally referred to as the motive 
tradition in empirical studies of political violence. However, they could also increase the 
opportunity for violence (see e.g. Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998).  
Many theoretical approaches provide valuable insights as to how increasing urban 
population pressure could transform into political violence. Possible explanations range 
from ethnic hatreds and associated security dilemmas (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Posen, 1993) 
via modernization-based arguments of radicalization of aggrieved, unemployed youths 
and migrants (e.g. Huntington, 1996; Gizewski & Homer-Dixon, 1995) to theories of 
relative deprivation and inter-group-, or horizontal inequalities (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 
2008). Common to all of these contributions is their attention to the distribution of 
opportunities and privileges among the urban population. Below I discuss the potential 
harmful consequences of rural-urban migration as well as three factors closely associated 
with urbanization: poverty and inequality, and social exclusion of migrant populations.  
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2.1. Rural-urban migration  
There is a plethora of studies that link cityward migration – both within and across 
national boundaries – to social unrest.1 Rural-urban migration can influence both 
grievances and opportunities for violent mobilization. Various explanations include 
relative deprivation and radicalization of migrants, reduced opportunity costs, enhanced 
social communication networks, as well as ethnic frictions. Although urban in-migration 
consists of both urban-urban and rural-urban streams of migration, I focus on the latter, 
because people that live in rural areas are presumably more vulnerable to the immediate 
effects of climate change.  
First, as argued by Gizewski & Homer-Dixon (1995), the rapid influx of rural-
urban migrants tends not to be accommodated by public or private sectors. In turn, 
mobility expectations are not met, and the proximity of privileged elites among the old 
urban residents raises the migrants’ awareness of their marginal role in society. Hence, 
migrants are likely to experience rising relative deprivation (both relative to their own 
expectations and relative to others), which in turn is assumed to increase their likelihood 
to engage in violent political activities. However, this is not to say that political protest 
and violence are necessarily instigated by the migrants themselves. In India, for example, 
poor integration and assimilation methods have also fueled anti-migrant political 
movements among ‘sons of the soil’ who perceive that their urban status is threatened 
(Huang & Keepper, 2009). 
Second, migrants may have problems adjusting socially to the new life in the city. 
The disruption of old living habits and customs along with cultural conflicts may cause 
personal identity crises and primary group breakdown. As a result, traditional social 
control on deviant behavior is weakened, and for this reason, some scholars hold that 
migrants tend to be more easily recruited into radical movements (e.g. Gizewski & 
Homer-Dixon, 1995). The literature provides both older and more recent contributions 
that strongly oppose such portrayals of the ‘radicalized migrant’ (see e.g. Cornelius, 1972; 
Gilbert, 1999; Nelson, 1970). The main contrasting argument is that migrants are often 
                                              
1 Due to data restrictions, this paper exclusively tests the violence potential of internal cityward 
migration, but there is no obvious reason why the argument might not apply to international migration 
as well.  
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politically passive, and that the threat to political stability may not lie with the 
newcomers, but with those deprived slum dwellers who are long-standing urban 
residents. For example, Indian cities have witnessed sharp urban violence, often in the 
poorest slums, and sometimes directed at the new migrants from the countryside 
(Homer-Dixon, 1994: 27–28). 
A third factor linking cityward migration to political violence is that the urban 
environment includes high levels of social communication, implying intense competition 
for access to services and jobs among migrants and local urbanites (e.g. Reuveny, 2007). 
People concentrated in slums can communicate more easily than those scattered in rural 
villages. This may reinforce grievances and reduce coordination problems, thereby 
increasing the opportunities for engaging in collective mobilization.  
Forth, as a result of urban in-migration, cities can be socially, culturally, ethnically, 
and religiously diverse and this mixing of ethnicities and shifting demographic 
composition of urban centers is often cited as a major destabilizing factor (see e.g. Beall, 
Gua-Khasnobis, & Kanbur, 2010), especially when migrants and long-standing urban 
dwellers belong to different ethnic groups. All the processes discussed above somehow 
relate to group grievances, whereas the third and forth processes expand the 
opportunities for these grievances to be articulated and acted upon. The four processes 
could occur simultaneously, and they all lead to the same basic assumption that high 
urbanization rates are likely to lead to greater risks of urban political violence. 
There is some empirical evidence from particular cases supporting the 
urbanization-violence nexus (e.g. Huntington, 1996; Kahl, 2006; Percival & Homer-
Dixon, 1998), but to my knowledge, only one quantitative study (Buhaug & Urdal, 2009) 
has tested the link between urbanization and urban violence. They find no support for 
what they refer to as the ‘urbanization bomb.’ A limitation of Buhaug & Urdal’s study, 
however, is that they only test the impact of urban population growth (based on national 
data), and hence cannot distinguish between city-level in-migration and natural 
population growth.2 Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Increased levels of rural-urban in-migration are associated with higher levels of urban violence. 
                                              
2 Urbanization is a product of natural growth, migration and reclassification of rural land. 
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2.2. Absolute deprivation 
Despite the above discussion, it should be stressed that migrants are also often valued 
for their skills and contributions to society, and can benefit absorbing areas in several 
ways, including increasing the workforce and tax-base (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2008; 
Reuveny, 2007). Indeed, the general link between urbanization and socioeconomic 
development is rarely disputed. However, in many developing countries around the 
world, economic growth has not resulted in prosperity for all. Absolute deprivation, or 
poverty, has long been recognized as an important risk factor associated with crime and 
violence in urban areas (UN Habitat, 2008). For example, Brennan (1999: 18) holds that 
‘when considering the linkages between urbanization, environment, and security, clearly, 
the missing link is poverty’. Yet, Beall, Gua-Khasnobis, and Kanbur (2010: 11–12) argue 
that the development literature has been marked by a general lack of focus on or 
understanding of urban poverty issues. Mitlin (2004) argues that urban poverty has been 
relatively ignored by development specialists, and shows that nearly all Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have s a strong emphasis on the relative importance 
of rural poverty whereas most show a general lack of focus on urban poverty issues, 
although there is evidence that ‘poverty is becoming more urban’ (Beall, Guha-
Khasnobis & Kanbur, 2010: 7). 
In the coming decades, increasing numbers of cities in developing countries will 
have a high proportion of their population living in poverty, and will also suffer from 
severe environmental degradation. Poor environmental conditions are most likely to 
affect the poor residents in megacities. Although citywide violence will have worldwide 
consequences, raising concerns for regional stability and financial markets, it will more 
frequently consist of ‘the poor preying upon the poor’ (Brennan, 1999: 18). Of the three 
billion urban residents in the world today, one billion live in slums. The rapid growth of 
urban slums – although many of them can be vibrant communities – tends to be 
associated with poverty and crime (e.g. Davis, 2007). The struggle to survive can lead to 
social fragmentation, creating grievances that can manifest themselves in crime and 
political violence. Also, there should be less opportunity costs involved for the poor 
associated with engaging in violent activities. This substantiates a second hypothesis: 
H2: Higher levels of socioeconomic deprivation in urban populations are associated with higher levels of 
urban violence. 
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2.3. Individual relative deprivation 
A particularly important debate concerns the extent to which crime and urban political 
violence are causally rooted in poverty and/or inequality.  The dynamics of poverty is 
arguably different in cities than in rural areas. Whereas poverty exists virtually 
everywhere, inequality is primarily an urban phenomenon (Hamdi, 2007). At least, 
income inequalities are generally more marked in urban than in rural areas (Moser, 2004). 
Intra-city inequalities have risen as the gap between rich and poor has widened, e.g. as a 
result of key exclusionary factors relating to unequal access to employment, education, 
health and basic infrastructure. Perceptions of declining living conditions in big cities 
have been buttressed by literature that documents substantial and growing inequality 
within cities (Brockerhoff & Brennan, 1998). The problem, hence, is not necessarily 
urbanization or poverty per se, but could rather relate to the fact that it has not resulted 
in a more equal resource distribution. 
It is in relation to basic urban services that urban inequalities are often most 
evident, with poor slum-dwellers paying water vendors up to fifty times more for clean 
water than a resident living a stone’s throw away in a neighborhood which is fully 
serviced (Beall, Gua-Khasnobis & Kanbur, 2010). As Stephens (1996: 13) bluntly 
observed, ‘the poor pay more for their cholera’. Such patterns of urban inequality have 
provoked ominous visions of future cities. For example, Massey (1996: 410) argues that 
‘urban inequality entails escalating crime and violence punctuated by sporadic riots and 
increased terrorism as class tensions rise’. This perspective derives from a rich body of 
social conflict theory (often associated with Marx), and from a common idea that the 
disadvantaged of large cities will challenge the established urban social order violently. In 
order to test this argument I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Higher levels of inequality in urban populations are associated with higher levels of urban violence. 
2.4. Social exclusion of migrants 
Where access to various goods and opportunities is shaped by underlying social 
cleavages, such as class, religion or cultural, historical and geographical origin, political 
violence is more likely to unfold. Stewart refers to such group-based differentials as 
‘horizontal inequalities’ (see e.g. Stewart, 2008). Rural-urban migration can offer 
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individuals or groups opportunities to improve their situation, thereby potentially 
reducing nationwide inequalities. However, although migration might improve the 
socioeconomic situation of the migrants relative to their region of origin, it may create a 
new set of unequal relations and mechanisms in the recipient cities. 
For example, cases in which rural-urban migrant populations live in informal 
settlements under poor environmental and economic conditions can cause social 
segmentation ‘as subgroups within the community withdraw into themselves to protect 
their own interests’ (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998: 290). The basic thesis is that 
macro-social patterns of inequality lead to social isolation and ecological concentration 
of the relatively disadvantaged (most likely the migrants), which in turn gives rise to 
structural barriers and cultural adaptations that undermine social organization and the 
control of violence (Sampson & Wilson, 2005: 178). 
In a developing country marked by a dual economy, people living in a city may 
not be sensitive to the overall level of inequality (measured e.g. by the Gini coefficient) at 
the city level. Rather, as argued by Jiang, Lu and Sato (2008) segmented social groups in 
a city can be more concerned with the welfare status within their own reference group, 
and with the welfare gap between different social groups. They find support for this 
hypothesis, demonstrating a high correlation between inter group inequality and lack of 
happiness in Chinese cities. Jiang, Lu and Sato (2008) conclude that in China, the major 
form of the urban-rural divide has been transformed from a traditional dual economy 
between urban and rural sectors to a ‘dual society’ between urban residents and migrants 
in urban areas. 
Recent statistical studies have demonstrated a positive impact of horizontal 
inequalities on the risk of armed civil conflict at the national, regional and ethnic group 
level (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch & Weidmann, 2010; Østby, 2008; Østby, Nordås & Rød, 
2009). As civil wars typically take place in rural areas,3 this raises questions as to whether 
various kinds of inequality may have similar effects on urban violence. Sociological 
research in the United States has long identified racial inequalities as an important 
explanatory factor behind interracial violence in urban areas. A prominent example of 
this is Blau & Blau (1982) who in a study of American metropolitan areas, found that 
                                              
3 For a study of (exceptional) urban insurgencies, see Staniland (2010). 
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socioeconomic inequality between races, as well as economic inequality generally, 
increases rates of urban violence. Apart from these studies of US cities, there has not 
been much research on inter-group inequality and urban violence. This does not imply 
that such inequalities should be of less importance. On the contrary, Brown (2008: 262) 
argues that: 
…the experience of horizontal inequality is rooted in locality and day-to-
day interactions. The sense of relative deprivation experienced by a marginalized 
ethnic periphery vis-à-vis a distant and unvisited capital region, for instance, may 
be of much less political importance than inequalities relative to local residents 
who are seen as ‘representative’ of the dominant ethnic group, even if these 
latter inequalities are less severe. 
The majority of rural-urban migrants tell researchers that they have moved to the 
city because of better opportunities for employment (Gilbert, 1999). If such expectations 
are not met, migrants may feel frustration and despair, particularly if they feel 
discriminated against due to their origin. This justifies the final hypothesis tested here: 
H4: Greater relative deprivation of migrants compared to non-migrants is associated with higher levels of 
urban violence. 
3. Research Design 
The study covers all cities which are both included in the Urban Social Disorder dataset 
(Urdal & Hoelscher, 2009) and whose country has hosted at least one Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS), which will be described below. According to these criteria I obtain 
a sample consisting of 34 major cities in 31 different countries. As shown in Figure 1, 
most of the cities are located in developing countries, and the study covers 21 cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and 13 cities in Central- and East Asia. In total, I use information 
from 124,534  individual urban respondents from 89 different DHS surveys (covering 97 
individual city-survey-years)4, which equals an average of 1,284 respondents per city for 
each survey, and close to 3 surveys per city for the entire period. The unit of analysis is 
the city-year, covering the years 1986–2006.5 
                                              
4 Two DHS countries have more than one city which is part of the present study: India 
(Calcutta, Mumbai, and New Delhi); Pakistan (Islamabad and Karachi). Hence the different numbers for  
surveys and city-survey-years. 
5 See Appendix D for a list of the DHS surveys used in the analyses. 
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Figure 1. Cities Covered in the Analyses  
 
 
The new PRIO dataset on Urban Social Disorder (USD) (Urdal, 2008; Urdal & 
Hoelscher, 2009) is compiled from electronic news reports in the ‘Keesing’s Record of 
World Events’ (KRWE). The dataset covers different forms of both violent and non-
violent politically motivated disorder, including demonstrations, rioting, terrorism and 
armed conflict. Each event is coded with precise date and location. In this study I use 
two count measures of urban social disorder aggregated to the annual level for each city. 
Due to emerging evidence that lethal and nonlethal urban violence are not necessarily 
explained by the same factors (Buhaug & Urdal, 2009; Urdal & Hoelscher, 2009), I 
distinguish between lethal events, including only those events reported to have resulted in 
at least one death, and non-lethal events, which include only the events where no deaths 
were reported.6 
For the spatio-temporal domain covered in this study (34 cities in 1986–2006), a 
total of 1,056 events are registered in the USD dataset, of which 476 (45.1%) are 
reported to have lead to fatalities. Correspondingly, 39.5% of all city-years covered here 
experienced non-lethal events, while 34.1% of the observations hosted at least one lethal 
                                              
6 See Buhaug & Urdal (2009) for a discussion of potential caveats associated with the USD data. 
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event.7 According to the USD data there has been a slight increase in the average 
number of urban disorder events (both lethal and non-lethal) over the last 50 years. This 
weak trend is also evident for the 34 cities and the time-period covered in the current 
study, although there is strong inter-annual variation (see also Urdal, 2008).  
The map in Figure 2 displays the accumulate number of lethal and non-lethal 
events by city for the period 1986–2006. Larger pies indicate a higher number of urban 
social disorder events, and dark grey shade refers to lethal events, whereas light grey 
shade refers to non-lethal events. The map reveals that the cities with the highest 
prevalence of events are located in Asia, such as e.g. Dhaka, Jakarta, Karachi, and New 
Delhi but there are also a number of African cities which are among the hotspots of 
urban political violence, such as Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos, and Nairobi. 
Figure 2. Accumulated Urban Social Disorder Events by Type in 34 Cities, 1986–
2006 
 
 
The main explanatory variables (used to test Hypotheses 1–4) are rural-urban in-
migration, and various forms of absolute deprivation, inequality and migrant relative 
                                              
7 See Appendix B for event counts by city. 
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deprivation. To my knowledge, this is the first study of urban violence to include such 
variables explicitly measured for each individual city. My new city-level data on in-
migration and socioeconomic indicators are computed from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS).8 
 MEASURE DHS is a worldwide ongoing research project providing data and 
analysis on the population, health, and nutrition of women and children in developing 
countries. Since 1984, the DHS project has carried out more than 240 surveys in 85 
countries. In a DHS, a sample of households is selected throughout the entire country. 
Women between the ages of 15 and 49 are interviewed about health, nutrition, and other 
issues, such as ethnicity, education, housing quality, and access to public services like 
drinking water and sanitation facilities. Typically, DHS surveys cover more than 10,000 
respondents representing urban and rural areas and provinces/states. DHS surveys are 
conducted every four to five years in most countries, with the same questions asked in 
each survey to facilitate comparisons across time and space.  This provides a rich data 
source from which one can construct indicators of in-migration as well as absolute and 
relative poverty at the city level. The DHS hence provide a unique opportunity for 
generating new data that are hard to find elsewhere, such as measures of inequality and 
social exclusion, which tend to be politically sensitive. 
The process of matching the data on urban disturbances with survey data on 
individuals and households from the DHS implies some challenges. The first step before 
I could generate the explanatory variables from DHS was to identify the respondents for 
each city in question. In the standard DHS survey form, not even the city name is 
provided for urban residents; it only includes a variable for the region of residence of 
each respondent. Furthermore, the DHS definition of ‘region’ is often broader and 
cruder than the official first-level administrative units. But recently the DHS has begun 
to include detailed information about the exact location of each sample cluster, 
providing geographical coordinates for each surveyed location (village/town/city). This 
opens up the possibility to aggregate specific city-level measures, which is described in 
the following procedure: 
                                              
8 See www.measuredhs.com. 
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First, each file with DHS survey coordinates was imported into ArcGIS and 
overlaid with shapefiles of African and Asian cities (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød, 2009) 
and first level administrative units (ESRI, 1998). I then identified all the coordinates 
which fall inside the administrative unit in which the city in question is located,9 as 
illustrated in Figure 3 below. The figure shows a map of Nigeria with administrative 
units, zooming in the national capital region of Lagos. The black dots indicate the 
location of the DHS survey clusters. I selected the dots which fall within the same 
polygon as Lagos city.10 Next, I merged each survey file to the corresponding geographic 
file with the cluster coordinates so that each respondent is associated with a specific 
geographical location. I censored all rural respondents, so that the basis for constructing 
city variables truly reflected the situation of city dwellers, not including rural respondents 
in the surrounding areas. However, in most cases, this was unnecessary, as all 
respondents within the small region of each city were actually urban residents. Finally, 
when the city dweller respondents had been identified for each survey,11 I calculated 
aggregate city-level measures as described below. 
                                              
9 The reason for doing this rather than selecting only the coordinates that overlap with the city 
coordinates, is to maximize the number of coordinates (and hence the number of respondents). 
10 In some cases this procedure required some manual corrections (see Appendix C). 
11 For surveys lacking GIS data I selected respondents from the DHS-defined region 
surrounding the city. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of DHS Survey Sample Points in Nigeria, 1990 
 
3.1. Generating the main explanatory variables  
In order to test the first hypothesis I construct a variable for rural-urban in-migration 
(rural-urban migration). A big advantage with the DHS surveys is that they report the 
number of years each respondent has lived in the village, town, or city where s/he was 
interviewed, as well as information about the previous place of residence. This facilitates 
generating migration-induced urbanization for each city, which constitutes a refinement 
compared to previous studies, which rely on overall urban population growth to proxy 
urbanization. More specifically, following Omariba & Boyle (2009), the term for rural-
urban migration is calculated as the percentage of city dwellers who have resided in the 
city in question less than five years, and whose previous area of residence was 
characterized as ‘countryside’ For comparison, I also calculate a more general in-
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migration term not distinguishing between the migrants who previously lived in other 
cities, towns or the countryside. Respondents who are just visitors to the city are 
excluded for both terms. As shown in Appendix A, the average share of total in-
migration to a city is app. 22%, whereas the average share of rural-urban migration is 
app. 7%. Hence, at least for my sample, the majority of in-migrants actually come from 
other towns or cities. 
In the current development debate, poverty is often associated with the lack of 
both tangible and non-tangible assets (e.g. Sen, 1992; Stewart, 2008). Based on the 
assumption that various environmental and socioeconomic factors could have different 
violence potential, I include a wide set of indicators for absolute and relative deprivation. 
The DHS surveys do not contain information on incomes or consumption expenditure, 
but I rely on information on consumer durables. In poor countries, where most people 
are part of the informal sectors, household goods might better capture variations in 
welfare than GDP per capita (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). Hence, I first construct an 
additive index of household standard of living in cities based on ownership of household 
assets: TV, radio, refrigerator, bicycle, car, and motorcycle. I then calculate the average 
ownership of such assets per city. The measure potentially reaches from 0 (no one owns 
a single asset) to 1 (everyone possesses all assets). My second indicator of city-level 
welfare is average years of education completed for city dwellers. Finally, I add a third 
dimension: Access to public services (PS). This measure is an additive index composed of 
three variables: whether each household has piped water, a flush toilet, and electricity).12 
This is constructed the same way as the asset measure, so that higher values indicate 
more welfare. I argue that such indicators of public services can be used as a basic 
measure of urban quality of life, and they provide a fundamental reflection of equity in 
policy. 
In order to test the third hypothesis, I also calculate Gini coefficients13 of intra-
city inequality between individuals with regard to the three dimensions assets, education 
                                              
12 Conceptually, this index bears resemblance to the UN’s definition of a slum household (see 
Thomas, 2008: 65). 
13 The Gini coefficient  ranges from  0 (totally egalitarian distribution) to 1 (complete 
concentration). 
220
 Internal Migration, Inequality and Urban Social Disorder 
 
and PS. Finally, for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 4, I combine the information on 
respondents’ well-being and settlement history to construct measures on inequalities 
between rural-urban migrants and non-migrants. Using the formula provided by Østby, 
Nordås & Rød (2009) I calculate rural-urban migrant relative deprivation (MRD) as the 
relative performance of each group of rural-urban migrants compared to the 
performance of the rest of the city population: 
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where M is the maximum number of household assets and A1 refers to mean 
asset score of the migrant population and A2 is the corresponding mean score of other 
residents in the city. The value ‘0’ indicates perfect equality, negative values indicate 
relative deprivation of migrants and positive values indicate relative privilege of migrants. 
In fact if one compares all migrants (including both rural-urban and urban-to urban 
migrants) there is hardly any difference at all between this group and the rest of the city 
population (which can be seen from the near to zero averages for these terms in 
Appendix A). However, the differences are much stronger between rural-urban migrants 
and the ‘born’ city dwellers, usually in favor of the latter group.  
Summing up, in addition to the pure rural-urban migration measure, I construct 
measures if overall absolute deprivation; intra-individual inequality and migrant relative 
deprivation along the three dimensions assets, education, and public services.14  
3.2. Control variables and statistical model 
Following Buhaug & Urdal (2009) I include the following controls: city population size 
(UN, annual); level of (national) development, represented by log-transformed real GDP per 
capita (World Bank, 2009), (national) economic growth (annual growth in GDP per capita); 
regime type (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003). Also, by the aid of ArcGIS I construct a variable 
measuring the distance in kilometers from each city to the closest armed conflict in the 
year of observation in order to control for potential spillover effects of ongoing armed 
                                              
14 Since the DHS surveys are not conducted annually, I interpolate, and extrapolate as 
appropriate to maximize the number of observations. 
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conflicts.15 More specifically, I measured the shortest distance from each city point to 
the border of the closest armed conflict zone. The latter information (geographical 
coordinates for conflict centre as well as radius corresponding to conflict circle) is 
available from the PRIO Conflict Site dataset.16 Appendix A provides descriptive 
statistics for all the variables included in the analyses. 
The dependent variable is an integer count of events, within a cross-sectional 
time-series structure. I use negative binomial regression to analyze the data. Based on the 
residuals from a panel-corrected OLS model, auto-correlated errors do not seem to be a 
problem in this sample.17 Lagged dependent variables are therefore not included. The 
negative binomial regression is able to correct for data series where the variance is 
different from the mean. However, in this sample, over-dispersion is city-specific. 
Hence, fixed effects are used to produce regression estimates conditional on each city's 
unique over-dispersion.18  
4. Results 
This section reports the results from the multivariate empirical evaluations of the 
proposed Hypotheses 1–4, which are conducted by means of three sets of regression 
models represented in Tables 1–3 below. All the models include the terms for city 
population, the country-level controls for GDP per capita, economic growth, and regime 
type, as well as the distance from each city to the nearest ongoing armed conflict. Finally, 
each model includes one of the main explanatory variables: the percentage of rural-urban 
migration, measured at the city-level. Since the other explanatory variables are closely 
associated with each other, both conceptually and correlationally, the terms for poverty, 
                                              
15  For generating the distance measure I apply the Winkel-Tripel map projection, which, 
according to Goldberg & Gott (2007) is the best overall whole-earth map projection known, producing 
very small distance errors, small combinations of ellipicity and area errors, and the smallest skewness of 
any map.  
16 See  http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Conflict-Site/. 
17 Using the Stata 11.0 xtregar procedure, Durbin/Watson values were consistently within the 
acceptable interval for a number of different model specifications (Baltagi & Wu, 1999). 
18 It is only the over-dispersion parameter that is city-specific. The intercept is estimated as 
normal. 
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inequality and migrant relative deprivation are introduced in separate models. Since lethal 
and non-lethal urban disturbances are reported to be associated with slightly different 
patterns (Urdal & Hoelscher, 2009), I use two different dependent variables, so that each 
model is tested with regard to both lethal and non-lethal events. 
Table 1 displays the results of the basic model including the term for rural-urban 
migration as well as the three city-level measures of absolute deprivation (average level 
of household asset ownership; education years, and access to public services). Contrary 
to Hypothesis 1, there seems to be no effect of the level of rural-urban migration on the 
frequency of political disorder, be it lethal or non-lethal. All the coefficients are positive, 
but the effect never reaches significance in Models 1a–3b. Buhaug & Urdal (2009) find 
similar results for their more crude measure of urbanization (overall urban population 
growth).19 
The terms for urban absolute deprivation, or poverty, produce some mixed 
findings. Overall, Models 1a–3b yield little support to Hypothesis 2, assuming a positive 
relationship between poverty and urban violence. The one exception to this is Model 2a, 
which reveals a slightly significant negative effect of education on the number of lethal 
events. In other words, cities with less educated inhabitants are likely to see more events 
of lethal urban disorder. Contrastingly, the coefficients for the other two alternative 
measures of absolute deprivation have signs in the opposite direction, and the positive 
effect of public services is even statistically significant.  
Whereas the finding that cities with better overall access to basic public services 
see more events of non-lethal violence is hard to qualify, the control variables provide a 
clearer picture as to what explains urban violence. The term for city population is 
constantly associated with disorder, although it never reaches statistical significance.20 
                                              
19 I also tried to replace the term for rural-urban migration with all urban in-migration (including 
urban-urban migration). This also enables me to include four additional cities in the analysis: Colombo, 
Hanoi, Saigon, and Tashkent (since the DHS in these cities do have information on years lived in the 
present location, although they lack sufficient information to distinguish between rural-urban and urban-
urban migrants). However,  the coefficient for migration remained statistically insignificant, regardless of 
the inclusion of these four cities (results not reported here).  
20 Buhaug & Urdal (2009) and Urdal & Hoelscher (2009) find a positive and significant effect of 
city population with a bigger sample. 
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Somewhat counter-intuitively, higher national income levels are associated with 
increased levels of political violence in all models below, although the effects are only 
statistically significant for non-lethal disturbance. This could be interpreted so that 
increasing development implies more to loot or fight over among city dwellers. 
However, since the term is measured at the national level it is hard to draw any clear 
conclusions.21 Again, coinciding with the findings of Urdal & Hoelscher (2009) and 
Buhaug & Urdal (2009), the negative squared term for regime type indicates that semi-
autocratic regimes appear to have higher levels of both lethal and non-lethal events than 
both autocracies and democracies. Furthermore, there seems to be a clear negative effect 
of distance to nearest armed conflict on the frequency of lethal events. 
Table 1. Rural-Urban Migration, Absolute Deprivation and Urban Social Disorder 
 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 
 Lethal Non-lethal  Lethal Non-lethal Lethal Non-lethal 
R-U migration 2.242 3.312 1.687 1.608 0.751 2.787 
 (4.403) (3.210)  (4.026)  (3.0800)  (3.644)  (2.842)  
Assets 2.011 2.076     
(2.169)  (1.487)      
Education   –0.156* 0.059   
  (0.093)  (0.086)    
Public services     1.246 2.389*** 
    (0.834)  (0.722)  
City population 0.0024 0.0023 0.0035 0.0018 0.0027 0.00062 
(0.0042)  (0.0037)  (0.0039)  (0.0038)  (0.0040)  (0.0038)  
GDP capita 0.191 0.566** 0.386 0.579** 0.216 0.603** 
(0.308)  (0.258)  (0.274)  (0.273)  (0.305)  (0.270)  
Growth –6.096*** –6.614*** –6.051*** –6.491*** –5.825*** –6.014*** 
(1.423) (1.222) (1.434) (1.235) (1.470) (1.308) 
Polity 0.0066 –0.0033 0.013 –0.0019 0.0094 –0.0085 
 (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
Polity, sq. –0.013*** –0.0076** –0.014*** –0.0083*** –0.014*** –0.0083*** 
(0.0032)  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0029)  
Distance conf. –0.00045*** –0.00025* –0.00046*** 0.00022 –0.00041*** 0.00017 
(0.00016)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00013)  
Constant –0.871 –3.824** –0.257 –3.202** –0.983 –4.489*** 
(1.795)  (1.500)  (1.548)  (1.508)  (1.795)  (1.550)  
χ2 51.34 47.09 52.11 44.79 52.24 53.04 
Observations 693 693 693 693 693 693 
Number of cities 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Negative binomial regression with fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
                                              
21 I also tested the effect of a more disaggregated measure of economic output based on 
Nordhaus’ (2006) G-Econ dataset, which records economic output per 1 x 1 degree grid cell (for details, 
see http://gecon.yale.edu/) This also returned a positive, although insignificant, coefficient for nonlethal 
events, and a negative insignificant coefficient for lethal events. 
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In Table 2, the models are estimated with the same controls as in Table 1. 
However, here I introduce three measures of intra-individual inequality along the three 
dimensions of household welfare, education, and access to basic public services. The 
results are a bit unclear. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the inequality terms are actually 
negative in 4 out of 6 models, and even significantly so for the case of asset inequality 
and non-lethal disturbance. On the other hand, with regard to lethal disturbance events, 
there seems to be a positive impact of inequality in terms of access to education, as 
shown in Model 5a. That is, in cities where the inhabitants have very unequal access to 
education, the prevalence of lethal violence is higher. This provides some support for 
Hypothesis 3, and indicates that city governments should aim to increase the educational 
opportunities to include the less privileged strata of society.  
Table 2. Testing the Effect of Inequality on Urban Social Disorder 
 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 
 Lethal Non-lethal Lethal Non-lethal Lethal Non-lethal 
R-U Migration 0.778 4.276 2.527 1.785 0.907 1.854 
(3.965) (3.046)  (4.123)  (3.058)  (4.045)  (3.027)  
Gini (Assets) –0.124 –4.205**     
(2.610)  (2.013)      
Gini (Education)   2.587** –0.168   
  (1.239)  (1.209)    
Gini (PS)     0.259 –0.458 
    (1.069)  (0.967)  
City population 0.0031 0.00060 0.0023 0.0024 0.0031 0.0024 
(0.0042)  (0.0039)  (0.0040)  (0.0037)  (0.0041)  (0.0037)  
GDP capita 0.252 0.512* 0.396 0.609** 0.261 0.598** 
 (0.311) (0.273) (0.266) (0.272) (0.304) (0.264) 
Growth –6.040*** –6.491*** –6.048*** –6.527*** –6.043*** –6.523*** 
(1.425)  (1.217)  (1.437)  (1.239)  (1.421)  (1.242)  
Polity 0.010 –0.0070 0.010 –0.0011 0.010 –0.0018 
(0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
Polity, sq. –0.014*** –0.0081*** –0.014*** –0.0077*** –0.014*** –0.0077*** 
(0.0032)  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0029)  
Distance conf. –0.00043*** –0.00024* –0.00047*** 0.00022 –0.00044*** 0.00021 
(0.00015)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00014)  
Constant –0.334 –1.042 –2.368 –2.994* –0.486 –2.917* 
 (2.223) (1.836) (1.734) (1.806) (1.799) (1.534) 
χ2 50.72 49.58 53.21 44.39 50.91 44.33 
Observations 693 693 693 693 693 693 
Number of cities 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Negative binomial regression with fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Finally, in Table 3, I test the forth hypothesis, introducing to the model the terms 
for relative deprivation of in-migrants coming to the city from rural areas. Again, the 
measures are calculated along the three dimensions of general household welfare, 
education, and access to public services. Two result stand out: First, Model 7a reveals 
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that there seems to be a stronger violence potential for relative household deprivation of 
city dwellers that have migrated to the city from rural areas. In other words, systematic 
deprivation of rural-urban migrants with regards to household assets is positively 
associated with lethal urban disorder.  
Table 3. Testing the Effect of Migrant Relative Deprivation on Urban Social 
Disorder 
 7a 7b 8a 8b 9a 9b 
 Lethal Non-lethal Lethal Non-lethal Lethal Non-lethal 
R-U Migration 0.533 1.655 –0.140 1.880 –0.116 1.397 
(3.848) (3.116)  (3.827)  (3.075)  (3.956)  (3.114)  
MRD (Assets) 2.169** 0.165     
(0.881)  (0.728)      
MRD (Education)   0.681 –0.060   
  (0.505)  (0.351)    
MRD (PS)     1.305* 0.416 
    (0.765 (0.676 
City population 0.0011 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0023 
(0.0044)  (0.0037)  (0.0040)  (0.0037)  (0.0041)  (0.0037)  
GDP capita 0.285 0.630** 0.239 0.619** 0.239 0.624** 
(0.337)  (0.265)  (0.295)  (0.260)  (0.324)  (0.263)  
Growth –6.035*** –6.529*** –5.986*** –6.535*** –6.000*** –6.520*** 
(1.431)  (1.241)  (1.416)  (1.239)  (1.425)  (1.240)  
Polity 0.0086 –0.0010 0.0092 –0.00091 0.011 –0.0011 
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
Polity, sq. –0.014*** –0.0077*** –0.014*** –0.0077*** –0.013*** –0.0077*** 
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.0029) 
Distance conf. –0.00046*** 0.00022 –0.00043*** 0.00022 –0.00046*** –0.00024* 
(0.00016)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00014)  (0.00016)  (0.00014)  
Constant –0.771 –3.223** –0.409 –3.128** –0.316 –3.148** 
(1.921)  (1.508)  (1.725)  (1.460)  (1.862)  (1.474)  
χ2 56.33 44.33 52.55 44.34 53.84 44.80 
Observations 693 693 693 693 693 693 
Number of cities 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Negative binomial regression with fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The map in Figure 4 displays the mean level of relative deprivation and 
accumulated number of lethal events for each of the 34 cities over the entire period, with 
white circles representing the number of lethal events and black circles representing the 
level of migrant relative deprivation. The level of overlap (indicated by gray shade) 
suggest in which cities this relationship indeed seems to play out, such as New Delhi and 
Johannesburg. 
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Figure 4. Migrant Relative Deprivation and Total Lethal Events in 34 Cities, 
1986–2006 
 
The predictive power of Model 7a is visualized in Figure 5 using the Clarify 
package (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). The vertical axis shows the number of 
estimated lethal events per year, and the horizontal axis represents the level of migrant 
relative deprivation. The line represents the best, or the most frequent, estimate, while 
the bars represent an 80% confidence interval.22 As we see the number of lethal events is 
relatively low in the right side of the graph. The gradual increase of the curve gains 
momentum when the relative deprivation of migrants is larger than .3, and on the right 
hand side of the scale, we expect at least 3 events per year, most likely 6 and maybe as 
many as 14, with 80% certainty, whereas the parallel figures for a situation with parity 
would be 2, 3 and 4. These estimates are simulated for a city with all other parameters 
equal to that of New Delhi.  
                                              
22 The 80% interval was chosen to illustrate the effect, not to test any hypothesis. Using the 
normal 95% confidence interval, the illustration would be more dramatic and less effective. 
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Figure 5. Estimated Number of Annual Violent Events by Migrant Relative 
Deprivation  
 
The positive coefficient for migrant relative deprivation holds when the term for 
household assets is replaced with public services in Model 9a. Migrant relative 
deprivation with regard to education has opposite signs (but neither is significant) with 
regard to lethal and non-lethal events.23 The lack of effect with regard to educational 
marginalization of migrants (Model 8a), is perhaps not so surprising. Assuming that a 
fair amount of the people who migrate from the rural areas to the cities have already 
passed the typical age for undertaking education, it is a less valid grievance indicator that 
born city dwellers are on average more highly educated. However, if moving to the city 
does not lead to higher living standards in terms of actual household welfare and access 
to basic social services, this could arguably generate more frustration. This underscores 
the need for increased public sector investments to ensure inclusive basic service delivery 
in urban areas. 
                                              
23 Replacing my MRD measure with Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch’ (2010) formula for ‘low’ 
inequality (Migrant score (g) /Non-migrant score (G) if g < G, 0 otherwise) does not change the results. 
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The findings reported above are robust to alternative specifications, outlier 
analysis, and the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Also, models with a binary 
dependent variable24 produce similar results. Finally, there could be an endogeneity 
problem with my analysis given that some of the independent variables are based on 
surveys which were carried out late in the sample period. In order to account for this 
potential problem, I reran the tests using only the years in which a DHS survey was 
conducted and allowing for interpolation between these. The results remained largely 
unchanged. 
5. Conclusions 
Urban populations, particularly in developing countries, will continue to grow over the 
next decades. Much of this urban growth is due to increasing rural-urban migration, 
which is partly caused by climate change and environmental scarcity in the countryside. 
Simultaneously, the amount of urban violence has been increasing since the 1960s 
(Urdal, 2008), putting large numbers of urban dwellers at risk. Citywide violence may 
also have serious global effects, such as destabilizing worldwide financial markets and 
destroying infrastructure, thereby affecting already fragile national economies, or igniting 
violence in entire regions (Rosan, Ruble & Tulchin, 2000). Hence, there is a great need 
for studies enhancing our knowledge on the determinants of urban disturbances. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to systematically investigate the 
relationship between in-migration, socioeconomic well-being and political violence with 
city-level data. Applying GIS tools on national demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), 
I have generated city-level measures of absolute and relative deprivation along three 
dimensions: household assets; educational attainment; and access to basic public 
services, such as drinking water, sewage, and electricity. Based on these three dimensions 
I have tested the violence potential of absolute deprivation, intra-individual inequality 
(Gini), as well as inter-group inequality, or relative deprivation of rural-to urban migrants 
compared to the rest of the city population.  
Existing quantitative research on the security consequences of high urban 
population growth has produced little support for the widespread concern over 
                                              
24 The alternative variable takes the value 1 if a city-year experiences >1 lethal event. 
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increasing urban violence. With a more nuanced measure of rural-urban migration, this 
study adds momentum to the general conclusion that urbanization does not seem to 
foster social urban disturbance in itself. This should relax official attempts to reduce the 
magnitude of cityward migration per se, as it is not the movement of people as such that 
seems to create problems. I do find, however, that both inter-individual and inter-group 
inequalities between migrants and non-migrants seem to matter for lethal forms of urban 
political violence, which entails some clear policy implications. City governments and 
other decision-makers are best advised to aim at facilitating more equitable access to 
education and basic social services among city dwellers. Establishing formal institutions 
to help migrants assimilate into the social and economic life of the city should mitigate 
social fragmentation and reduce the level of urban violence. 
Admittedly, the present study is associated with some shortcomings and 
challenges, which should inspire future efforts within this research portfolio. For 
example, one might question whether the DHS surveys are sufficiently representative at 
the city level (see e.g. Montgomery, 2003). However, because the sample of cities 
consists of national capitals and other large cities, this should not present a significant 
problem, at least regarding the poverty and inequality terms. But in the absence of 
national census data, the migration figures should be interpreted with some caution (see 
e.g. Bhagat, 2005). Furthermore, the DHS data only cover a limited number of cities and 
years. Future studies should look for other potential sources for coding city-level 
variables on socioeconomic well-being. 
The combination of GIS tools and survey data opens up a lot of possibilities in 
terms of new data generation. However, while aggregated city level studies may yield 
important insights into systematic patterns between structural explanatory variables like 
migrant relative deprivation and urban violence, such studies (including this one) involve 
critical assumptions about individual-level behavior that may be potentially flawed. Even 
where inequalities are associated with violence, assuming that it is the personally most 
aggrieved individuals who are engaging in violence could, in principle, constitute an 
ecological fallacy. National surveys like the DHS do not usually provide information 
about perceptions of (or involvement in) political violence, or reasons for migrating to 
the city. This underscores the need for carefully designed micro-level studies. 
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APPENDICES Chapter 1 
Appendix A1. New Tests with Updated Data on HIs 
The current updating of the DHS project makes it possible to continuously update the 
HI data. Many new countries and surveys have been included since the two first chapters 
in this dissertation (Østby, 2008a,b) were published. In order to check whether my 
original results remain robust in a larger sample of countries, I have updated the data and 
rerun some basic tests of the effect from HIs to civil conflict onset. The updated study 
includes data from 177 national surveys in 73 countries, with more than 11,000 
respondents per survey on average. In fact, the analyses in this paper are based on 
2,016,932 individuals (women). Appendix A2 provides a complete list of the surveys 
(countries and survey years) used to generate the HI variables. As demonstrated in 
Figure A1 (taken from Østby & Strand, 2010), the results from Chapters 1 & 2 remain 
largely the same. Based on this updated dataset I have also singled out the effects for the 
African countries, to investigate whether HIs may be particularly relevant in Africa 
(Østby & Strand, 2010). 
Figure A1. Six Horizontal Inequality Measures Compared, Global vs. SSA Sample  
 
See Appendix A3 for full multiple regression model output. Control variables are economic 
development, population size and conflict history. 
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Figure A1 reports the effects of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities (measured 
in terms of household assets and education years) with regard to conflict onset. I test the 
impact of HIs between ethnic, religious, and regional groups respectively for the Sub 
Saharan Africa sample vs. the global sample. The figure summarizes the results from 12 
regression models with six different measures of horizontal inequalities and two different 
samples (see Appendix A3 for full regression model output). I look at two dimensions of 
inequality (household assets and education) which are both calculated for three different 
group identifiers (ethnic, religious, and regional groups). The six measures are applied to 
both the global sample of countries with DHS surveys and Africa South of Sahara (SSA), 
and all models include control variables are economic development, population size and 
conflict history. The dots in Figure A1 refer the estimated difference in the risk of 
conflict onset between a country with very low and very high horizontal inequalities (5th 
and 95th percentile on the corresponding HI measure) when both of these countries are 
otherwise similar and typical for the sample median (quite similar to Guinea for the SSA 
sample). The lines are the 95% confidence intervals for this difference of conflict risk.  
Overall, Figure A1 reveals that three of the HI measures stand out as particularly 
strong and significant for the global sample: Ethnic inequality in terms of education and 
both of the measures of regional divides (i.e. inequality in terms of both household 
assets and education between the capital region and other regions) Religious divides do 
not appear to be very important (although both effects are significant at the 10 and 5 
percent level of significance, respectively, as can also be seen in Appendix A3). 
Ethnically based asset inequality is positive but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Both asset and education yield strong and substantially important effects for regional 
inequality, which also is estimated on the largest number of cases.1 While the uncertainty 
regarding the estimates for ethnic- and religious-based asset inequality is larger than the 
accepted level of 95%, the over-all impression from Figure A1 is that horizontal 
inequality is strongly linked with armed conflict.  
  
                                              
1 The reason for the differences in N is the different availability of data. All the DHS surveys include questions 
regarding regional affiliation, but several surveys exclude questions about ethnic and religious affiliations. 
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Appendix A2. DHS Surveys Used to Generate the HI Variables 
No.   GWno   GWname Year(s)   DHS code    Respondents 
1   41   Haiti 1994-95   HTIR31 5,356 
2   41   Haiti 2000   HTIR42 10,159 
3   41   Haiti 2005-06   HTIR52 10,757 
4   42   Dominican Republic 1986   DRIR01 7,645 
5   42   Dominican Republic 1991   DRIR21 7,320 
6   42   Dominican Republic 1996   DRIR32 8,422 
7   42   Dominican Republic 1999   DRIR41 1,286 
8   42   Dominican Republic 2002   DRIR4A   23,384 
9   42   Dominican Republic 2007   DRIR52   27,195 
10   52   Trinidad and Tobago 1987   TTIR01   3,806 
11   70   Mexico 1987   MXIR00   9,310 
12   90   Guatemala 1987   GUIR01   5,160 
13   90   Guatemala 1995   GUIR34   12,403 
14   91   Honduras 2005-06   HNIR51   19,948 
15   93   Nicaragua 1998   NCIR31   13,634 
16   93   Nicaragua 2001   NCIR41   13,060 
17   100   Colombia 1986   COIR01   5,329 
18   100   Colombia 1990   COIR22   8,644 
19   100   Colombia 1995   COIR31   11,140 
20   100   Colombia 2000   COIR41   11,585 
21   100   Colombia 2005   COIR51   41,344 
22   110   Guyana 2005   GYIR50   4,300 
23   130   Ecuador 1987   ECIR01   4,713 
24   135   Peru 1986   PEIR01   4,999 
25   135   Peru 1991-92   PEIR21   15,882 
26   135   Peru 1996   PEIR31   28,951 
27   135   Peru 2000   PEIR41   27,843 
28   135   Peru 2004-08   PEIR50   12,465 
29   140   Brazil 1986   BRIR01   5,892 
30   140   Brazil 1991   BRIR21   6,223 
31   140   Brazil 1996   BRIR31   12,612 
32   145   Bolivia 1989   BOIR01   7,923 
33   145   Bolivia 1994   BOIR31   8,603 
34   145   Bolivia 1998   BOIR3B   11,187 
35   145   Bolivia 2003   BOIR41   17,654 
36   150   Paraguay 1990   PYIR21   5,827 
37   359   Moldova 2005   MBIR52   7,440 
38   369   Ukraine 2007   UAIR51   6,841 
39   371   Armenia 2000   AMIR42   6,430 
40   371   Armenia 2005   AMIR53   6,566 
41   373   Azerbaijan 2006   AZIR51   8,444 
42   432   Mali 1987   MLIR01   3,200 
43   432   Mali 1995-96   MLIR32   9,704 
44   432   Mali 2001   MLIR41   12,849 
45   432   Mali 2006   MLIR52   14,583 
46   433   Senegal 1986   SNIR02   4,415 
47   433   Senegal 1992-93   SNIR21   6,310 
48   433   Senegal 1997   SNIR32   8,593 
49   433   Senegal 2005   SNIR4H   14,602 
50   434   Benin 1996   BJIR31   5,491 
51   434   Benin 2001   BJIR41   6,219 
52   434   Benin 2006   BJIR50   17,794 
53   436   Niger 1992   NIIR22   6,503 
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54   436   Niger 1998   NIIR31   7,577 
55   436   Niger 2006   NIIR51   9,223 
56   437   Cote D’Ivoire 1994   CIIR35   8,099 
57   437   Cote D’Ivoire 1998-99   CIIR3A   3,040 
58   438   Guinea 1999   GNIR41   6,753 
59   438   Guinea 2005   GNIR52   7,954 
60   439   Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1993   BFIR21   6,354 
61   439   Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1998-99   BFIR31   6,445 
62   439   Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 2003   BFIR43   12,477 
63   450   Liberia 1986   LBIR01   5,239 
64   450   Liberia 2007   LBIR51   7,092 
65   452   Ghana 1988   GHIR02   4,488 
66   452   Ghana 1993   GHIR31   4,562 
67   452   Ghana 1998   GHIR41   4,843 
68   452   Ghana 2003   GHIR4A   5,691 
69   452   Ghana 2008   GHIR5H   4,916 
70   461   Togo 1988   TGIR01   3,360 
71   461   Togo 1998   TGIR31   8,569 
72   471   Cameroon 1991   CMIR22   3,871 
73   471   Cameroon 1998   CMIR31   5,501 
74   471   Cameroon 2004   CMIR44   10,656 
75   475   Nigeria 1990   NGIR21   8,781 
76   475   Nigeria 1999   NGIR41   9,810 
77   475   Nigeria 2003   NGIR4B   7,620 
78   475   Nigeria 2008   NGIR51   33,385 
79   481   Gabon 2000   GAIR41   6,183 
80   482   Central African Republic 1994-95   CFIR31   5,884 
81   483   Chad 1996-97   TDIR31   7,454 
82   483   Chad 2004   TDIR41   6,085 
83   484   Congo 2005   CGIR50   7,051 
84   490   Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire) 2007   CDIR50   9,995 
85   500   Uganda 1988-89   UGIR01   4,730 
86   500   Uganda 1995   UGIR33   7,070 
87   500   Uganda 2000   UGIR41   7,246 
88   500   Uganda 2006   UGIR51   8,531 
89   501   Kenya 1989   KEIR03   7,150 
90   501   Kenya 1993   KEIR33   7,540 
91   501   Kenya 1998   KEIR3A   7,881 
92   501   Kenya 2003   KEIR41   8,195 
93   510   Tanzania/Tanganyika 1991-92   TZIR21   9,238 
94   510   Tanzania/Tanganyika 1996   TZIR3A   8,120 
95   510   Tanzania/Tanganyika 2003   TZIR41   4,029 
96   510   Tanzania/Tanganyika 2004   TZIR4I   10,329 
97   510   Tanzania/Tanganyika 2007-08   TZIR50   16,318 
98   516   Burundi 1987   BUIR01   3,970 
99   517   Rwanda 1992   RWIR21   6,551 
100   517   Rwanda 2000   RWIR41   10,421 
101   517   Rwanda 2005   RWIR52   11,321 
102   530   Ethiopia 2000   ETIR41   15,367 
103   530   Ethiopia 2005   ETIR50   14,070 
104   541   Mozambique 1997   MZIR31   8,779 
105   541   Mozambique 2003   MZIR41   12,418 
106   551   Zambia 1992   ZMIR21   7,060 
107   551   Zambia 1996   ZMIR31   8,021 
108   551   Zambia 2001-02   ZMIR42   7,658 
109   551   Zambia 2007   ZMIR50   7,146 
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110   552   Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1988   ZWIR01   4,201 
111   552   Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1994   ZWIR31   6,128 
112   552   Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1999   ZWIR41   5,907 
113   552   Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 2005-06   ZWIR51   8,907 
114   553   Malawi 1992   MWIR22   4,849 
115   553   Malawi 2000   MWIR41   13,220 
116   553   Malawi 2004   MWIR4C   11,698 
117   560   South Africa 1998   ZAIR31   11,735 
118   565   Namibia 1992   NMIR21   5,421 
119   565   Namibia 2000   NMIR41   6,755 
120   565   Namibia 2006-07   NMIR51   9,804 
121   570   Lesotho 2004   LSIR41   7,095 
122   572   Swaziland 2006-07   SZIR51   4,987 
123   580   Madagascar (Malagasy) 1992   MDIR21   6,260 
124   580   Madagascar (Malagasy) 1997   MDIR31   7,060 
125   580   Madagascar (Malagasy) 2003-04   MDIR41   7,949 
126   581   Comoros 1996   KMIR32   3,050 
127   600   Morocco 1987   MAIR01   5,982 
128   600   Morocco 1992   MAIR21   9,256 
129   600   Morocco 2003-04   MAIR43   16,798 
130   616   Tunisia 1988   TNIR02   4,184 
131   625   Sudan 1989-90   SDIR02   5,860 
132   640   Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1993   TRIR31   6,519 
133   640   Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1998   TRIR41   8,576 
134   640   Turkey/Ottoman Empire 2003   TRIR4H   8,075 
135   651   Egypt 1988   EGIR01   8,911 
136   651   Egypt 1992   EGIR21   9,864 
137   651   Egypt 1995   EGIR33   14,779 
138   651   Egypt 2000   EGIR41   15,573 
139   651   Egypt 2005   EGIR51   19,474 
140   651   Egypt 2008   EGIR5A   16,527 
141   663   Jordan 1990   JOIR21   6,461 
142   663   Jordan 1997   JOIR31   5,548 
143   663   Jordan 2002   JOIR42   6,006 
144   663   Jordan 2007   JOIR51   10,876 
145   678   Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) 1991-92   YEIR21   6,010 
146   703   Kyrgyz Republic 1997   KYIR31   3,848 
147   704   Uzbekistan 1996   UZIR31   4,415 
148   705   Kazakhstan 1995   KKIR31   3,771 
149   705   Kazakhstan 1999   KKIR41   4,800 
150   750   India 1992-93   IAIR22   89,777 
151   750   India 1998-99   IAIR42   90,303 
152   750   India 2005-06   IAIR51   124,385 
153   770   Pakistan 1990-91   PKIR21   6,611 
154   770   Pakistan 2006-07   PKIR52   10,023 
155   771   Bangladesh 1993-94   BDIR31   9,640 
156   771   Bangladesh 1996-97   BDIR3A   9,127 
157   771   Bangladesh 1999-00   BDIR41   10,544 
158   771   Bangladesh 2004   BDIR4J   11,440 
159   771   Bangladesh 2007   BDIR50   10,996 
160   780   Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1987   LKIR02   5,865 
161   790   Nepal 1996   NPIR31   8,429 
162   790   Nepal 2001   NPIR41   8,726 
163   790   Nepal 2006   NPIR51   10,793 
164   800   Thailand 1987   THIR01   6,775 
165   811   Cambodia (Kampuchea) 2000   KHIR42   15,351 
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166   811   Cambodia (Kampuchea) 2005   KHIR51   16,823 
167   816   Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 1997   VNIR31   5,664 
168   816   Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 2002   VNIR41   5,665 
169   840   Philippines 1993   PHIR31   15,029 
170   840   Philippines 1998   PHIR3A   13,983 
171   840   Philippines 2003   PHIR41   13,633 
172   850   Indonesia 1987   IDIR01   11,884 
173   850   Indonesia 1991   IDIR21   22,909 
174   850   Indonesia 1994   IDIR31   28,168 
175   850   Indonesia 1997   IDIR3A   28,810 
176   850   Indonesia 2002-03   IDIR41   29,483 
177   850   Indonesia 2007   IDIR51   32,895 
Total respondents 2,016,932 
Surveys from country years censored from the analyses due to ongoing civil conflict highlighted in grey. 
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Appendix D. Robustness Checks: The Impact of  Outliers 
The maximum likelihood fit of a logistic regression is extremely sensitive to outliers 
(Pregibon, 1981). Given that the number of onsets relative to the number of control 
cases is quite skewed, it is not unlikely that the findings reported in this article could be 
due to the inclusion of some highly influential cases. Perigbon (1981) presents an 
influence statistic for logistic regression, ‘dbeta’, which behaves parallel to the more 
commonly used Cook’s D in OLS. This statistic measures each observation’s influence 
on the coefficients in the model. The norm is to remove observations with an influence 
higher than 1 (Hamilton 1992: 132). Tables AI and AII are identical to Tables II and III 
in the article respectively, except that outliers (i.e. observations with dbeta >1) are 
excluded from the analysis. In general, the results reported in the article are robust to the 
removal of influential outliers. 
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Table AI. Re-estimation of Models in Table II, Outliers Excluded 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
Vertical economic inequality 2.63       
 (2.36)       
Vertical social inequality  4.13*      
  (2.15)      
Economic polarization   10.87**     
   (5.02)     
Social polarization    4.62*    
    (2.72)    
Economic bipolarization     11.79***   
     (4.01)   
Social bipolarization      4.33*  
      (2.61)  
Ethnic polarization       0.32 
       (1.06) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.97* -1.20* -0.44 -0.62 -0.72 -0.61 -0.83** 
 (0.55) (0.67) (0.52) (0.51) (0.43) (0.52) (0.40) 
Population (ln) -0.28 -0.45 -0.38 -0.41 -0.48 -0.40 -0.18 
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30) (0.35) 
Constant  3.27 5.22 0.76 2.88 4.12 2.82 3.06 
 (6.13) (6.96) (5.21) (5.26) (4.33) (5.29) (5.36) 
Log likelihood -60.56 -59.57 -69.24 -69.13 -69.24 -69.18 - 71.80 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 
N  515 515 517 517 517 517 517 
Number of countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Number of civil wars 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 
Logit estimates with robust z-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p 
≤ 0.01. Estimates for peaceyears and three natural cubic splines not reported. Observations with 
dbeta>1 (ouliers) excluded from the analysis. 
 
All coefficients remain with the same sign, but effects are generally stronger and 
more significant. Exceptions are ‘vertical economic inequality’ and pure ethnic 
polarization, which remain insignificantly associated to conflict, as demonstrated in 
Table AI. With regard to the terms combining ethnic and socioeconomic aspects (Table 
AII), the results become much stronger when outliers are removed.  
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Table AII. Re-estimation of Models in Table III: Outliers Excluded 
 (A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) 
Horizontal economic inequality 4.95***    
 (1.64)    
Horizontal social inequality  3.17**   
  (1.34)   
Ethnic/economic polarization   38.41**  
   (15.39)  
Ethnic/social polarization    7.90 
    (9.27) 
GDP per capita (ln) -1.52*** -2.12*** -1.38** -0.94** 
 (0.58) (0.81) (0.54) (0.44) 
Population (ln) -1.07*** -0.78*** -0.82** -0.37 
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.32) 
Constant  14.24** 16.14 11.59** 5.09 
 (5.67) (5.85) (5.71) (5.09) 
Log likelihood -59.10 -59.85 -60.26 -64.92 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.20 
N  515 515 515 516 
Number of countries 36 36 36 36 
Number of civil wars 18 18 18 19 
Logit estimates with robust z-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p 
≤ 0.01. Estimates for peaceyears and three natural cubic splines not reported. Observations with 
dbeta>1 (outliers) excluded from the analysis. 
Most notably, the coefficient for horizontal economic inequality almost triples 
and becomes significant at 5% (Model 8). The effect of Horizontal Social Inequality also 
increases, with about 50%, and significance jumps from 10% to 5% (Model 9). The 
outliers are four conflict onsets in three countries: Cote d’Ivoire in 2002; Trinidad & 
Tobago in 1990; and Uzbekistan in 2000 and 2004. These are outliers because they 
represent unlikely conflict onsets. Economic development is much higher than for the 
rest of the sample, and levels of horizontal social inequality are very low for Trinidad & 
Tobago and Uzbekistan. Finally, the effect of one of the composite polarization terms, 
ethnic/economic polarization, almost doubles (Model 10) and reaches significance at the 
5% level. Ethnic/social polarization becomes slightly stronger, but remains insignificant 
(Model 11). In sum, the outliers are not driving the results reported in the article. On the 
contrary, they actually prevent results from being statistically stronger.
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Appendix 7B.  DHS Used in the Analysis 
Country Year  Country Year  Country Year 
Armenia  2000  Guatemala  1998  Peru  1996 
Bangladesh  1993  Guinea  1999  Peru  2000 
Bangladesh  1996  Haiti  1994  Philippines  1993 
Bangladesh  1999  Haiti  2000  Philippines  1998 
Benin  1996  India  1992  Rwanda  1992 
Benin  2001  India  1998  Rwanda  2000 
Bolivia  1989  Indonesia  1987  Senegal  1986 
Bolivia  1994  Indonesia  1991  Senegal  1992 
Bolivia  1998  Indonesia  1994  Senegal  1997 
Brazil  1986  Indonesia  1997  South Africa  1998 
Brazil  1991  Indonesia  2002  Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1987 
Brazil  1996  Kazakhstan  1995  Sudan  1990 
Burkina Faso 1992  Kazakhstan  1999  Tanzania/Tanganyika 1992 
Burkina Faso  1998  Kenya  1998  Tanzania/Tanganyika 1996 
Burkina Faso 2003  Kenya  2003  Tanzania/Tanganyika 1999 
Burundi  1987  Kenya  1989  Thailand  1987 
Cameroon  1991  Kenya  1993  Togo  1988 
Cameroon  1998  Kyrgyz Republic  1997  Togo  1998 
Central African Rep. 1994  Liberia  1986  Trinidad and Tobago  1987 
Chad  1996  Madagascar (Malagasy) 1997  Tunisia  1988 
Colombia  1986  Malawi  1992  Turkey/Ottoman Emp. 1993 
Colombia  1990  Malawi  2000  Turkey/Ottoman Emp. 1998 
Colombia  1995  Mali  1987  Uganda  1988 
Colombia  2000  Mali  1995  Uganda  1995 
Comoros  1996  Mali  2001  Uganda  2000 
Cote d'Ivoire  1998  Mexico  1987  Uzbekistan  1996 
Cote d'Ivoire  1994  Morocco  1987  Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 1997 
Dominican Republic  1986  Morocco  1992  Vietnam, Dem. Rep. 2002 
Dominican Republic  1991  Mozambique  1997  Yemen (Arab Rep. of Y.) 1991 
Dominican Republic  1996  Namibia  1992  Zambia  1992 
Dominican Republic  1999  Namibia  2000  Zambia  1996 
Dominican Republic  2002  Nepal  1996  Zambia  2001 
Ecuador  1987  Nepal  2001  Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1988 
Egypt  1992  Nicaragua  1997  Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1994 
Egypt  1995  Nicaragua  2001  Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 2000 
El Salvador  1985  Niger  1992    
Ethiopia  2000  Niger  1998    
Gabon  2000  Nigeria  1990    
Ghana  1988  Nigeria  1999    
Ghana  1993  Nigeria  2003    
Ghana  1998  Pakistan  1990    
Ghana  2003  Paraguay  1990    
Guatemala  1987  Peru  1986    
Guatemala  1995  Peru  1992    
* In some countries the survey was conducted over a two-year period.  In these cases the table reports 
the first year only. 
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Appendix 7C.  Logit Regression of  Civil War Onset, GDP/Capita and 
Population Size, Various Samples 
 
 
Model A1 
(Dev. ctrs.   
only) 
Model A2 
(Dev. ctrs.  
only) 
Model A3 
(Global 
sample) 
HI_Educ.  (Regions) 2.18***   
 (3.04)   
Population (ln) 0.17 0.045 0.22** 
 (0.63) (0.20) (2.13) 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1 0.051 -0.29 -0.42***  
 (0.20) (-1.20) (-3.13)  
Peaceyears -0.11 -0.16 -0.18 
 (-0.58) (-0.89) (-1.24) 
Constant -6.37 -0.87 -2.49  
 (-1.21) (-0.20) (-1.15) 
LL -137.13 -140.73 -275.48 
Pseudo R² 0.059 0.034 0.101 
# Conflicts 36 36 69 
# Countries 55 55 147 
N 777 777 2186 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses.  Estimates for three natural cubic splines 
not shown in table.  *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. 
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This online appendix includes a selection of alternative specifications to the Models 1–
14, Tables 1–4, presented in Østby, Nordås, and Rød (2009). In Appendix C, we 
replicate Models 1–14 using only the years after the survey was conducted in each 
country. For example, since the DHS survey was conducted in Côte d’Ivoire in 1994; we 
used the years 1994–2004 for Côte d’Ivoire in the replication. This provides an 
unbalanced panel. Appendix D reports the results for Models 1–14 using random effects 
models. In Appendix E, we introduce country-level controls for GDP per capita; GDP 
growth, Regime type, and Population size. Finally, Appendix F reports a full model 
including all the core explanatory variables that proved significant predictors of regional 
conflict onset in Tables 1–4 in the article. In general, the main results hold, with the 
exception of the term for education Gini, which drops to insignificance. However, 
including these terms together implies collinearity problems, particularly regarding the 
terms for education and education Gini. Running Model 15 with these two variables 
separately they both come out highly significant in line with the findings in the article. 
Overall, the results reported in the article are robust to all the alternative specifications 
reported in Appendices C–F below. 
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Appendix C: Models with Restricted Sample 
Table C1. Onset of Conflict by Absolute Welfare, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Restricted Sample  
 (C1) (C2) (C3) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.007 0.008 0.018 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.39) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.116** -0.120** -0.116** 
 (-2.09) (-2.01) (-2.13) 
Int. border -0.622 -0.584 -0.784* 
 (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.92) 
Population sizeb -0.167 -0.160 -0.130 
 (-1.45) (-1.34) (-1.08) 
Ethnic difference 0.425 0.420 0.496 
 (1.27) (1.28) (1.29) 
Diamonds 0.713*** 0.699*** 0.736*** 
 (3.23) (3.10) (3.10) 
Oil producer 0.400 0.402 0.651* 
 (0.86) (0.82) (1.76) 
Household assets  0.788  
  (0.40)  
Education years   -0.294*** 
   (-2.70) 
Constant -0.001 -0.209 -0.236 
 (-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.12) 
Pseudo R2 .120 .120 .137 
Observations 3,241 3,241 3,241 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 351 351 351 
# Regionyears with onset 104 104 104 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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Table C2. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Restricted Sample 
 (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.118** -0.116** -0.116** -0.115** 
 (2.14) (2.08) (2.07) (2.08) 
Int. border -0.609 -0.617 -0.622 -0.617 
 (1.45) (1.44) (1.47) (1.44) 
Population sizeb -0.162 -0.167 -0.171 -0.167 
 (1.35) (1.45) (1.53) (1.46) 
Ethnic difference 0.450 0.432 0.466 0.427 
 (1.31) (1.25) (1.32) (1.18) 
Diamonds 0.687*** 0.707*** 0.751*** 0.707*** 
 (3.17) (3.33) (3.28) (3.34) 
Oil producer 0.365 0.390 0.390 0.395 
 (0.74) (0.81) (0.80) (0.83) 
Rel.depr. (assets) -0.190    
 (0.69)    
Rel.depr. (educ.)  -0.033   
  (0.19)   
Rel.depr. (assets)c   -0.363  
   (1.56)  
Rel.depr. (assets), sqc   0.548***  
   (3.23)  
Rel. depr. (educ.)c    -0.018 
    (0.09) 
Rel. depr. (educ.),sqc    -0.010 
    (0.16) 
Constant 0.018 0.011 -0.064 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.120 0.124 0.120 
Observations 3,241 3,241 3,241 3,241 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 351 351 351 351 
# Regionyears with onset 104 104 104 104 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. cCentered. *p<.1; ** p<.05; 
***p<.01. Rel. Depr. (assets): relative deprivation in household assets for region versus rest of country; 
Rel. Depr. (educ.): relative deprivation in education years for region versus rest of country. 
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Table C3. Onset of Conflict by Intra-Regional Inequality, African Regions, 1986-
2004, Restricted Sample 
 (C8) (C9) (C10) (C11) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.019 
 (0.14) (0.40) (0.15) (0.38) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.099* -0.114** -0.116** -0.103* 
 (-1.79) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-1.82) 
Int. border -0.747* -0.782* -0.654 -0.887** 
 (-1.81) (-1.91) (-1.56) (-2.35) 
Population sizeb -0.201* -0.136 -0.174 -0.167 
 (-1.74) (-1.12) (-1.48) (-1.38) 
Ethnic difference 0.436 0.421 0.437 0.416 
 (1.23) (1.05) (1.34) (1.05) 
Diamonds 0.734*** 0.749*** 0.694*** 0.744*** 
 (3.24) (3.13) (3.09) (3.19) 
Oil producer 0.397 0.674* 0.398 0.624 
 (0.94) (1.80) (0.81) (1.59) 
Gini (assets) 2.205*   1.577 
 (1.65)   (1.06) 
Gini (educ.yrs)  2.958***  2.701*** 
  (2.87)  (2.69) 
Regional ELF   0.092 0.057 
   (0.17) (0.11) 
Constant -1.065 -2.990 0.062 -3.447* 
 (-0.59) (-1.54) (0.03) (-1.71) 
Pseudo R2 .127 .140 .120 .144 
Observations 3,241 3,241 3,211 3,211 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 351 351 346 346 
# Regionyears with onset 104 104 104 104 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01.
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Table C4. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation and Natural Resources, 
African Regions, 1986-2004, Restricted Sample 
 (C12) (C13) (C14) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.006 0.006 0.000 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.00) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.119** -0.132** -0.128** 
 (-2.14) (-2.21) (-2.30) 
Int. border -0.611 -0.658 -0.633 
 (-1.43) (-1.55) (-1.44) 
Population sizeb -0.147 -0.160 -0.148 
 (-1.23) (-1.35) (-1.07) 
Ethnic difference 0.435 0.489 0.426 
 (1.27) (1.37) (1.25) 
Rel.depr. (assets)c -0.232 -0.309 -0.243 
 (-0.88) (-1.11) (-1.05) 
Diamonds 0.633***   
 (3.29)   
Rel. depr. (assets)c * Diamonds 0.673   
 (0.93)   
Oil producer  0.184  
  (0.47)  
Rel. depr. (assets)c * Oil producer  1.390  
  (1.35)  
Nat. resources    0.550** 
   (2.23) 
Rel. depr. (assets)c * Nat. resources   1.173 
   (1.64) 
Constant -0.177 0.312 -0.066 
 (-0.10) (0.18) (-0.03) 
Pseudo R2 .120 .116 .124 
Observations 3,241 3,241 3,241 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 351 351 351 
# Regionyears with onset 104 104 104 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged.  *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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Appendix D: Random Effects 
Table D1. Onset of Conflict by Absolute Welfare, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Random Effects 
 (D1) (D2) (D3) 
 Random   
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.013 0.013 0.025 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.88) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.080*** 
 (4.81) (4.43) (4.71) 
Int. border -0.209 -0.279 -0.525** 
 (0.98) (1.27) (2.57) 
Population sizeb -0.013 -0.032 0.021 
 (0.21) (0.48) (0.31) 
Ethnic difference 0.051 0.049 0.095 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.48) 
Diamonds 0.789*** 0.766*** 0.637*** 
 (3.29) (3.20) (2.92) 
Oil producer 0.717** 0.699** 0.738** 
 (2.30) (2.24) (2.55) 
Household assets  -1.283  
  (1.40)  
Education years   -0.398*** 
   (7.08) 
Constant -2.751*** -2.270** -2.225** 
 (2.95) (2.28) (2.31) 
Wald chi2 96.64 99.25 174.55 
Rho .109** .105** .013 
Observations 6208 6208 6208 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 354 
# Regionyears with onset 144 144 144 
Note: Random effect logit coefficients with absolute values for z statistics in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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Table D2. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Random Effects 
 (D4) (D5) (D6) (D7) 
 Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.014 
 (0.50) (0.46) (0.52) (0.47) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.087*** 
 (4.53) (4.82) (4.51) (4.79) 
Int. border -0.247 -0.226 -0.238 -0.229 
 (1.14) (1.06) (1.10) (1.07) 
Population sizeb -0.019 -0.012 -0.021 -0.011 
 (0.29) (0.18) (0.32) (0.17) 
Ethnic difference -0.002 0.020 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) 
Diamonds 0.802*** 0.795*** 0.862*** 0.794*** 
 (3.34) (3.32) (3.55) (3.31) 
Oil producer 0.742** 0.739** 0.763** 0.746** 
 (2.37) (2.36) (2.44) (2.38) 
Rel.depr. (assets) 0.328    
 (1.47)    
Rel.depr. (educ.)  0.115   
  (0.98)   
Rel.depr. (assets)c   0.139  
   (0.60)  
Rel.depr. (assets), sqc   0.534*  
   (1.96)  
Rel. depr. (educ.)c    0.143 
    (0.85) 
Rel. depr. (educ.),sqc    -0.017 
    (0.23) 
Constant -2.770*** -2.801*** -2.830*** -2.751*** 
 (2.95) (2.99) (3.02) (2.94) 
Wald chi2 99.20 97.70 102.09 97.84 
Rho .107** .108** .108** .108** 
Observations 6,208 6,208 6,208 6,208 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 354 354 
# Regionyears with onset 144 144 144 144 
Note: Random effect logit coefficients with absolute values for z statistics in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. cCentered.  *p<.1; ** p<.05; 
***p<.01. 
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Table D3. Onset of Conflict by Intra-Regional Inequality, African Regions, 1986-
2004, Random Effects 
 (D8) (D9) (D10) (D11) 
 Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.017 0.024 0.013 0.025 
 (0.57) (0.84) (0.45) (0.88) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.065*** -0.078*** -0.089*** -0.067*** 
 (3.43) (4.57) (4.90) (3.74) 
Int. border -0.436** -0.485** -0.281 -0.645*** 
 (1.98) (2.36) (1.30) (3.07) 
Population sizeb -0.082 0.017 -0.022 -0.029 
 (1.22) (0.25) (0.35) (0.44) 
Ethnic difference 0.035 0.004 0.006 -0.083 
 (0.17) (0.02) (0.03) (0.41) 
Diamonds 0.692*** 0.654*** 0.775*** 0.619*** 
 (2.86) (3.00) (3.22) (2.82) 
Oil producer 0.605* 0.778*** 0.755** 0.743** 
 (1.91) (2.71) (2.41) (2.53) 
Gini (assets) 3.796***   1.968*** 
 (5.04)   (2.80) 
Gini (educ.yrs)  3.630***  3.276*** 
  (7.19)  (6.21) 
Regional ELF   0.566 0.702 
   (1.25) (1.63) 
Constant -4.191*** -5.674*** -2.777*** -6.255*** 
 (4.21) (5.35) (2.98) (5.82) 
Wald chi2 121.03 169.94 95.57 177.14 
Rho .104** .013 .108** .013 
Observations 6,208 6,208 6,113 6,113 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 349 349 
# Regionyears with onset 144 144 144 144 
Note: Random effect logit coefficients with absolute values for z statistics in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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Table D4. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation and Natural Resources, 
African Regions, 1986-2004, Random Effects 
 (D12) (D13) (D14) 
 Random      
effects 
Random      
effects 
Random 
effects 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.016 0.016 0.013 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.44) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.081*** -0.091*** -0.086*** 
 (4.43) (4.97) (4.71) 
Int. border -0.270 -0.286 -0.251 
 (1.26) (1.31) (1.16) 
Population sizeb 0.009 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.07) 
Ethnic difference -0.017 0.037 -0.020 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) 
Rel.depr. (assets)c 0.310 0.265 0.321 
 (1.39) (1.19) (1.42) 
Diamondsc 0.719***   
 (2.97)   
Rel. depr. (assets) * Diamondsc 0.596   
 (0.93)   
Oil producerc  0.612*  
  (1.91)  
Rel. depr. (assets) * Oil producerc  1.324*  
  (1.81)  
Nat. resourcesc   0.753*** 
   (3.53) 
Rel. depr. (assets) * Nat. resourcesc   1.015* 
   (1.94) 
Constant -2.925*** -2.607*** -2.748*** 
 (3.13) (2.76) (2.94) 
Wald chi2  96.00 92.59 102.73 
Rho .109** .116*** .109** 
Observations 6,208 6,208 6,208 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 354 
# Regionyears with onset 144 144 144 
Note: Random effects. Logit coefficients with absolute values of z statistics in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. cCentered.  *p<.1; ** p<.05; 
***p<.01. 
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Appendix E: Adding Country-Level Controls 
Table E1. Onset of Conflict by Absolute Welfare, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Controlling for Country-Level Variables  
 (E1) (E2) (E3) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.051* 0.047 0.054** 
 (1.77) (1.58) (2.33) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.078*** -0.073** -0.081*** 
 (2.66) (2.20) (2.87) 
Int. border -0.387 -0.466* -0.746** 
 (1.45) (1.68) (2.50) 
Population sizeb 0.062 0.065 0.310 
 (0.34) (0.33) (1.25) 
Ethnic difference 0.306 0.331 0.458 
 (0.84) (0.85) (1.08) 
Diamonds 0.756*** 0.732*** 0.743*** 
 (2.75) (2.60) (3.15) 
Oil producer 0.686 0.679 0.872*** 
 (1.40) (1.56) (3.40) 
GDP per capitaa,b -0.431 -0.430 -0.070 
 (1.29) (1.24) (0.20) 
GDP growtha -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.098*** 
 (3.35) (3.45) (3.73) 
Regime typea -0.050 -0.047 -0.023 
 (0.71) (0.72) (0.35) 
Regime type, squareda -0.010 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.94) (0.85) (0.09) 
Population sizeb -0.374 -0.401 -0.574 
 (0.98) (0.94) (1.40) 
Assets  -1.203  
  (0.48)  
Education   -0.450*** 
   (5.07) 
Constant 2.987 3.382 -0.439 
 (0.98) (0.90) (0.14) 
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.146 0.198 
Observations 5,702 5,702 5,702 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 354 
# Regionyears with onset 142 142 142 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries (Huber-White) in parenthesis. 
Estimates for peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; 
***p<.01. Country-level variables in italics. 
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Table E2. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation, African Regions, 1986-2004, 
Controlling for Country-Level Variables 
 (E4) (E5) (E6) (E7) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.051* 0.051* 0.052* 0.051* 
 (1.85) (1.80) (1.87) (1.81) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.075** -0.078*** -0.074** -0.077*** 
 (2.55) (2.66) (2.55) (2.64) 
Int. border -0.427 -0.397 -0.440 -0.402 
 (1.61) (1.51) (1.62) (1.54) 
Population sizeb 0.086 0.075 0.127 0.077 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.61) (0.43) 
Ethnic difference 0.285 0.296 0.310 0.286 
 (0.77) (0.81) (0.79) (0.76) 
Diamonds 0.770*** 0.762*** 0.811*** 0.761*** 
 (2.83) (2.73) (3.07) (2.75) 
Oil prod.  0.721 0.702 0.750 0.711 
 (1.54) (1.44) (1.58) (1.48) 
GDP per capitaa,b -0.421 -0.428 -0.415 -0.426 
 (1.27) (1.27) (1.26) (1.26) 
GDP growtha,b -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.095*** 
 (3.32) (3.36) (3.28) (3.36) 
Polity scale -0.048 -0.048 -0.052 -0.048 
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.76) (0.71) 
Polity scale, squared -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.87) (0.92) (0.90) (0.91) 
Population sizeb -0.415 -0.389 -0.496 -0.391 
 (1.02) (1.01) (1.16) (1.02) 
Rel.depr. (assets) 0.271    
 (0.94)    
Rel.depr. (educ.)  0.067   
  (0.58)   
Rel.depr. (assets) c   0.104  
   (0.42)  
Rel.depr. (assets), sqc   0.546***  
   (2.67)  
Rel. depr. (educ.) c    0.109 
    (0.64) 
Rel. depr. (educ.),sqc    -0.024 
    (0.57) 
Constant 2.854 2.902 2.904 2.918 
 (0.96) (0.96) (0.99) (0.97) 
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.145 0.149 0.145 
Observations 5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 354 354 
# Regionyears with onset 142 142 142 142 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. c Centered. *p<.1; ** p<.05; 
***p<.01. Country-level variables in italics. 
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Table E3. Onset of Conflict by Intra-Regional Inequality, African Regions, 1986-
2004, Controlling for Country-Level Variables 
 (E8) (E9) (E10) (E11) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.046* 0.058** 0.051* 0.054** 
 (1.70) (2.40) (1.79) (2.30) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.058* -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.067** 
 (1.85) (2.75) (2.64) (2.21) 
Int. border -0.614** -0.684** -0.413 -0.820*** 
 (2.14) (2.44) (1.55) (2.94) 
Population sizeb 0.101 0.265 0.038 0.248 
 (0.46) (1.03) (0.20) (0.98) 
Ethnic difference 0.381 0.347 0.296 0.284 
 (0.91) (0.84) (0.83) (0.65) 
Diamonds 0.639** 0.742*** 0.750*** 0.690*** 
 (2.34) (2.86) (2.68) (2.89) 
Oil producer 0.625* 0.880*** 0.677 0.810*** 
 (1.84) (2.95) (1.26) (2.80) 
GDP per capitaa,b -0.341 -0.206 -0.446 -0.161 
 (1.04) (0.62) (1.34) (0.47) 
GDP growtha -0.090*** -0.099*** -0.094*** -0.095*** 
 (3.15) (3.63) (3.34) (3.28) 
Regime typea -0.062 -0.022 -0.048 -0.033 
 (0.91) (0.34) (0.69) (0.49) 
Regime type, sqa -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 0.000 
 (0.69) (0.10) (0.94) (0.03) 
Population sizeb -0.502 -0.557 -0.340 -0.577 
 (1.16) (1.31) (0.89) (1.32) 
Gini (assets) 3.375***   1.845 
 (2.67)   (1.40) 
Gini (educ.yrs)  4.125***  3.826*** 
  (5.08)  (4.64) 
Regional ELF   0.109 0.368 
   (0.26) (0.72) 
Constant 0.777 -3.114 3.086 -4.053 
 (0.26) (1.15) (1.04) (1.35) 
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.196 0.144 0.200 
Observations 5,702 5,702 5,632 5,632 
# Countries 22 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 349 349 
# Regionyears with onset 142 142 142 142 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis. Estimates for 
peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. *p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
Country-level variables in italics. 
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Table E4. Onset of Conflict by Relative Deprivation and Natural Resources, 
African Regions, 1986-2004, Controlling for Country-Level Variables 
 (E12) (E13) (E14) 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.056* 0.050* 0.049* 
 (1.75) (1.77) (1.76) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.080*** 
 (2.61) (2.65) (2.87) 
Int. border -0.431 -0.491* -0.436 
 (1.63) (1.85) (1.58) 
Population sizeb 0.072 0.103 0.081 
 (0.37) (0.52) (0.40) 
Ethnic difference 0.260 0.335 0.259 
 (0.72) (0.88) (0.70) 
GDP per capitaa,b -0.484 -0.492 -0.486 
 (1.43) (1.45) (1.36) 
GDP growtha -0.097*** -0.093*** -0.096*** 
 (3.37) (3.39) (3.54) 
Regime typea -0.043 -0.049 -0.043 
 (0.64) (0.70) (0.67) 
Regime type, sqa -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.73) (0.94) (0.84) 
Population sizeb -0.357 -0.455 -0.381 
 (0.93) (1.07) (0.98) 
Rel.depr. (assets) c 0.234 0.154 0.215 
 (0.82) (0.54) (0.90) 
Diamondsc 0.682**   
 (2.27)   
Rel. depr. (assets) * Diamondsc 0.971   
 (1.46)   
Oil producerc  0.599  
  (1.49)  
Rel. depr. (assets) * Oil producerc  1.145  
  (1.29)  
Nat. resourcesc   0.707** 
   (2.41) 
Rel. depr. (assets) * Nat. resourcesc   1.230*** 
   (2.80) 
Constant 3.078 3.803 3.250 
 (1.03) (1.21) (1.07) 
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.140 0.150 
Observations 5,702 5,702 5,702 
# Countries 22 22 22 
# Regions 354 354 349 
# Regionyears with onset 142 142 142 
Note: Logit coefficients with absolute values of z statistics in parenthesis, clustered on country. 
Estimates for peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. cCentered.  
*p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. Country-level variables in italics. 
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Appendix F: Full Model 
Table F1. Onset of Conflict by Absolute Welfare, Relative Deprivation, Intra-
Regional Inequalities, and Natural Resources, African Regions, 1986-2004 
Distance to internal conflicta,b 0.015 
 (0.26) 
Distance to neighb. conflicta,b -0.070* 
 (1.67) 
Int. border -0.878*** 
 (2.74) 
Population sizeb -0.014 
 (0.11) 
Ethnic difference 0.300 
 (0.78) 
Education years -0.599*** 
 (3.86) 
Nat. resourcesc 0.438** 
 (2.48) 
Rel.depr. (assets) c -2.191*** 
 (5.17) 
Rel.depr. (assets), sqc 0.919*** 
 (3.72) 
Rel. depr. (assets) * Nat. resourcesc 0.996** 
 (2.10) 
Gini (assets) 5.149*** 
 (3.31) 
Gini (educ.yrs) -0.687 
 (0.59) 
Constant -3.939** 
 (1.96) 
Pseudo R2 0.178 
Observations 6,208 
# Countries 22 
# Regions 354 
# Regionyears with onset 144 
Note: Logit coefficients with robust z statistics clustered on countries in parenthesis, Huber-White. 
Estimates for peaceyears and three cubic splines not reported. aLagged 1 year. bLogged. cCentered. 
*p<.1; ** p<.05; ***p<.01. 
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APPENDICES Chapter 6 
Appendix A. Identification of  Outliers 
The maximum likelihood fit of a logistic regression is extremely sensitive to outliers. 
Given that the number of violent provinceyears relative to the number of control cases 
is quite skewed, it is not unlikely that the findings reported in this article could be due to 
the inclusion of some highly influential cases. Perigbon (1981) presents an influence 
statistic for logistic regression, ‘dbeta’, which behaves parallel to the more commonly 
used Cook’s D in OLS. This statistic measures each observation’s influence on the 
coefficients in the model.  
We identified two outliers with the dbeta diagnostic, using the quite conservative 
threshold of 1.5, one observation for each of the dependent variables: Riau, 1996 for 
routine violence, and  Jakarta, 1998 for episodic violence. These observations are 
removed from the models reported in the manuscript.  More radical thresholds only 
strengthen our main results. 
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Appendix B. Indonesian Provinces and Province-Years Included in 
Analysis 
ID Province Start  
year 
End 
year 
Years 
included in 
analysis 
101 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 1959 - 1990–2001 
102 Sumatera Utara (North Sumatra) 1950 - 1990–2001 
103 Sumatera Barat (West Sumatra) 1957 - 1990–2001 
104 Riau 1957 - 1990–2003* 
105 Kepulauan Riau (Riau islands) 2002 - - 
106 Jambi 1957 - 1990–2001 
107 Bengkulu 1967 - 1990–2001 
108 Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra) 1950 - 1990–2001 
109 Bangka-Belitung 2001 - - 
110 Lampung 1964 - 1990–2001 
111 Jakarta 1957 - 1990–2003† 
112 Banten 2000 - 2000–2003 
113 Jawa Barat (West Java) 1950 - 1990–2003 
114 Jawa Tengah (Central Java) 1950 - 1990–2003 
115 Yogyakarta 1950 - 1990–2001 
116 Jawa Timur (East Java) 1950 - 1990–2003 
117 Bali 1958 - 1990–2001 
118 Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara) 1958 - 1990–2003 
119 Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara) 1958 - 1990–2003 
120 Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan) 1956 - 1990–2003 
121 Kalimantan Tengah (Central Kalimantan) 1958 - 1990–2003 
122 Kalimantan Selatan (South Kalimantan) 1956 - 1990–2001 
123 Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan) 1956 - 1990–2001 
124 Sulawesi Utara (North Sulawesi) 1960 - 1990–2001 
125 Gorontalo 2000 - - 
126 Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi) 1964 - 1990–2003 
127 Sulawesi Tenggara (South East Sulawesi) 1964 - 1990–2001 
128 Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi) 1960 - 1990–2003 
130 Maluku 1950 - - 
131 Maluku Utara (North Maluku) 1999 - - 
132 Papua 1963 - - 
133 Irian Jaya Barat (West Irian Jaya) 2003 - - 
138 Timor Timur (East Timor) 1976 2002 - 
Note: *: the observation for Riau in 1996 is not included in models of routine violence due to excessive 
influence. †: the observation for Jakarta in 1998 is not included in models of episodic violence due to 
excessive influence. 
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Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics for Sample Used in Analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Routine deaths (min 5) 313 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Episodic deaths (min 5) 313 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Pop. Growth 313 1.83 0.97 0.17 4.35 
Pop. growth (c) 313 0.04 0.97 -1.62 2.56 
Land scarcity  (ln) 313 1.33 1.60 -0.85 7.51 
Land scarcity  (ln) (c) 313 0.11 1.60 -2.07 6.29 
Urban share (%) 313 33.72 18.19 10.80 100.00 
Polarization (rel) 313 0.33 0.28 0.02 0.97 
Polarization (rel) (c) 313 -0.03 0.28 -0.35 0.61 
Horizontal inequality (IMR) 313 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.68 
Horizontal inequality (IMR) (c) 313 0.01 0.12 -0.17 0.49 
Vertical Inequality (assets) 313 0.36 0.11 0.18 0.79 
Polarization (rel) * Pop. Growth 313 0.01 0.19 -0.58 0.40 
Horizontal inequality * Pop. growth 313 0.01 0.11 -0.25 0.63 
Horizontal inequality * Land scarcity 313 0.03 0.14 -0.68 0.50 
GDP /capita (ln) 313 -6.30 0.59 -7.20 -4.68 
Population (ln) 313 15.36 0.94 13.98 17.48 
Routine deaths (min 5), lagged 313 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Episodic deaths (min 5), lagged 313 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Neighb. routine deaths (min 5) 313 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Neighb. episodic deaths (min 5) 313 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Note: (ln) denotes that the variable is log-transformed. (c) refers to centred variables. The figures refer to 
the sample used for routine violence. Figures for episodic violence are largely the same (since only one 
observation differ from the sample used for routine violence). 
Appendix D. Constructing Inequality Measures: Some Details 
Horizontal Inequality 
The dimension we use as a basis of constructing a HI measure for inequality between 
religious groups is the infant mortality rate (IMR), which we calculate for all religious 
groups within each province for all the survey years in the Indonesian DHS. We apply 
Newell’s (1988: 64) definition and formula of IMR: 
1000*yearin  births Live
yearin  1 ageunder  Deaths






IMR   
Though it is common to calculate IMR for only one year at the time, we chose to 
follow Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000: 35) and generate the IMR measures based on 
births in the 10 years preceding each DHS survey, in order to get sufficiently large 
samples for the disaggregated religious groups within the provinces. 
Mancini, Stewart and Brown (2008) review different approaches to measuring 
HIs and conclude that an ideal measure should: a) be in so far as possible descriptive, 
not evaluative, b) be sensitive to group size, and c) measure inequality between groups as 
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such, without conflating it with vertical inequality and/or demographic polarization. 
Following Tadjoeddin, Suharyo and Mishra (2003) we use a measure of horizontal 
inequality which meets these criteria, namely the group-based coefficient of variance 
(GCOV), which is described in the article. 
Vertical Inequality 
Since the IMR described above is by definition a group measure (and hence cannot be 
broken down to individuals), we use another variable as the basis for constructing 
vertical, or inter-individual inequality, which we believe also is a good indicator of 
general welfare; namely an additive household asset index. This index is constructed on the 
basis of the following variables from the DHS surveys: v119–v125 (dummies for whether 
or not each household has electricity, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a 
motorcycle and/or a car).  
We then calculate a province level Gini coefficient for vertical inequality in terms 
of the household asset index, using the ineqdec0 command in Stata. The Gini 
coefficient is an index between 0 and 1 where 0 implies an egalitarian distribution 
(complete equality) and 1 indicates total concentration (complete inequality). 
Appendix E. Robustness Checks 
The main results reported in this article are robust to alternative specifications of the 
dependent variable (e.g. if we alter the violence threshold from a minimum of 5 to 1 
death(s) per province-year), and to different constellations of the control variables.  
Table A-I provides evidence that our main results reported in Models 7 and 8 are 
robust both to the exclusion of Jakarta (Models A1 and A2) and when we introduce year 
dummies (Models A3 and A4). The low N in these models is partly due to the exclusion 
of Jakarta, and partially due to the fact that some years have no variation on the 
dependent variable, leading to perfect collinearity and subsequently elimination from the 
analyses with year dummies. 
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Table A-I. Excluding Jakarta from Main Models, and Including Year Dummies 
 Excluding Jakarta  Including Year Dummies 
 Model A1 (r) Model A2 (e) Model A3 (r) Model A4 (e) 
Pop. Growth (c) -0.118  0.216  0.391  0.525  
 (0.482)  (0.340)  (0.483)  (0.344)  
Land scarcity (ln) (c) -1.089*  -1.380**  1.155*  -0.157  
 (0.573)  (0.702)  (0.655)  (0.849)  
Urban share  (%)  0.126*** -0.028  -0.024  -0.177*** 
 (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.072)  (0.066)  
Polarization (rel)  -0.203  0.143  2.146*** 0.931  
 (1.028)  (0.993)  (0.803)  (1.112)  
HI (IMR) (c) 0.687  -4.324**  -0.994  -0.674  
 (2.208)  (1.952)  (2.181)  (2.268)  
HI * Pop. growth  5.412*** 3.793*** 6.546*** 2.832*  
 (2.013)  (1.270)  (2.062)  (1.699)  
GDP /capita (ln) -3.207**  -0.251  -0.821  1.710**  
 (1.477)  (0.539)  (1.234)  (0.847)  
Population (ln)  1.802*** 1.687*** 2.557*** 1.437*  
 (0.530)  (0.595)  (0.500)  (0.741)  
Temporal lag 1.898*** 1.278*  1.387**  0.380  
 (0.535)  (0.729)  (0.673)  (0.745)  
Neighbouring violence  -0.604  0.886*  -2.616*** 0.003  
 (0.645)  (0.516)  (0.801)  (0.498)  
Constant  -53.472*** -28.429*** -70.618  -27.628  
 (16.554)  (10.239)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Log Pseudolikelihood -76.69  -74.61  -56.66  -56.67  
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.18 0.63 0.31 
N  299 300 290 218 
Note: ***: p-value<0.01. **: p< 0.05. * p<0.10 (two-sided tests).  (ln) denotes that  the variable is log-
transformed. (c) refers to centred variables in models with interactions that include the specific variable. 
(r) and (e) refer to routine and episodic violence respectively. Figures are coefficients and estimated 
robust standard errors clustered on province (in parentheses).  Year dummies in Models A3 and A4 not 
shown. 
Although the correlation between vertical and horizontal inequality is not strong 
(and actually it is negative: r = –.17) it could be questioned whether the two variables 
should be included in the same model because, theoretically, they are somehow 
functions of each other (see Stewart, 2002). We tried to remove both terms in turn and 
the results remained largely unchanged (results not shown). 
Furthermore, there is an increasing discussion over the use of a lagged dependent 
variable, the main concern being that it ‘may soak up so much of the variance that it 
masks potential causal factors explained by the other independent variables of interest’ 
(de Soysa and Nordås, 2007: 934; see also Plümper, Troeger and Manow, 2005). A 
province which experienced routine violence in a given year actually has almost 47.1 per 
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cent risk of experiencing it again in the subsequent year.  It could be questioned then 
whether this effect is so strong that it disturbs the effects of other potential predictors of 
violence by putting these on too strict a test. However despite this strong control we do 
find some robust results on other variables, and if we remove the temporal lag these 
results remain largely the same, only stronger (results not shown). 
Appendix F. Alternative Controls for Spatial Autocorrelation 
The issue of spatial regression in cross-sectional time series is not straight forward, and 
the fact that we utilize a maximum likelihood model effectively limits our options. Spatial 
autocorrelations is most commonly specified either as spatial error or spatial lags 
(Anselin, 1988). The spatial error model is not very compatible with our general research 
design, but we present a test with a number of limitations. We also test a local regression 
model, geographically weighed regression, based on running a number of regressions 
with each unit as the point of origin (i), and then assigning weights to all other 
observations (j) inversely proportional to the distance ij.  
In our view, the spatial lag model is the best alternative given the data limitations 
we have present. The spatial lag model allows us to explicitly model the mechanism 
behind spatial autocorrelation.  
In an OLS framework, the spatial error model can be written as ܻ ൌ ߚܺ ൅
ߣܹ݁ ൅ ߤ, where ߤ is the homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors, and ܹ݁ is the spatial 
component of the error-term. ߣ indicates the strength of the error term, and this 
parameter should not be outside of the inverse range of the eigenvalues of the spatial 
weights matrix W .  
The alternative formulation is called the spatial lag model and the OLS version is 
given by ܻ ൌ ߩܹܻ ൅ ߚܺ ൅ ߤ, where ߩ denotes the spatial autoregressive coefficient. 
Since the true error-term of the logistic regression model is unobserved, it is pointless to 
specify a spatial error logistic model, so we are limited to a spatial lag model. We have 
implemented this in our analysis, through a spatial lag of violence. Our spatial lag 
function returns 1 if one or more neighbors experience 5 or more casualties and 0 if that 
is not the case. 
The spatreg package for Stata (Pisati, 2001) does not support the logistic 
regression model; does not support observations without neighbors; nor does it support 
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a panel data structure. Testing the spatial error model is therefore quite difficult, and it 
requires a number of adjustments to our model: 
 We use OLS instead of the Logistic model in this test. This is not very 
problematic. The dependent variable is fairly balanced, and the most likely bias is 
that OLS standard errors become larger than they should have been.  
 Spatial errors are more likely to be present the more variance there is in the 
dependent variable. Since we cannot analyze time series, we have chosen the 
most violent year as the test case, 1999. 
 In order to include the isolated regions, we make the assumption that regions 
without neighbors are influenced by an unobserved factor, and we therefore 
make all isolated regions an idiosyncratic neighborhood. This is a heroic 
assumption, but the alternative is to either drop them; alter our specification of 
the spatial mechanism towards a distance-based continuous measure, or make 
another equally heroic assumption. With 27 regions in 1999, dropping the 6 
isolated cases is a quite unattractive option. 
 We impute missing observations with sample average to avoid listwise deletion. 
One unit has four missing values, and two units miss one value each.  
 
Below, we report six models, all based on Model 1 in the article: 
 The original logistic model without spatial and temporal lags. 
 An OLS version of the original model 
 A Spatial error model with all covariates from Model 1 
 A Spatial lag model with all covariates from Model 1 
 A Spatial error model with no covariates (constant only) 
 A Spatial lag model with no covariates (constant only) 
Table A-II describes the results from this exercise for routine violence and Table 
A-III provides corresponding results for episodic violence. Most importantly, the spatial 
parameters, ߣ and ߩ are never outside their acceptable range. This suggests that neither 
the spatial lag nor the spatial error models outperform the parsimonious option for the 
year 1999.  
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The coefficients do not change very much between the various models. The 
largest deviance is the coefficient for gcovrel_imr in Table A-II, Model A7, which 
becomes positive and insignificant instead of negative and insignificant.  
We believe these results support our choice to use the logistic regression model 
with a spatial lag component. Overall, since the spatial error model seems unsuited for 
our purpose, we suggest that we do not report these tests in the online appendix. 
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Table A-II. Robustness Tests with Alternative Spatial Controls, Routine Violence 
 Mod A5 Mod A6 Mod A7 Mod A8 Mod A9 Mod A10 
Pop. Growth (c) 2.470 0.174 0.208** 0.214*   
 (1.40) (1.34) (2.80) (2.21)   
Land scarcity (ln) (c) 1.303 0.127 0.0298 0.205   
 (0.74) (0.78) (0.24) (1.64)   
Urban share  (%)  0.0362 0.00570 0.0246 0.00622   
 (0.24) (0.34) (1.66) (0.51)   
Polarization (rel)  1.447 -0.131 -0.0316 -0.157   
 (0.27) (-0.30) (-0.10) (-0.49)   
HI (IMR) (c) -10.43 -0.399 0.0556 -0.154   
 (-0.71) (-0.39) (0.08) (-0.20)   
Vertical inequality (as) 9.064 1.879 2.947** 2.194   
 (0.55) (1.07) (2.59) (1.69)   
GDP /capita (ln) -2.404 -0.178 -0.386 -0.223   
 (-0.97) (-0.76) (-1.66) (-1.29)   
Population (ln)  2.806 0.227 0.171 0.210*   
 (1.64) (1.88) (1.86) (2.35)   
Constant -68.39 -5.430 -6.992** -5.646** 0.299** 0.264* 
 (-1.77) (-2.01) (-3.02) (-2.84) -3.02 -2.5 
Lambda -0.778*** 0.117     
_cons (-3.55) (0.55)     
Sigma 0.264*** 0.297*** 0.453*** 0.453***   
_cons (6.25) (7.05) (7.33) (7.33)   
Rho  -0.459* 0.117     
_cons (-2.06) (0.55)     
N  27 27 27 27 27 27 
NOTE: t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A-III. Robustness Tests with Alternative Spatial Controls, Episodic 
Violence 
 Mod A11 Mod A12 Mod A13 Mod A14 Mod A15 Mod A16 
Pop. Growth (c) -1.017 -0.0675 -0.00197 -0.0753   
 (-0.47) (-0.59) (-0.03) (-0.84)   
Land scarcity (ln) (c) 4.236 0.243 0.312** 0.222   
 (0.90) (1.68) (3.16) (1.95)   
Urban share  (%)  -0.671 -0.0394* -0.0385*** -0.0363**   
 (-1.27) (-2.67) (-3.44) (-3.09)   
Polarization (rel)  10.08 0.539 0.891*** 0.598*   
 (1.22) (1.41) (3.43) (1.98)   
HI (IMR) (c) -2.042 -0.853 -0.631 -0.598   
 (-0.18) (-0.95) (-1.11) (-0.82)   
Vertical inequality (as) -14.42 -1.147 -1.343 -0.761   
 (-0.96) (-0.74) (-1.43) (-0.61)   
GDP /capita (ln) 10.07 0.543* 0.450* 0.501**   
 (1.31) (2.63) (2.49) (3.04)   
Population (ln)  0.196 -0.0245 -0.0911 -0.0628   
 (0.15) (-0.23) (-1.20) (-0.71)   
Constant 78.56 5.577* 5.693** 5.693** 0.222** 0.232* 
 (1.43) (2.33) (3.04) (3.04) -2.9 -2.49 
Lambda -0.791*** -0.0435     
_cons (-4.57) (-0.21)     
Sigma 0.220*** 0.280*** 0.415** 0.415***   
_cons (6.56) (7.24) (7.35) (7.35)   
Rho  -0.282 0.0435     
_cons (-1.29) (0.21)     
N  27 27 27 27 27 27 
NOTE: t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
We have also experimented with Geographically Weighted Regressions models. The 
literature suggests taking the coordinates of the shape centroid for each region, but it 
made more sense to us to code the region capital as the location of each state. Since 
GWR does not take the panel data structure into account, we have moved these capitals 
slightly each year to avoid distances of 0. This is obviously not a sufficient solution to 
the problem. We have tried to run the model for a cross section (all observations from 
2002), which did not give any interesting results. We found no significant bandwidths, 
but the number of observations became very low indeed. 
Computing the GWR model on Stata is non-trivial, and the program does not 
accept negative coordinates. Indonesia was hence moved to the northern hemisphere for 
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this test. A cursory look at the literature indicates that this is the first application of this 
Stata routine on the southern hemisphere.  
The GLM-based module failed to converge. Stata refused to provide ML 
estimates of the local regression, and there is not much we can do about that, except 
accept the fact that we are pushing our data to the point where it is an open question 
whether the answers received are produced by the model or the data. The R 
documentation of this procedure (Bivand 2010, 6) notes that “[t]he use of GWR on 
GLM is only at the initial proof of concept stage, nothing should be treated as an 
accepted method at this stage”. However, we were able to produce results with the OLS-
based module. The initial model is presented in Table A-IV and the final output from 
the Monte Carlo simulations is presented in Table A-V. 
Table A-IV. Initial Regression for GWR Bandwidth Estimation 
 Coef. Std. Err. T P>|t| 
Pop. Growth (c) .0456813 .0262409 1.74 0.083 
Land scarcity (ln) (c) .0087332 .0290385 0.30 0.764 
Urban share  (%)  .0036697 .0027931 1.31 0.190 
Polarization (rel) .0296134 .0736641 0.40 0.688 
HI (IMR) (c) -.0647313 .1820656 -0.36 0.722 
Vertical inequality (as) .2505794 .1580074 1.59 0.114 
GDP /capita (ln) -.0808122 .0507611 -1.59 0.112 
Population (ln) .1191229 .0283054 4.21 0.000 
Temporal lag .4848093 .0521748 9.29 0.000 
Neighboring violence .0256236 .0459442 0.56 0.577 
Constant -2.377293 .6254359 -3.80 0.000 
 
Table A-V. Significance Tests for Non-Stationarity 
Variable Si P-Value 
Pop. Growth (c) 1.6258 0.000 
Land scarcity (ln) (c) 0.0247 0.610 
Urban share  (%)  0.0514 0.010 
Polarization (rel) 0.0050 0.010 
HI (IMR) (c) 0.1429 0.020 
Vertical inequality (as) 0.1828 0.430 
GDP /capita (ln) 0.1670 0.460 
Population (ln) 0.1012 0.010 
Temporal lag 0.0612 0.020 
Neighboring violence 0.0560 0.710 
Constant 0.0732 0.100 
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The overall statistic implies that the local regression beats the global regression 
with a long distance, as the model bandwidth was large and highly significant 
(p<0.0005). The factors that come out significant largely relate to population and 
population density. This is not very surprising. The most densely populated regions are 
also the smallest regions, such as the capital region, which therefore are most proximate 
to other regions and will be the most influenced. Furthermore, each of these local 
regressions are very much influenced by the other observations from the same region. 
The best indicator of this being a problem is that the constant term is the most affected 
variable in the equation. We added fixed effects to the regression to check for this factor. 
First, the difference between the GWR and the global regression is no longer 
significant when we include region dummies. Adding fixed effects has removed most of 
the variance that was attributed to the spatial weights. Our assumption is that this is due 
to the undue weights assigned to observations from the same region but from different 
years. Also, most of the other significant variances are now insignificant. Both the 
temporal and the spatial lags are unaffected by the GWR, which leaves us very optimistic 
with regard to their effectiveness as autocorrelation controls. 
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Table A-VI. Significance Tests for Non-Stationarity 
Variable Si P-Value 
Constant 0.7968 0.805 
_Iprovid_102 0.1145 0.439 
_Iprovid_103 0.0943 0.195 
_Iprovid_104 0.2636 0.000 
_Iprovid_106 0.0558 0.976 
_Iprovid_107 0.2262 0.439 
_Iprovid_108 0.1155 0.195 
_Iprovid_110 0.1432 0.415 
_Iprovid_111 0.3468 0.463 
_Iprovid_112 0.3565 0.024 
_Iprovid_113 0.2719 0.195 
_Iprovid_114 0.2329 0.341 
_Iprovid_115 0.1811 0.463 
_Iprovid_116 0.1793 0.463 
_Iprovid_117 0.0946 0.463 
_Iprovid_118 0.2333 0.268 
_Iprovid_119 0.1102 0.829 
_Iprovid_120 0.1504 0.244 
_Iprovid_121 0.1583 0.341 
_Iprovid_122 0.0304 0.902 
_Iprovid_123 0.2170 0.220 
_Iprovid_124 0.1326 0.610 
_Iprovid_126 0.1111 0.854 
_Iprovid_127 0.2259 0.512 
Pop. Growth (c) 0.0911 0.659 
Land scarcity (ln) (c) 0.1148 0.000 
Urban share  (%)  0.0979 0.122 
Polarization (rel) 0.0014 0.854 
HI (IMR) (c) 0.2211 0.024 
Vertical inequality (as) 0.0807 0.610 
GDP /capita (ln) 0.0207 1.000 
Population (ln) 0.1174 0.512 
Temporal lag 0.0265 0.951 
Neighboring violence 0.0128 0.927 
Constant 0.0084 0.732 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non-lethal events 693 0.83 1.58 0 13 
Lethal events 693 0.68 1.37 0 15 
In-migration (all) 693 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.66 
Rural-Urban migration 693 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.30 
Assets (city mean) 693 0.39 0.10 0.21 0.64 
Education (city mean) 693 6.81 2.31 2.92 12.00 
Public services (city mean) 693 0.59 0.20 0.12 0.95 
Gini (Assets) 693 0.35 0.08 0.14 0.52 
Gini (Education) 693 0.38 0.17 0.10 0.72 
Gini (Public Services) 693 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.77 
MRD, all (Assets) 693 0.07 0.12 -0.24 0.44 
MRD, all (Education) 693 0.04 0.20 -0.37 0.70 
MRD, all (Public Services) 693 0.01 0.09 -0.21 0.54 
MRD, Rural-Urban (Assets) 693 0.20 0.18 -0.29 0.57 
MRD, Rural-Urban (Education) 693 0.37 0.40 -0.36 1.52 
MRD, Rural-Urban (Public Services) 693 0.11 0.14 -0.29 1.00 
City population 693 32.38 36.01 2.04 163.68 
GDP per capita (ln) 693 6.00 0.72 4.39 8.18 
GDP per capita growth 693 0.01 0.05 -0.22 0.14 
Regime type 693 0.61 6.06 -9 9 
Regime type, squared 693 37.08 26.12 0 81 
Distance to nearest conflict (km) 693 1.51 2.40 0 17 
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Appendix B: Cities Covered in Analysis, Event Count (1986–2006)  
City Country 
No.  
events 
No.  
fatal 
%  
fatal 
Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire 41 18 43.9 
Accra Ghana 5 3 60.0 
Addis Ababa Ethiopia 24 19 79.2 
Almaty Kazakhstan 8 3 37.5 
Antananarivo Malagsy Republic 11 5 45.5 
Bamako Mali 10 4 40.0 
Bangkok Thailand 20 3 15.0 
Bishkek Kyrgyz Republic 17 4 23.5 
Brazzaville Congo 21 18 85.7 
Calcutta India 7 3 42.9 
Conakry Guinea 12 5 41.7 
Dakar Senegal 8 4 50.0 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 3 1 33.3 
Dhaka Bangladesh 77 21 27.3 
Harare Zimbabwe 32 5 15.6 
Islamabad Pakistan 26 9 34.6 
Jakarta Indonesia 76 15 19.7 
Johannesburg South Africa 57 30 52.6 
Kampala Uganda 10 9 90.0 
Karachi Pakistan 125 98 78.4 
Kathmandu Nepal 59 21 35.6 
Khartoum Sudan 14 7 50.0 
Kinshasa Zaire 45 22 48.9 
Lagos Nigeria 47 24 51.1 
Lomé Togo 29 15 51.7 
Lusaka Zambia 16 8 50.0 
Manila Philippines 71 28 39.4 
Maputo Mozambique 7 5 71.4 
Mumbai India 19 11 57.9 
Nairobi Kenya 37 9 24.3 
New Delhi India 72 23 31.9 
Niamey Niger 17 5 29.4 
Phnom Penh Cambodia 28 19 67.9 
Yaoundé Cameroun 5 2 40.0 
Total 1,143 534 46.7 
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Appendix C. Relocation of  DHS Survey Sample Points  
Sometimes, a few DHS survey sample points seem slightly dislocated (i.e. they are not 
located on the right side of the border of the administrative unit). For example, in the 
file for Senegal 1992–93 (SNGE22FL), one point was located in the sea, and not in the 
capital region of Dakar. In order to include the survey respondents who belong to this 
location in my calculations, I simply relocated this point using the Editor in ArcGIS, as 
shown in Figure C1 below 
 
Figure C1. Relocation of DHS Survey Sample Point, Example from Senegal      
1992–93 
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Appendix D: DHS Surveys Used to Generate the Migration and Inequality 
Measures  
City Country 
DHS survey 
year 
City respondents 
(N) 
Abidjan Ivory Coast 1994 1,432 
Abidjan Ivory Coast 1998a 1,250 
Accra Ghana 1988 530 
Accra Ghana 1993b 547 
Accra Ghana 1998 617 
Accra Ghana 2003b 731 
Accra Ghana 2008 622 
Addis Ababa Ethiopia 2000 2,015 
Addis Ababa Ethiopia 2005 1,812 
Almaty Kazakhstan 1995 615 
Almaty Kazakhstan 1999 636 
Antananario Malagasy Republic 1992 1,092 
Antananario Malagasy Republic 1997c 1,446 
Antananario Malagasy Republic 2003 2,301 
Bamako Mali 1987 503 
Bamako Mali 1995 1,265 
Bamako Mali 2001 2,067 
Bamako Mali 2006 2,011 
Bangkok Thailand 1987 1,248 
Bishkek Kyrgyz Republic 1997 893 
Brazzaville Congo 2005 2,165 
Calcutta India 1992 c 898 
Calcutta India 1998 1,947 
Calcutta India 2005 3,642 
Conakry Guinea 1999a 1,337 
Conakry Guinea 2005 941 
Dakar Senegal 1986 1,298 
Dakar Senegal 1992 1,506 
Dakar Senegal 1997 1,017 
Dakar Senegal 2005 1,354 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 1991 900 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 1996 666 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 2003c  335 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 2004 386 
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 2007c 717 
Dhaka Bangladesh 1993 583 
Dhaka Bangladesh 1996 558 
Dhaka Bangladesh 1999 970 
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Dhaka Bangladesh 2004 1,125 
Dhaka Bangladesh 2007 1,085 
Harare Zimbabwe 1988c 345 
Harare Zimbabwe 1994a 608 
Harare Zimbabwe 1999 562 
Harare Zimbabwe 2005 1,395 
Islamabad Pakistan 1990 995 
Islamabad Pakistan 2006a 1,597 
Jakarta Indonesia 1987 3,251 
Jakarta Indonesia 1991a 1,813 
Jakarta Indonesia 1994a 1, 805 
Jakarta Indonesia 1997a 1, 784 
Jakarta Indonesia 2002a 1, 882 
Jakarta Indonesia 2007a 1, 722 
Johannesburg South Africa 1998 1,034 
Kampala Uganda 1988 527 
Kampala Uganda 1995 1,151 
Kampala Uganda 2000 597 
Kampala Uganda 2006 846 
Karachi Pakistan 1990 1,059 
Karachi Pakistan 2006 a 1,212 
Kathmandu Nepal 1996 471 
Kathmandu Nepal 2001 305 
Kathmandu Nepal 2006 390 
Khartoum Sudan 1989 1,037 
Kinshasa Zaire 2007 1,666 
Lagos Nigeria 1990 1,369 
Lagos Nigeria 1999b 715 
Lagos Nigeria 2003 3,040 
Lagos Nigeria 2008 1,946 
Lomé Togo 1988c 750 
Lomé Togo 1998 1,417 
Lusaka Zambia 1992 1,042 
Lusaka Zambia 1996 943 
Lusaka Zambia 2001 771 
Lusaka Zambia 2007 660 
Manila Philippines 1993 1,882 
Manila Philippines 1998 1,490 
Manila Philippines 2003 2,168 
Maputo Mozambique 1997 381 
Maputo Mozambique 2003 723 
Mumbai India 1992c 1,699 
Mumbai India 1998 3,191 
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Mumbai India 2005 6,394 
Nairobi Kenya 1989 859 
Nairobi Kenya 1993 367 
Nairobi Kenya 1998 419 
Nairobi Kenya 2003 1,169 
New Dehli India 1992c 3,189 
New Dehli India 1998 2,287 
New Dehli India 2005 3,106 
Niamey Niger 1992 1,347 
Niamey Niger 1998 1,048 
Niamey Niger 2006 1,329 
Phnom Penh Cambodia 2000 621 
Phnom Penh Cambodia 2005 624 
Yaoundé Cameroun 1991 766 
Yaoundé Cameroun 1998 786 
Yaoundé Cameroun 2004 919 
Total 124,534 
All surveys listed are used to generate the terms for relative deprivation and inter-individual inequality. 
However some surveys could not be used to create the figures for in-migration and migrant relative 
deprivation. The reasons for the latter are the following:  aSurvey lacks information on settlement history 
(years lived in city and previous residence type) bSurvey has too few rural-urban migrant respondents in 
the city in question to create meangful figures (<15) cSurvey has information on years lived in city, but 
lacks info on previous residence type.  
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